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N Abstract, - 
The Dutch do not consider themselves to be a warlike nation. Traditionally isolated from 
mainstream European affairs, in 1914 they had no major allegiances that bound them to any 
one side of the conflict. Geographically and economically caught between two of the major 
belligerents, Great Britain and Germany, the Netherlands was constantly vulnerable to attack 
from either side. In adopting a position of neutrality at the beginning of the war, the Dutch 
took a huge gamble. 
The mobilization of the Dutch army offered some deterrent to a possible invader but although 
significant in relation to the size of the Dutch population the Dutch army was far too small to 
offer a realistic long-term deterrent. It therefore fell to the Dutch diplomats to pursue a course 
that would underscore and protect the Dutch neutral position. Whilst the Dutch government 
was forced to compromise and adapt their neutral stance in some areas, as a result of pressure 
from the belligerents and most notably in matters relating to trade and shipping, it had 
complete control over issues relating to internment. The internment of approximately 50,000 
foreign troops in the Netherlands, some for almost the entire four years of the war, provided a 
convenient showcase for the Dutch to demonstrate their adherence to international law and 
their impartiality towards the all of the belligerents. It also allowed the Dutch to demonstrate 
their talents as international peacemakers and negotiators by providing a means for Great 
Britain and Germany to meet and agree treaties, even though at the same time they were still 
fighting a very bloody war. 
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Chapter 1w 
A Neutral Country 
Introduction 
The first two decades of the twentieth century were eventful ones for all of the 
countries of Europe, indeed for most of the countries of the world. For the Netherlands 
they were the decades that defined the position that it wanted to take on the world 
stage: politically involved, important and influential but above all neutral. With its 
history of empire and global trading the Netherlands was used to a position of influence 
in world affairs, indeed her strong links to the Far East and the Americas made her far 
more of a world power than some of her larger European neighbours. By the turn of the 
twentieth century, however, her Empire, both fiscal and political, was on the wane and 
her role as a major player in world affairs was on the decline. Out of this came a new 
role, that of host to a series of international conferences aimed at providing a legal 
framework for the conduct of international relations and, if needed, international war. ` 
The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 established the Netherlands, in Dutch eyes 
'The recommendations from these conferences were enshrined in Dutch law. Tuinen, C. van., 'De 
Mititaire Handhaving van Neutraliteit en Gezag', in Brugmans, Prof. Dr. H., Nederland in den 
Oorlogstfjd, (Amsterdam: Elseviers, 1920). p. 63-102, p. 64. 
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at least, as an unallied but politically savvy nation whose contribution to world affairs 
would no longer depend on military or fiscal clout but on integrity and legality. 2 
As the war clouds gathered over Europe the Netherlands held firm to its belief that it 
was a neutral country and refused to offer its support to any of the major European 
nations. As the threat of a European war grew, the Netherlands held on to its declared 
neutral status whilst at the same time holding talks with its near neighbours about 
defence alliances. Its representatives loudly proclaimed the Dutch intention to remain 
peaceful whilst throughout 1913 its army was holding exercises designed to repel any 
invading troops that crossed the Dutch frontier. Dutch spending on defence in 1914 
was, per capita, twice that of its near neighbour Belgium and a third more than 
Switzerland. ' But when the `Api Api' telegram reached The Hague on 25 July 1914, 
signaling the large scale movement of German troops towards the Dutch and Belgian 
borders, the confidence of the Dutch Cabinet in its ability to remain neutral by 
declaration alone failed and the Dutch army became one of the first to call up all of its 
troops in preparation for war. 
The story of the Api Api telegram is an interesting one. The exact circumstances 
surrounding the telegram, who sent it and why, are unclear, but it is generally accepted 
'There are a number of works available that consider Dutch foreign policy in the period prior to the First 
World War. These include: Vandenbosch, Amry., Dutch Foreign Policy Since 1815. A Study in Small 
Power Politics, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959). Colenbrander, H. T., `De internationale positie 
van Nederland tijdens, voor en na den wereldoorlog', in Brugmans, H., Nederland in den Oorlogstijd, 
(Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1920), Smit C., Hoogtij der neutraliteitspolitiek. De buitenla: ds politick van 
Nederland, 1899-1919, (Leiden: 1959). Smit, C., Nederland in de Ferste Wereldoorlog (Vol 1), 
(Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 1971), Smit, C., Bescheiden betreffende de buitenlands politick van 
Nederland 1848-1919, (dee141914-7, dee151917-19, deel 7 buitenlandse bronnen1914-17 (2 vols) deel 
8 buitenlands bronnen 1917-19 (2 vols), (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), Wels, Cornelis Boudewijn., 
Aloofness and Neutrality, (Utrecht: Hes Publishers, 1982). 
3 Ferguson, Niall., The Pity of War, (London: The Penguin Press, 1998). p. 101. 
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that it was sent by J. J. Le Roy of the Dutch-German Telegraph Company to Forbes 
Wels, a member of the Dutch General Staff. 4 The phrase Api Api translates as Fire Fire 
in Malaysian and was clearly intended as a warning of an imminent threat to the 
Netherlands. Informal intelligence gathering was usual at this time but it is not clear 
exactly what threat this telegram was alerting the Dutch government to. It was some 
five days after the telegram was received that the Dutch Army finally mobilized, so it 
could be argued that the warning had not been taken as urgent. Nevertheless, the 
telegram was considered important enough for Snijders, the Dutch Commander-in- 
Chief and Bosboom, the Dutch Minister of War, to mention it in their later 
recollections of the mobilisation period. ' 
The Dutch army remained mobilized for the entire duration of the war. Its numbers 
increased, by conscription, as the threat to Dutch security increased, but at times of low 
threat the soldiers were released for short periods to go home. Even in times of war the 
harvest had to be gathered, children were born and businesses needed attending to. The 
political and cultural life of the country continued. This mobilization was not the only 
impact that the First World War would have on the Netherlands. Its close proximity to 
the fighting meant that although never actually invaded by foreign troops, a large 
number of soldiers from both sides of the conflict would cross Dutch borders in search 
4 Van Tuyll van Serooskerken Hubert, P., `Inside Knowledge: Api-Api and the Netherlands' 
Mobilization', hup: iimven. cc. ukana_edu/-kansitefww one/co ment/tilyll /, (14 June 2000) 
1997. p. 4 and Woltring, J., 'De Berste jaren van de Militaire Inlichtingendienst', Militaire Spectator, 
134, (1965), p. 566-571, p. 567. 
s See Bosboom, N., In Moeilijke Omstandigheden, augustus 1914-reel 1917, ( Gorinchem: J. Noorduyn 
& Zoon, 1933). p. 2&6 and Snijders, `Mobilisatie-Herinneringen 1914-18' No 16 IMG DC 91A/3 May 
1931. Interestingly, a similar telegraph sent to the Governor General of the Netherlands Indies from an 
unknown source claiming that the Japanese fleet had entered Wijnkoops Baal on the south coast of West 
Java proved to be an elaborate hoax. Dijk, Kees, Van., The Netherlands Indies and the Great War, 1914- 
1918, (Leiden, K1TLV Press, 2007). p. 125. 
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of refuge and often medical help. It is these troops, and the Dutch reaction to them, that 
will form the basis of this thesis. 
Neutrality in a time of 'Total War' 
It is easy to see the two decades before 1914 only in terms of their eventual 
consequences for the First World War. The old orders were weakening, and in their 
place new movements and ideals were emerging that were supported by the advance of 
modem technology and an increasing ease in communications that was starting to 
shrink the world in a way that had not been seen before. This viewpoint is perhaps 
valid for those nations that fought in the war and suffered heavy losses. Other 
countries, like the Netherlands, who declared and maintained a neutral stance 
throughout the war, saw this period in a different way. International affairs after 1900 
can be viewed both as a time when the initial steps were taken in a drama that could 
only lead to war and also as a period of time when changing attitudes and the rise of 
international organisations and diplomatic alliances appeared to make a global war not 
only unlikely but also impossible. 6 With hindsight, Hosbawm writes about the First 
World War as a `zero sum game', a war without limits and one that was fought in a 
manner which would only ensure total victory or total loss. 7 The adoption of this `all or 
nothing' attitude by the belligerents had several consequences for the neutral countries, 
6 Roberts, J. M., Europe 1880-1945, (London and New York: Longman, 1994, second edition). p. 253 
Kennedy, Paul., The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, (London: Fontana Press, 1989), p. 322, Ponting, 
Clive,. Thirteen Days, (London: Pimlico, 2003). p. xi-x., Ogley, Roderick., The Theory and Practice of 
Neutrality in the Twentieth Century, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970). p. 33. Keegan, John,. The 
First World War, (London: Random House, 1998). p. 10. and Maier, C. S., 'Wargames: 1914-1919' 
Rotberg, Robert, I., & Rabb, Theodore, K., (eds) The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). p. 256. 
7 Hosbawm, Eric,. The Age of Extremes, The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991, (London: Abacus, 
1995). p. 29. 
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not least economic, geographical and political (all of which are dealt with at later points 
in this thesis). The main consequence of this attitude for the Netherlands in the summer 
of 1914 was that unlike a regional conflict a `total war' could not be avoided by simply 
remaining out of the fighting. Nor, unfortunately, could it, or any of the smaller 
neutrals, confidently rely entirely on international law to protect their position. From 
the very first days of the war there was always the possibility that one of the belligerent 
nations, fighting an all out war, would ignore the restraints of international law and put 
its own interests before that of the international community or, more specifically, any 
small neutral nation that got in its way. Marwick has also defined total war as a time of 
vast disruption and destruction that tested the existing social and political structures and 
what was to become increasing apparent as the war progressed, was that as well as 
placing a great strain on their diplomatic relations the neutrals, and the Netherlands 
especially, would feel the impact of this `total war' on almost every aspect of their 
internal and domestic affairs. 8 
As the host of two major conferences in 1899 and 1907 which were intended to reduce 
the possibility of war, the Netherlands could be forgiven for hoping that future conflicts 
would be resolved around a table rather than on a battlefield. A belief in the rule of law 
prevailed. " The unsatisfactory conclusion of the 1907 conference, however, did perhaps 
cast a shadow on the Dutch view of a peaceful Europe. The failure to agree on a naval 
limitation treaty and the subsequent intensification of the German/Anglo naval race 
was just one example of negotiation, however well intentioned, failing to achieve its 
8 Beckett. Ian F. W., `Total War', Emersley, Clive, Marwick, Arthur, & Simpson, Wendy, War, Peace 
and Social Change in Twentieth-Century Europe, (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1994), p2. 
9 Keegan,. The First World War. p. 8. 
12 
aim. 1° There have been many volumes written about the years leading up to the First 
World War and the causes of the war. " Amongst the many divergent opinions offered 
on the most important features of the period and the most likely causes of the conflict, 
one thing remains constant. None of the major works on the pre-war period or the 
causes of the war devotes any significant attention to the European Neutrals. In a few 
of these books the emergence of America as a world power earns it some discussion, 
but the Netherlands and its Scandinavian neighbours only feature as shaded areas on 
maps of the time. To many historians the Netherlands' only claim to significance in the 
early years of the new century was as a venue for the 1899 and 1907 conferences. 
Tuchman sums up the mood quite successfully when she describes the choice of the 
1899 conference venue as being `The Hague, as the capital of a small neutral 
country' 12 
So what was that `small neutral country' like in the decades before the war? In 1913 
The Netherlands celebrated a jubilee, one hundred years since the House of Orange had 
retuned to reclaim and revitalise Dutch independence after years of French and Spanish 
influence. In those one hundred years the Netherlands had once again regained its 
10 Kennedy, Paul., The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism 1860-1914, (New York: Humanity Books, 
1980). p. 442 and Beckett, 'Total War', p. 30. 
" Amongst the many books written about the origins of the First World War a few that cover the 
diplomatic elements as well as the purely military are: Hosbawn, Eric,. The Age of Extremes, The Short 
Twentieth Century 1914-1991, London: Abacus 1995) Schaepdrijver, Sophie, de., De Groote Oorlog; het 
konrijk Belgic tijdens de groote oorlog, (Amsterdam and Antwerp: Atlas, 1997)' Tuchmau, B., August 
1914, (London: Macmillan), Tuchman, B., The Proud Tower. A portrait of the world before the war. 
1890-1914, (Toronto: 1966), Liddle-Hart, Sir Basil., The Great War, (London: Macmillan, 1997), 
Keegan, John,. The First World War, (London: Random House, 1998), Gilbert, Martin,. First World War, 
(London: Harper Collins, 1995). The implications of the Schlieffen Plan as a major cause of the war are 
covered by Maier, ' Wargames: 1914-1919', p. 253. 
12 Tuchman, The Proud Tower, p. 255. Little changes, Macmillan, writing in 2001 about the Netherlands 
in 1919 uses exactly the same phrase. Macmillan, Margaret., Peacemakers, (London: John Murray, 
200I). p. 174. 
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`zelfstandigheid'. 13 The Dutch economy was considerably more stable, with far more 
potential than it had had at the end of French rule and with social reform very much a 
feature of the political agenda. 14 Under the influence of King William I (1813-1840) the 
Dutch had begun to look towards investing their money at home or in the Dutch 
colonies instead of in foreign ventures. The long-standing tradition of investment 
overseas was curbed, and more thought given to building an industrial base in the 
homeland. By 1910 there was more of the active working population employed in 
industry (32%) than in the traditional occupations of agriculture and fishing (28.4%). '5 
The infrastructure of the country was improved and attempts were made to reduce the 
Netherlands' dependence on foreign trade simply to feed her growing population. This 
growth was by no means smooth. Although the trend over the period was continual 
growth it was not constant. The period after 1900 saw far more rapid growth in many 
areas than the in the century before. Conflict amongst Dutch trading partners, weather 
and outbreaks of disease all hindered the growth of the Dutch economy. 16 In 1913, 
however, the Dutch economy could be described as blooming, as illustrated by the 
opening of the new stock exchange in Amsterdam, and yet for all this the Netherlands 
was still very reliant on overseas trade, especially trade with her European 
neighbours. " The growth of Rotterdam to a port of world status was due almost 
"There is no direct translation into English for this term. A mix of self-reliance, independence and 
neutrality it defines how the Dutch viewed themselves and occurs frequently in writings on this period of 
history and again in work on the Netherlands role in the Second World War. Smit, Nederland in de 
Eerste Wereldoorlog Vol 1 p. 2 and Moore, Bob., 'The Posture of an Ostrich? Dutch Foreign Policy on 
the eve of the Second World War' Diplomacy and Statecraft Vol 3 (Nov 1992), p. 468-493, p. 468. 
"a De Vries De Nederlandse Economie 7ijdens de 20ste Eeuw, (Kappellen: Uitgeverij De Nederiandsche 
Boekhandel, 1973). p. 10-12. 
" Moeyes, Paul. Buiten Schot, Nederland ti; jdens de 1914-1918 Eerste Wereldoorlog, (Amsterdam: 
Uitgeverij de Arbeiderspers, 2001). p. 16 
1e A good overview of the period can be found in De Vries, De Nederlandse Economie Tjdens de 20ste 
Eeuw. p. 63-71. 
"There are several good general histories of the Netherlands available that cover this period. Amongst 
them are; Blom, J. C. H., & Lambert., E. (eds. ), Geschiedenis van de Nederlanden, (Rijswijk: 
Universitaire Pers Rotterdam, 1994), Kossmart, E. H., De lags Landen 1780-1980, (Amsterdam: 
14 
entirely to trade with Germany. As Moyes says, `the Dutch economy grew thanks to 
German trade, and for Germany the port of Rotterdam was the gateway to the world 
economy'. 18 
Having shaken off the French and Spanish influence the Netherlands was faced with a 
new dilemma, what role would it now play on the international stage? Commenting on 
the changing shape of international politics in a speech in 1897 the then British 
Minister of Colonies, Joseph Chamberlain, said ` that the tendency of the time is to 
throw all power into the hands of the greater empires, and the minor kingdoms - those 
which are non-progressive - seem to fall into a secondary and subordinate place... s19. 
Reluctant to be aligned with the group of small independent states like Sweden, 
Luxemburg, Switzerland and Belgium and be consigned to the second rank in 
international relations, the Netherlands government held on to the view that as a 
colonial power their country deserved more status and a greater role in international 
affairs. 20 Unlike the other small neutral nations the Netherlands did not look to one or 
more of the larger European powers to guarantee its neutrality. It placed its faith in 
international law and, rather naively, its own ability to defend itself if attacked. Ogley 
identifies four types of neutral states. The first of these are `neutralized' states such as 
Belgium and Sweden, which have their neutrality imposed and guaranteed by 
international treaty. Secondly he identifies the `traditonal' neutrals as states that are 
neutral by choice but which, because their neutrality is not guaranteed by other states, 
Olympus, 1986), Colenbrander, T. H., Nederland in de wereldpolitiek van 1900 tot heden, (1936), Smit, 
Bescheiden betreffende de buitenlands politiek van Nederland 1848-1919. (deel 4 1914-7, deel S 1917- 
19, dee17 buitenlands bronnen1914-17 (2 vols) dee18 buitenlands bronnen 1917-19 (2 vols), 
`8 Moeyes, Buiten Schot p. 16. The shipping traffic through Dutch ports had grown by 120% between 
1870 and 1890 and in the next twenty years it grew a further 240%. De Vries, De Nederlandse Economie 
Tijdens de 20ste Eeuw, p. 65 
" Kennedy, Paul., The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, p. 251 
20 loll, James., Europe Since 1870 (fourth edition), (London: Penguin, 1990). p. 23 
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retain the right to forsake neutrality and enter into a war if they so wishes. The third 
category is of `ad hoc' neutrals, states which change their neutral status according to 
the conflict or who simply have not yet established a strong tradition of neutrality. The 
final group, according to Ogley, are the non-aligned states, those states who may well 
be active participants in a war but which, because they are fighting as an individual 
state and not as part of some larger alliance, can also be considered as a neutral. The 
Netherlands falls into the category of a `traditional' neutral. It has a strong tradition as a 
neutral, as does Switzerland, but unlike Switzerland the Netherlands retained the right 
to decide on its own neutral status without having to refer to any guarantors. Ogley 
identifies ad hoc neutrals as being the most at risk during a conflict but goes on to 
comment that even those states with a prior history of neutrality `can be very insecure 
in time of war'. 21 Professor Colenbrander, a prominent Dutch historian of the time said, 
The inclination towards self-reliance is deeply entrenched in the Dutch, as is 
their absolute right over their own property. We feel we are our own people, 
with our own wishes and are pleased that this is so. We do not desire another's 
goods and do not wish to impose on another's freedom; political opportunity 
has no attraction for us. We pose no threat to others and wish only to be left in 
peace. We do not seek the world, and are dismayed when the world does not 
recognise this. 
Unlike the Scandinavian neutrals, the Netherlands had the significance of its geography 
to consider. Not only was it positioned in the middle of the three great European 
powers, Germany, France and Great Britain, it also controlled the mouths of three of 
the major European rivers, the Rhine, the Maas and the Schelde. These rivers were all 
major trading routes and their closures would have serious economic consequences for 
21 Moeyes, Buiten Schot, p. 28, Ogley, The Theory and Practice of Neutrality in the Twentieth Century. 
p. 3. 
22. Colenbrander, De Internationale Positie van Nederland lijdens, Voor, en Na den Wereldoorlog quoted 
in Moeyes, Buiten Schot. p. 27. 
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all European nations, not just the Netherlands. In The Rise and Fall of the Great 
Powers Kennedy considers the elements which contribute towards a state's ability to 
survive a war, whether as a bystander or as a participant He sites geography, proximity 
to the crisis, the number of potential enemies and the number of directions that they 
might advance from. He also considers the states participation in international 
alliances. Although Kennedy is referring to the major nations in early twentieth century 
Europe these issues are all equally valid when applied to the Netherlands. ' Any army 
invading the Netherlands would need to be certain that it could capture, and hold, all of 
the crucial rivers. To lose them to an opposing force would be unthinkable. Better then 
to have the Netherlands neutral and her ports open to all, than to risk exclusion if the 
port fell into enemy hands. Likewise, the Netherlands had her colonies to consider. If 
Germany was the Netherlands' main trading partner within Europe then Great Britain 
was the only nation with a navy capable of taking, or protecting, the Dutch colonies (or 
at least the trade routes). ' British activities in the Boer War had upset many of the 
Dutch but whilst their fight against the Afrikaners might well have made them natural 
enemies of the Netherlands the needs of the Dutch colonies kept them as allies, if not 
friends. '5 
Whilst this self-reliance appealed to the Dutch sense of national identity it was a risky 
game to play. The idea of a `neutral' Netherlands crossed both political and religious 
boundaries. In many ways it was a concept that unified what would otherwise have 
2' Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, p. 253 
2` Germany could be seen as the greatest threat to Dutch colonies. Bulow, the German Chancellor 
declared in 1895 that `The question is not whether we want to colonize or not, but that we must 
colonize. 'Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, p. 272 
25 Abbenhuis Maartje., The Art of Staying Neutral, The Netherlands in the First World War, 
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006). p. 26, Moeyes, Buiten Schot, p. 30 
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been opposing factions within Dutch society. 26 The Dutch army was relatively small 
compared to the major European powers and the main line of defence was the 
`waterline' (waterline), a plan to flood a central section of the Netherlands and produce 
a natural barricade from behind which the key cities and ports in the west could be 
defended. The area behind this line was known as Vesting Holland (Fortress Holland). 
As it took several days for these floodwaters to rise to a realistic level for defence, a 
major requirement for any army invading the Netherlands was that it should be slow 
moving and give adequate notice of its intention to invade. Modern technology had also 
reduced the effectiveness of this defence line. As artillery now had a greater range 
Amsterdam was more vulnerable to attack. ' Nevertheless Struycken, the prominent 
professor of international law from Leiden University, regarded this position of 
neutrality as not only vital for the Netherlands but also for the whole of Europe. He had 
full regard for the Dutch geographical position and did not underestimate the 
importance of the Rhine delta for European trade. ' 
Although outwardly remaining firmly attached to their neutral stance, events within 
Europe after 1900 did give rise to debate within the Netherlands that questioned the 
policy. The idea that any country could stand alone without allies was unusual at this 
time. Most governments believed that if war came it would be fought by large 
alliances. ' For example, when the German Keiser Wilhelm 11 landed at Tangiers in 
1905, the young Queen Wilhemina called a meeting of her ministers to discuss the 
implications of a possible German/French conflict. Kuyper, the leader of the coalition 
26 Abbenhuis, The Art of Staying Neutral, p. 29, Kossman, De Lage Landen, p. 545. 
2' Abbenhuis The Art of Staying Neutral, p. 40 
28 Karnebeek, Van, H. A., De internationale positiv van Nederland in de halste veertig jaren, (The 
Hague: Van Stockum, 1938) p. 10-11 and Smit , Nederland in 
de Eerste Wereldoorlog, p.! 
' Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers p. 321. 
18 
government from 1901-1905, records that although the Netherlands stuck fast to its 
neutral status, consideration was given as to which of the European powers would 
make the best ally. The conclusion reached was that a good ally in time of peace is not 
necessarily the best ally in time of war, and in the absence of a clear choice then doing 
nothing and adhering to the neutral policy was by far the best action. 30 The same policy 
had been used earlier during the Boer War. The strong Dutch links with the white 
Boers had placed great pressure on the Dutch government to declare support for the 
Boers and to stand against Great Britain 3' Despite some pressure from their own 
population the government held firm, refusing even to impose strong economic 
sanctions. 32 
Whilst the official government line was a fine adherence to neutrality, individuals 
within the government and the military had differing views on how realistic this policy 
would be in the event of war. ' Hendrikus Colijn, the Dutch Minister of War between 
1911 and 1913 saw the modernisation and training of the existing military forces as 
essential for a speedy response to any potential invaders, a view many regarded as pro- 
British. His views are regarded as at odds with those of Kuyper, the Christian 
Democratic politician and former Prime Minister, who initiated plans to greatly 
strengthen the coastal defences. To achieve this, the cabinet had voted some forty 
million guilders in 1910 to build fortifications at Flushing, but it generated much 
30 Smit , Nederland in de Eerste Wereldoorlog, p. 2 3' PRO CAB 17/69 11 August 1905. Letter from Sir Henry Howard, the British Minister to the 
Netherlands to Sir Thomas Sanderson, the Permanent Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
detailing the 'dreadfully and unreasonably anti-English' sentiment amongst the Dutch media and the 
public. Cited in Frey, Marc., 'Anglo-Dutch Relations During the First World War', in Ashton, Nigel et 
al. (eds. ), Unspoken Allies, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2001), p. 59-84, p61. 
32 Moeyes, Buiten Schot, p. 30 and Abbenhuis The Art of Staying Neutral, p. 28 
33 See Leeuw, A. S. de., Nederkmd in de wereldpolitiek van 1900-36, (Nijmegen, Sun 1975 and 1936) and 
Langeveld, H. J., 'Abraham Kuyper, Hendrikus Colijn, and the Dutch Foreign Policy, 1901-1914', Uutch 
Crossings, No 48, (Autumn 1992), p. 5-19 
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debate. Whist Kuypers has traditionally been viewed as pro-German and Colijn as pro- 
British this view has been questioned. 34 Troelstra, the leader of the Dutch Social 
Democratic Party was one of those who were very much against this plan. " If the 
Netherlands was to be neutral and was protected by international law why was this 
money being spent? This money might be better used for other purposes - like welfare. 
More significantly there was much concern that a move to strengthen the coastal forts, 
clearly to repel any attack by Great Britain, would be seen as an overtly pro-German 
move and would, in fact, prompt Britain into launching such an attack. The discussions 
surrounding the fortification at Flushing created a major political storm. The matter 
was addressed in the British Parliament, where concern was expressed that the building 
of such a fort would inhibit British access to Antwerp should Belgium be invaded, and 
received much coverage in the German and British press ' In the event, the planned 
strengthening of the forts never took place as the outbreak of war in 1914 dictated 
another agenda. General C. J. Snijders, the Dutch Army Commander-in-Chief during the 
First World War was also of the opinion that whilst a policy of neutrality was 
politically appealing, in reality it was completely impractical. " In the years prior to the 
outbreak of war he engaged the Dutch army in a series of military exercises that were 
' Langeveld, 'Abraham Kuyper, Hendrikus Colijn, and the Dutch Foreign Policy, 1901-1914', p. 5-19 
gives a good overview of the background and the current debate. 
35 Vandenbosch, Amry., The Neutrality of the Netherlands during the World War, (Michigan: 
W. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1927). p. 101 
3` Many historians have written on the topic, amongst them are: Klinkers, W., 'Met de pen of met het 
zwaard, Militaire middelen en de verdediging van de neutraliteit 1910-1914', Binneveld, Hans., 
Kraaijestein, Martin., et el., Leven naast de catastrofe, (Hilversum, Verloren, 2001). p. 17. Vandenbosch, 
The Neutrality of the Netherlands during the World War, p. 101, Frey `Anglo-Dutch Relations During the 
First World War' and Ferguson, The Pity of War, p. 67. 
"De Vries, W. Dr., 'Nederland als Non-beligerente Natie en de Internering van Buitenlandse Militairen 
Gedurende de Ferste Wereldoorlog', Mededelingen van de Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis Landmachtstaf 
Dee13, le en 2e of levering, (1980). p. 83 
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designed to prepare them for an attack on one or other of their borders. ' Dutch 
intelligence on a possible attack was limited, but such information as Snijders managed 
to gain all pointed to an attack by Germany as the most likely. A similar view is held 
by a number of modern historians. Kennedy talks of the `latent German threat to the 
Low Countries and Northern France' and Berghahn argues that in the years 
immediately before the war German intentions switched back from the colonies to 
Continental Europe. -' In The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism 1860-1914 
Kennedy also comments, albeit indirectly, on Dutch vulnerability to attack simply by 
being in the path of the German wish to expand into France 40 Snijders also believed 
that the Netherlands was incapable of repelling a German attack and that if Great 
Britain then launched a counter-attack on Dutch soil the neutral Netherlands would 
suffer greatly, sandwiched between these two warring nations. His opinion was that in 
the event of an attack by either side the best option for the Netherlands would be to 
swiftly align themselves with the one country that he believed could win such a 
conflict; Germany. Snijders was considered by many to be pro-German as were a 
section of the Dutch army's more junior officers. "' Snijders constantly petitioned the 
Dutch Cabinet, both before and during the war, for a formal commitment to his 
proposed policy. Each time the matter was raised, however, the government held firm 
to its declared policy. The Netherlands was neutral and would remain so, even if it 
' Klinkert, Met de pen of met de zwaard. p. 15, Abbenhuis, The Art of Staying Neutral, p. 39-41 and 
Snijders, C. J., ` Nederlands militaire positie gedurende den wereldoorlog', Militaire Spectator, 92, 
(1923), p. 536-566, p. 536. 
-' Kennedy The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers p. 274 and Berghahn, V. R., Germany and the 
Approach of War, (London: Macmillan, 1973). p. 165 and p. 168. See also Van Tuyll van Serooskerken, 
Hubert, P., 'The Dutch Mobilization of 1914: Reading the "Enemy"s Intentions', The Journal of 
Military History, No 64, (July 2000). p. 711-738. 
40 Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism 1860-1914 p. 233, p. 445 and p. 451. 
" Abbenhuis, The Art of Staying Neutral p. 81 & 82 and De Vries, `Nederland als Non-beligerente Natie 
en de Internering van Buitenlandse Militairen Gedurende de Eerste Wereldoorlog', p. 83. 
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found itself fighting invading armies on two flanks. " Snijders was not the only 
interested party looking for a firm affirmation that the Netherlands would pick sides in 
the event of an invasion. A group of Cabinet Ministers wanted to ensure that Holland 
would always side with the Allies as a means of safeguarding Dutch independence 
from Germany. 4-' 
THE STRUGGLE FOR WORLD POWER - And the position of the neutrals. By 
Albert Hahn, the Dutch political cartoonist. ' 
Smit, Nederland in de Eerste Wereld Oorlog. Part 2 p. 14, Abbenhuis, The Art of Staving Neutral p. 82, 
Van Tuyll, `The Dutch Mobilization of 1914', p. 713 and p. 718 and Snijders, ' Nederlands militaire 
positie gedurende den wereldoorlog', p. 536. 
°' Kossman De Lage Landen, p. 547-9. Ogley also works on the basis that a neutral nation, if attacked, 
needs to call on the assistance of the `other side' to help repel the invader. Ogley, The Theory and 
Practice of Neutrality in the Twentieth Century, p. 15. 
44 http: // vww. greatwar. nl/ 28.08.2008 Cartoons by Albert Hahn (1887-1918) were featured regularly in 
the Dutch press during the war. 
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July 1914 
It is difficult to assess the level of Dutch intelligence regarding the prospect of an 
invasion into the Netherlands in 1914. The strong public stance of impartiality and 
neutrality that the government had pursued since the turn of the century had made it 
hard to justify collecting information on possible aggressors, at least officially. It seems 
highly likely, however, that the Dutch were aware of the 1905 Von Schlieffen plan 
which included a German invasion of Dutch Limburg as part of an overall German plan 
to invade Belgium. As early as 1877 the British Foreign Secretary had predicted that in 
the event of a German attack on France `we may be fighting for Holland before two 
years are out'. °S What seems less likely is any knowledge of the Chief of the German 
General Staff, Helmuth von Moltke's, later revision that took the attacking German 
forces around the Netherlands. * Most of the intelligence on the increasingly fragile 
European situation that made its way back to the Netherlands seems to have been as a 
result of informal enquiries. Snijders certainly had his contacts in Germany and as 
Dutch officers were often invited to make visits to German military units for the 
purpose of `observation' it is reasonable to assume that his information was relatively 
accurate. Businessmen and holidaymakers were also asked to report back on things 
`5 Fortuin, J. A., 'Nederland en het Schlieffenplan. Len onderzoek naar de positie van Nederland in het 
Duitse aanvalsplan voor de Eerste Wereldoorlog', Militaire Spectator, 149 (1980), p. 21. Abbenhuis, The 
Art of Staying Neutral p. 65 and Moeyes, Buiten Schot, p. 80, Ponting, Thirteen Days, p. 45, Cecil, G., Life 
of Robert Marquis of Salisbury, 4 Vols (London: 1921-1923). VollI, p. 126-9 p. 373 quoted in Kennedy, 
Paul., The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism 1860-1914, p. 133 and p. 493 and Ferguson, The Pity of 
War, p. 88. 
46 Abbenhuis, The Art of Staying Neutral p. 65, Moeyes, Buiten Schot, p. 80, Ponting, Thirteen Days p. 46, 
Oostendorp, Th., 'Duitsland en de Nederlandse neutralieit 1914-18', Militaire Spectator 134, (1965) and 
Fortuin, JA., 'Nederland en het Schlieffenplan. Een onderzoek naar de positie van Nederland in het 
Duitse aanvalsplan voor de Eerste Wereldoodog', Militaire Spectator, 149 (1980), p. 21-35. 
p. 229-223. Kennedy claims that although the Schlieffen Plan had been in existence for some time, it was 
only the massive increase in the strength of the German army in 1913 that made the plan feasible. 
Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism 1860-1914, p. 448 and Smit, Nederland in de 
Eerste Wereld Oorlog. Part 2 p. 4. 
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they might have seen during their travels. Likewise embassy staff, not allowed to 
collect intelligence in any official capacity, often passed information privately to 
friends in the government or military. 47 
The gaps in Dutch intelligence gathering become apparent, however, when, in the 
middle of July 1914, Snijders was allowed to leave the Netherlands for three weeks 
holiday in Scandinavia, with the full approval of the Dutch government for his absence. 
The timing of Snijders' vacation indicates that most of his reliable (in his view) 
intelligence came from Germany, as many of the leading German military figures were 
also on holiday at this time"a After hearing of Austria-Hungary's ultimatum he 
immediately began his journey back to the Netherlands but did not actually make it 
back to Dutch soil until after the start of the Dutch mobilisation. In the meantime, as 
soon as the Minister of War, Bosboom, was told of the `Api Api' telegram and its 
implications in the early hours of 26 July 1914 he gave instructions for an immediate 
partial mobilisation. 49Snijders returned home the following day, 27 July. SO 
On 27 July 1914 Queen Wilhemina called a meeting of her ministers and it was agreed 
that the government would issue a statement reaffirming Dutch neutrality. At the same 
time plans were put in place for a full mobilisation on 1 August unless the international 
situation rapidly improved, something it was not expected to do. The population of the 
Netherlands was, understandably, nervous. The financial markets dropped rapidly in 
One of the best assessments of the state of Dutch intelligence gathering in the pre-war period can be 
found in Hubert Van Tuyll van Serooskerken's 'The Dutch Mobilization of 1914: Reading the "Enemy's 
Intentions',. p. 711-738. Klinker[ and Abbenhuis also consider the topic in their work on the mobilisation. 
"ý. Berghahn, V. R., Germany and the Approach of War. p. 190. 
49 Bosboom, In Moeilijke omstandigheden, p. 2. 
30 Abbenhuis, The Art of Staying Neutral, p. 64. 
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the expectation of war. 5' As a trading nation the Netherlands would be hard hit if the 
seas were no longer safe for her merchant ships. Measures were put in place by the 
Dutch Minister of Finance, Treub, both to try and prevent any run on the banks and to 
try and stabilise the financial markets. Once the mobilisation had been announced 
many Netherlanders started to stockpile food and other essentials. They also withdrew 
their savings from the Dutch banks, demanding that they be given hard currency and 
not paper money. The Dutch stocks of copper and silver coins were severely reduced 
and this shortage of coins in circulation lasted throughout the war as the cautious Dutch 
placed more trust in a bag of coins under the mattress than paper money in a bank. 'Z By 
this time the situation in Europe looked very grim and the Dutch government, along 
with the Dutch public, were very afraid that an invasion was imminent. On 29 July the 
Stock market was closed. 53 For many this was a very visible and significant step. As the 
diarist Ritter, says `The Amsterdam stock market closed! Now the crisis is a reality! '. 34 
It remained closed until 1916. Although the initial reaction of the Dutch financial sector 
to the turbulent events of July 1914 was panic, the situation was soon stabilised by the 
actions of Treub and the Dutch business leaders working together to restore stability 
and confidence. ' This was achievable because none of those in a position to influence 
the financial situation, least of all the Ministry of Finance, believed that any outbreak 
of hostilities would last for very long. m 
51 Van Dijk, The Netherlands Indies and the Great War, 1914-1918, p. 131 and Brugmans, H., 
Geschiedenis van Nederland order de Regeering van Koningin Wilhelmina, (Amsterdam, Scheltens & 
Giltay, no date). p. 120. 
' Abbenhuis, The Art of Staying Neutral, chapter 3, p. 68, Moeyes, Buiten Schot, p. 53 and Van Dijk, The 
Netherlands Indies and the Great War, 1914-1918, p. 131. 
De Vries, De Nederlandse Economie Tijdens de 20ste Eeuw, p73. 
Ritter, P. H., De Donkere Poort, (The Hague: D. A. Daamen's Uitgeversmaatschappij N. V., 1931). p. 21. 
Van Dijk, The Netherlands Indies and the Great War, 1914-1918, p. 133. 
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As an indication of the seriousness of the situation the Dutch government made further 
resolutions that it felt reflected the grim times facing Europe. The celebrations for the 
birthdays of both the Queen and the Queen Mother were cancelled, no flags were to be 
flown from public buildings on those two days and all expressions of public joy on 
festive days were also prohibited. ' It is arguable whether this public admission of 
concern and austerity helped or hindered the growing anxiety in the country. 
Nevertheless the government clearly felt that any frivolity was inappropriate at this 
time. 
The Dutch options were limited. Even with the existing Dutch forces fully mobilized 
the chances of repelling an attack by any of the three main contenders for a breach of 
57 http: //www. wereldoorlog 1418. nI/Iokale-noden/index. html 24 August 2008. 
'Van Dijk, The Netherlands Indies and the Great War, 1914-19/8, p. 128. 
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Panic at the Netherlands Bank in Amsterdam - August 1914' 
the Dutch borders, Germany, Great Britain or France, were s1im. 5' Snijders, the most 
knowledgeable and realistic critic of Dutch military capabilities, believed that the 
Netherlands had neither the manpower nor the equipment to defend its own borders 
without forming an alliance. In 1914 the Netherlands had only a combined military and 
naval strength of 200,000.60 Many of these were conscripts or recent volunteers. In 
comparison France had a total strength of 910,000, Russia 1,352,000, Britain 532,000 
and Germany 891,000.61 Whilst as a declared neutral the Dutch could mobilize without 
it being seen by the major powers as an act of war, any attempt to form an alliance with 
any nation other than another neutral would have been seen as a declaration of intent to 
join a war, should hostilities begin. On 29 July the Dutch Foreign Minister, Loudon, 
contacted the Belgian Ambassador in The Hague and suggested that the two countries 
form a defence union in the event of one or both of them being attacked ' The Belgian 
government did not respond immediately, in fact it was four days later before it replied 
and by then Germany had issued a declaration acknowledging the Netherlands' 
neutrality. 6' Having also rejected out of hand a British statement that the British 
government would aid the Netherlands in the event of an attack, the Dutch government 
s' The details of the mobilisation can be found in Abbenhuis, The Art of Staying Neutral, chapter 3, p. 61- 
94, Klinkert, `Met de pen of met het zwaard, Militaire middelen en de verdediging van de neutraliteit 
1910-1914', Binneveld, Hans., Kraaijestein, Martin., et el., Leven naast de catastrofe, p. 13-26, 
Oosterman, J. T., `De lnterneering hier to lande' in Kooiman, J (ed. ), De Nederlandsche Strijdlvnacht en 
Hare Mobilisatie in 1914, (Arnham: Herman de Ruiter, 1922) p. 801-843, Klinkert, W. & Schultens, 
J. W. M. & De Vos, L. (eds)., Mobilisatie in Nederland en Belgier 1870-1914-1939, (Amsterdam: De 
Braafsche Leeuw, 1991), Kooiman, J., De Nederlandsche Strjjdmacht en hare Mobilisatie in het jaar 
1914, (Purmerend), Munnekrede, PJ. van., `De Mobilisatie van de Landmacht', Brugmans, H., 
Nederland in den Oorlogstijd, (Amsterdam: Elsivier, 1920). For a view of the mobilisation given by 
someone who lived through it see Ritter, De Donkere Poort. 
60 Snijders, C. J., ` Nederlands militaire positie gedurende den wereldoorlog', p. 541. 
62 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. p. 261. 
62 Moeyes, Buiten Schot, p. 81, Ponting, Thirteen Days, p. 168 and Smit, Nederland in de Ferste Wereld 
Oorlog. Part 2 p. 5 & 6. 
Moeyes, Buiten Schot, p. 81-83, Laporte, G., Belgische Geinterneerden in Nederland Gedurende De 
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decided that an alliance with Belgium was not in the Netherlands best interest. ` In 
early August Dutch neutrality was precarious, but not nearly as precarious as that of her 
southern neighbour. The Dutch were not prepared to sacrifice their own neutrality for 
the sake of Belgium if, as now seemed possible, the Netherlands was not to be 
attacked. 65 This was something of a gamble. Although Germany had recognised Dutch 
neutrality Britain and France had yet to do so. ' These two countries did not issue 
formal declarations accepting the Dutch position until 6 August 6' 
Internment and the Neutral State 
Not only was the Netherlands militarily ill prepared for a European war, it was also 
uncertain about its obligations as a neutral state towards belligerents in the event of 
such a war. Whilst rules had been drafted at The Hague Conferences concerning 
internment, they remained untested and it would be the Dutch politicians, diplomats 
and military leaders in 1914 who would have the task of interpreting them as the war 
situation developed. 
The first known modem example of internment in a neutral country occurred during the 
64 Ponting, Thirteen Days, p. 306. 
63 Bossenbrook writes that Belgium felt very let down by the Dutch actions Bossenbroek, Wuchten voor 
de Groote Oorlog p. 17. He implies that Holland had done a deal with the Germans that would benefit the 
Netherlands to the cost of Belgium. 
66 Smit, Nederland in de Eerste Wereld Oorlog. Part 2 p. 6 and Frey, Marc, 'Anglo-Dutch Relations 
During the First World War', in Ashton, Nigel., Hellema, Duco., (eds. ), Unspoken Allies, (Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, 2001), P. 59-84, p. 60. 
67 ARA 2.13.70 no inventory number, note from the Head of the Cabinet of Foreign Affairs to the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs informing him of the British position. Dated 6 August 1914. Smit, Nederland 
in de Ferste Wereld Oorlog. Part 2 p. 8 and Frey, 'Anglo-Dutch Relations During the First World War', 
p. 60. 
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1870-71 Franco-Prussian war. During the Battle of Sedan in 1870 the French General, 
MacMahon, found himself and his troops caught between the advancing Prussians and 
the Belgian border. Anticipating a French retreat Bismarck issued a warning to the 
Belgian government advising them that unless the French troops were disarmed the 
moment that they crossed the Belgian frontier then the Prussians reserved the right to 
pursue them. To his own commanders he issued the order `should the enemy enter 
Belgium and not be disarmed at once he is to be followed thither without delay' 6' 
In the event the French managed to lose the battle without having to resort to a retreat 
into Belgium, but the message had been clear enough. If non-participants in a war 
wanted to remain non-participants then they would have to be punctilious and swift in 
their dealings with armed forces that crossed their border. This lesson was not lost on 
the Swiss when later in the same war a second French commander, Clinchant, found 
himself facing another unstoppable German advance. This time the French backs were 
against the Swiss frontier and after hurried negotiations with the Swiss authorities 
Clinchant led 80,000 of his troops over the border where they were disarmed and 
interned. 70 In this instance the duration of the internment was short, some six weeks in 
all, but it was sufficient for the international community to realise that the subject of 
internment in neutral states and of prisoners of war in general was one that needed to be 
addressed and regulated by law. " 
`8 Annet, P. L'internment de Soldats Frangais en Belgique pendant La Guerre de 1870 in Revue Belge 
d'Histoire militaire Vol 28, (Brussels, March 1990). p. 337-349. 
`'Howard, Michael E.,? he Franco-Prussian War, (L)ndon: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1961). p. 203. 
70 Howard The Franco-Prussian War p. 431. 
" De Vries, 'Nederland als Non-beligerente Natie en de Internering van Buitenlandse Militairen 
Gedurende de Eerste Wereldoorlog', p. 89. 
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Surprisingly, although the issue of the treatment of sick and wounded soldiers was 
included on the agenda of the Geneva Conference in 1864, there was no mention of 
prisoners of war. This was in spite of persistent lobbying on the subject by Henry 
Dunant, who felt most emphatically that it was a subject that needed to be debated. n In 
an attempt to bring the matter onto the international stage Dunant founded the 
International Society for the Amelioration of the Prisoners of War in 1872 and a draft 
paper from this society was presented at the Conference of Brussels in 1874. With the 
events of the recent Franco-Prussian conflict to add emphasis to the discussions, the 
Conference adopted the draft proposal. However, despite this adoption, the draft 
remained unratified although its influence was apparent when in 1880 the Institute for 
International Law, meeting in Oxford, issued their latest manual that now also 
contained a section on prisoners of war. 
The first major international treaty to include specific references to prisoners of war 
was the 1899 Hague Declaration. 73 Minor amendments were added in 1907 but both of 
these borrowed heavily from the Brussels Convention of 1874. The Hague declarations 
defined who should be allowed free passage across neutral terrain and who should be 
interned. '4 The Dutch position was clarified in a series of four articles published in the 
Staatsblad in 1910 that outlined the position that would later be taken by the 
Netherlands as the basis for neutrality. 's As the First World War progressed, however, 
it became apparent that the general and rather simple terms of these conventions were 
inadequate to cover many of the situations with which the Dutch government came to 
' Moorehead. Caroline., Dunants Dream. War, Switzerland and the Red Cross, (London: Harper 
Collins, 1998). p. 126. 
73 Moorehead, Dunants Dream. War, Switzerland and the Red Cross, p. 170. 
Castren, Eric., The present Law of War and Neutrality, (Helsinki: 1954). p. 463. 
's Staatsblad No 73 citied in Tuinen, 'De Militaire Handhaving van Neutraliteit en Gezag', p. 63. 
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be faced. In more than one instance it was necessary to act within the spirit of the 
convention and create the legislation at a later date, as and when time and circumstance 
permitted'6 
The legislation concerning military internees, whilst recognising the difference in status 
between an internee and a more conventional prisoner of war, is understandably linked 
with prisoner of war legislation. The rights and regulations applicable to prisoners of 
war were used as a basis when establishing the rights due to a military internee. 
However, POWs now had an economic value as well as a tactical one. Not only did the 
taking of prisoners deprive the opposition of troops but it also provided the capturing 
army with a supply of workmen that could be used to replace the labour of the men 
needed for the army. " 
What had not been anticipated prior to 1914, however, was the sheer scale of the 
numbers of POWs and military internees that the First World War would generate, nor 
the length of time that they would need to be detained for. Not only the huge numbers 
that needed to be housed, fed and guarded but also, as the destructive power of the 
weaponry also increased, the huge numbers that required medical treatment or were 
permanently unfit for work and were therefore a drain on resources instead of an asset. 
The term `prisoner of war' (POW) can be defined as a soldier (or sailor or airman) of a 
belligerent nation that is captured by the enemy and kept in captivity until the end of 
76 For an insight into the large amount of legislation that had to be created during the early years of the 
war see Carsten, I., Mastregel ter Handhaving Onzer onzijdigheid in den Huldigen Oorlog, (The Hague: 
Mouton, 1916) and Vandenbosch, The Neutrality of the Netherlands during the World War. 
" Ferguson, The Pity of War, p. 371. 
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the conflict. There are now rules governing how these POWs can be treated, the 
Geneva Convention is one of the few international treaties that many people can name. 
In 1914 this was not the case. Tentative efforts had been made to formalize the position 
of POWs but these were fledgling guidelines that had yet to be tested by the demands 
of a large-scale international conflict. The position of military internees was also 
regulated but these were even more theoretical than the rules for POWs as there had 
been only a very few instances where servicemen had been interned and there was very 
little experience to draw upon when creating the new regulations. There was also very 
little legislation concerning the regulations for exchanging POWs through neutral 
countries. 78 
The difference between a POW and a military internee is quite straightforward. A POW 
is a serviceman who is captured (or surrenders) directly to the enemy during a conflict 
and is held, usually in captivity, in order to prevent him re-entering the war. An 
internee is a soldier (or sailor or airman) who is a member of a belligerent force who 
enters into a neutral country as a direct result of the conflict or who is taken on board a 
neutral ship and is then interned by the neutral country until the end of the war. In the 
case of the Netherlands that meant that any soldiers who crossed into the Netherlands 
from Belgium during World War I because they were fleeing from an advancing army 
had to be interned. Any soldiers, who entered the Netherlands because they were on 
leave, and had chosen to visit, were not interned and were free to leave at the end of 
their visit. In the case of soldiers, especially Belgian soldiers, entering the Netherlands 
during World War 1, this was not always so straightforward. Bastiaan Ort, the Dutch 
Minister of Justice in August 1914, defined a soldier as an individual who was with a 
Castren, Eric., The present Law of War and Neutrality p. 465 and 466. 
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commanding officer, carried arms, wore a uniform or who could be proved to have 
enlisted in the armed forces. An exception to this was medical personnel. The Geneva 
Convention did not allow for medical staff to be taken as POWs or interned. In reality 
many of the medical staff that crossed into the Netherlands during the war opted to 
remain and assist their interned comrades. In August 1914 the assumption was that 
soldiers would want to avoid internment, and that they would wish to return to the war 
to continue to fight for their country. The emphasis would be on the interning nation, in 
this case the Netherlands, to prove that they were liable for internment. After the fall of 
Antwerp in October 1914, however, many Belgian civilians who had fled to the 
Netherlands decided not to trust the German assurances that it was safe to return home. 
They decided instead to remain in Holland and for those without any other means of 
support internment was an attractive option. The Dutch authorities were faced with 
requests to be placed in internment. Snijders authorized his officers only to intern those 
that were in uniform or carrying arms. Not a foolproof solution but a practical one 
given the turbulence of the times. It was also common for soldiers who were entitled to 
internment to try and pass themselves off as medical staff. In this way they could take 
advantage of the status of an internee for as long as suited them but could reserve the 
right to opt to return to Belgium when they wanted to. ''9 
During the First World War some of the belligerent nations also interned civilians who 
were considered to be a threat to the interning nation. Men of military age were treated 
as POWs whilst older men, women and children became civilian internees. As Carsten 
says, in some respects these civilian internees were in a more favorable position than 
POWs but in other respects, because there was not yet any legislation covering these 
ARA 2.13.70 Inv 74 dated I5 October 1914. Abbenhuis, The Art of Staying Neutral, p. 107. 
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internees, their position was more vulnerable. 80 The Netherlands did not intern any 
civilians, as a neutral nation it had no need to. It did, however, restrict the access of 
some nationalities to certain areas of the country as a security measure but civilians of 
all nationalities were free to enter and leave the Netherlands during the war. In 1917 
under the terms of the treaty between Germany and Great Britain some civilian 
internees were transferred to the Netherlands where they were treated the same as the 
exchanged POWs. 
Historiography 
The Dutch attitude to the First World War is very different to that of its near 
neighbours. In Belgium, Germany, France and Great Britain the First World War was, 
and is still, considered to be a major event. Whichever side these nations allied 
themselves to, and whether they consider themselves to be winners or losers, there is no 
doubt that the events of 191418 have had a far-reaching influence on the formation of 
these countries as they are today. There is a lively and ongoing debate over whether the 
First World War should be considered a war in its own right or whether it forms part of 
an extended thirty years war that encompasses both world wars into one `super 
conflict'. This is a debate that lies well outside the scope of this thesis but it does serve 
to illustrate the significance that the First World War holds for many even now, almost 
a century after the first shot was fired. This is not the case in the Netherlands. 
' Castren, Eric., The present Law of War and Neutrality. p. 112, and Moorehead, Dunants Dream,. War, 
Switzerland and the Red Cross, p. 196. 
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Some years ago when starting to research this thesis I made an appointment to take a 
preliminary look into the archives at the Dutch Army Museum in Delft. An excellent 
museum, it is housed in a very impressive castle and has exhibits that tell the tale of the 
Dutch military from the time of the Romans right up to the Dutch participation in 
NATO peacekeeping missions in Eastern Europe. There is a small World War One 
section devoted mainly to uniforms of the belligerent countries but with a 
representation of the mobilized Dutch troops. The archive in the museum holds files 
from the relocated archive of the Ministerie van Oorlog (Ministry of War) as well as 
documents and memorabilia from the armed forces. On the day of my appointment I 
presented myself along with Maartje Abbenhuis81, a fellow historian visiting from New 
Zealand who was also researching the Dutch involvement in World War One. The 
archivist was dismayed when we told her of our interest -'but Holland wasn't in the 
First World War, you've wasted your time coming! ' An instant reaction but one that 
sums up the attitude of many in the Netherlands. 
Studies of the Netherlands during World War One by Dutch scholars are not only few 
and far between, but until recently have also suffered from a lack of breadth. Interest 
has centred primarily on two aspects of the conflict. Firstly, the economic implications 
for the Netherlands caught as a neutral country in the middle of an economic blockade 
of one belligerent by another, and secondly, the legal status of the Netherlands. 
Scholarship from outside the country, and this means primarily American publications, 
has also tended to look at the involvement of the Netherlands in the conflict from the 
same two angles, the economic implications and the legal status of a small neutral 
81 Maartje has since completed her research and has published an excellent book Abbenhuis, M. M., The 
Art of Staying Neutral, (Amsterdam, Amsterdam University press, 2006). She refers to the same incident 
on page 18. 
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power caught up in an international conflict. The best examples of this are two early 
works sponsored by the Carnegie Foundation, The Neutrality of the Netherlands during 
the World War (1927) by Amry Vandenbosch which falls into the category of law 
books, and the excellent four volume The Netherlands and the World War, Studies in 
the War History of a Neutral, (1928) edited by H. B. Greven which deals with the 
economic aspects of the war. ' Greven, in volume three of his four volume series, also 
considers the implications for the Dutch colonies of the European war, a very rare 
feature amongst Dutch World War One histories. His contributors consider the impact 
of the economic crisis for the domestic Dutch market by looking at subjects such as 
housing and wages, although clearly from the viewpoint of an economist rather than a 
social scientist or historian. Another book in the Carnegie series, M. J. Flier's War 
Finances in the Netherlands up to 1918 (1923) covers much of the same ground but 
uses a more statistical approach, providing figures for not only the traditional budget 
items but also for items of extraordinary wartime expenditure, such as the cost of 
preventing smuggling and of housing wartime refugees. ' 
Whilst international historians have tended to restrict themselves to the theoretical, 
Dutch lawyers and historians have been more willing to try and record not only what 
should have happened but also, as far as possible, what did. A good example of this is 
L. Carsten's Maatregel ter Handhaving Onzer Onzijdheid in den Huldigen Oorlog 
(1916). ' He, like Vandenbosch, outlines the requirements of international law but then 
goes on to explain how this was incorporated into Dutch domestic law and how it was 
"2 Vandenbosch, The Neutrality of the Netherlands during the World War, Greven, H. B., The 
Netherlands and the World War. Studies in the war history of a Neutral (4 Vols), New Haven: Yale 
University press, 1928). 
8' Flier, M. J., War finances in the Netherlands up to 1918, (Oxford: 1923). 
84 Carsten, I., Maatregel ter Handhaving Onzer onzijdigheid in den Huldigen Oorlog, (1916). 
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then applied in practice. Carsten uses actual examples of where laws were applied 
correctly and, in his opinion, incorrectly. Much of his book deals with the rules 
concerning internees and in doing so he highlights the problems incurred when laws do 
not exist to cover new eventualities and governments are forced to adapt and operate 
within the spirit of existing law rather than using specific legal remedies. Carsten was 
in the unique position of being both a lawyer and an officer in the Dutch army so his 
insight into his subject is excellent. Regrettably, this book was written and published in 
1916, and as such does not reach any conclusions that are valid for the war as a whole. 
Almost without exception, Dutch histories of the Netherlands during World War One 
that were written prior to 1940 were written by participants in the events they 
described. Some, but not all, take the form of straightforward memoirs, such as In 
Moeilijke Omstandigheden (1933) written by Nicholaas Bosboom, the Dutch Minister 
of War until 1917.85Others are compilations from magazines, produced during the war 
or very shortly afterwards, which were built into comprehensive volumes covering all 
aspects of the crisis, and were written by a selection of authors, all experts in their 
respective fields but not necessarily professional historians. J. Kooiman's De 
Nederlandsche Strijdmacht en Hare Mobilisatie in hetjaar 1914 and the Gedenkboek 
van den Europeeschen Oorlog in 1914 (1919) with a forward by W. A. T de Meester are 
good examples of this type of publication. ' The best single volume history of the 
Netherlands during World War One written by a participant also follows the 
compilation idea but was produced as a complete edition, Brugman's Nederland in den 
"s Bosboom, In Moeihjke Onrstandigheden. 
"' Kooiman, J., `De Nederlandsche Strijdmacht en hare Mobilisatie in het jaar 1914'. 
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Oorlogstijd (1920). ' Ritter's De Donkere Poort (1931) is the other major single 
volume book on the subject 88 Although written by just one author it provides some 
interesting, if selective, insights into the war from the Dutch viewpoint. It is these 
books that begin to flesh out the theoretical outlines of the likes of Vandenbosch and 
Flier and give some idea of the impact of the war, including internment, on Dutch 
domestic life. A notable feature of many of Dutch works, especially the collections, is 
their use of pictorial evidence. A large number of photographs exist, or at least did at 
the time of publication, and these were freely used. Political cartoons are another 
favourite form of illustration, as are reproductions of postcards from the era. 
Later Dutch historians have produced books that have more in common with their 
American colleagues than the early Dutch accounts of the war. Foremost amongst these 
is Smit, whose collection of work on the First World War has done much to remind 
Dutch post-war historians that there was indeed a major European conflict before 1939. 
Smit, however, does not restrict himself merely to the legal and economic aspects of 
the war and in his very comprehensive three volume work Nederland in de Eerste 
Wereldoorlog (1971) gives more attention to the policies of the van der Linden 
government 0 Two more scholars who have taken up Smit's mantle in recent years and 
produced large-scale studies of the Netherlands during World War One are Moeyes 
with Buiten Schot, Nederland tijdens de 1914-1918 Eerste Wereldoorlog (2001) and 
Abbenhuis with The Art of Staying Neutral, The Netherlands in the First World War, 
1914-1918 (2006). 90 Both of these books utilise a vast number of resources and provide 
87 Brugmans, H., Nederland in den Oorlogstijd. 
8' Ritter, De Donkere Poort. 
'"' Smit, Nederland in de Eerste Wereldoorlog. 
90 Moeyes, Buiten Schot, Abbenhuis, The Art of Staying Neutral. 
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an excellent insight into conditions in the Netherlands during the war especially as they 
relate to the Dutch military. These are well thought out books that address not only the 
traditional issues of the mobilisation and trade difficulties but attempt to put the issues 
into a political context both domestically and internationally. Two further books that 
have been published in recent years have also increased understanding of this 
previously neglected areas of Dutch history. Tames' Oorlog voor Onze Gedachten 
deals with the Dutch perception and attitude to the War as evidenced by publications of 
the time and considers how this affected the Dutch national identity and the Dutch 
population's view of themselves a neutrals 91 Frey's Der Eerste Weltkrieg und die 
Niederlande, ein neutrales Land im politischen und militärischen Kalktal der 
Kriegsgegner provides an insight into the Dutch involvement in World War One by 
analysing the Dutch relationship with Germany. In this publication Frey makes it very 
clear that economics underpinned much of the dealing that the Netherlands had with its 
neighbour during the war. ' 
Most, but not all, of the books discussed above make some mention of internment. A 
few, like Carsten, take it as their main theme whilst others, such as Greven and Flier 
barely mention it. The two best general accounts of internment are to be found in 
Brugman and Kooiman and were written within months of the end of the war by 
participants in the internment organisation. In `De Militaire Handhaving van 
neutraliteit en gezag' in Brugmans Nederland in den Oorlogstijd, Kolonel van den 
Generale Staf C. Van Tuinen views internment as just one of the many tasks to be 
91 Tames, Ismee., Oorlog voor Orue Gedachten, (Hilversum: UitgeverijVerloren, 2006) 
92 Frey, Mark., Der Eerste Weltkrieg und die Niederlande, ein neutrales Land im politischen und 
militärischen Kalkül der Kriegsgegner, (Berlin: Akademieverslag, 1998). 
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undertaken by the Dutch military as a means of maintaining Dutch Neutrality. " His 
account is very factual, addressing some of the difficulties faced by the Dutch army, 
such as the prevention of escapes, but he does not even begin to consider the issue of 
internment in the diplomatic forum. Nor does he comment on the interrelationship 
between the internees and their Dutch hosts or differentiate between any of the 
different nationalities amongst the internees. By far the most comprehensive account of 
internment is `De intemeering hier to lande' by Generaal-majoor JT Oosterman in 
Kooiman, De Nederlandsche Strijdmacht en hare Mobilisatie in hetjaar 1914. " The 
former commander of the interment camp in Zeist, Oosterman was in a unique position 
to record the history of internment, as many of the problems he addresses in his chapter 
were those that he initially faced in reality. Consequently he not only provides a very 
factual account of numbers of prisoners and where they were held, as does Tuinen, but 
he goes on to deal with the more practical aspects of interning so many men for such a 
long period, such as the management of the canteens, the prevention of escapes and the 
control of visitors. He also gives details of the structure and organisation of the camps, 
how they were built, who built them and who guarded them. His insight into the later 
development of the command and control mechanisms is also unique. Oosterman 
acknowledges the day to day problems of feeding so many internees and providing 
them with work and education that not only kept the internees contented and less prone 
to cause trouble, but that also did not conflict with the needs of the Dutch population. 
His is one of the few immediate post-war works on internment that addresses the social 
unrest in the camps, the work groups and the participation by internees in the 
development of left wing politics in the Netherlands, although his version is more 
'0 Tuinen, 'De Militaire Handhaving van Neutraliteit en Gezag'. p. 63-102. 
"Oosterman, `De Interneering hier to lande' p. 801-843. 
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supportive of Dutch government actions than later works were. Oosterman was selected 
to write the official history of internment for the Dutch government after the war, a 
very large account running to many volumes, the last remaining original copy of which 
is held in the Leger Museum in Deift. 
A different, but equally important record of internment is that of Bosboom's In 
Moeidijke Omstandigheden. " Bosboom, the Dutch Minister of War until May 1917, 
was directly involved in the policy-making decisions concerning internment. His 
memories are not those, like Tuinen and Oosterman, of someone dealing with the day- 
to-day practicalities of feeding and housing so many men. He was more preoccupied 
with ensuring that Holland complied fully with her international legal obligations and, 
of perhaps greater concern, was seen to be complying. Unfortunately, his move from 
office before the end of the war makes this an incomplete account but nevertheless one 
of immense interest and value. 
Oosterman, like Tuinen, concentrates his account on the internment of military 
personnel who crossed into Dutch territory because of the forces of war. Neither 
mentions, other than in a very general way, those who were interned in the Netherlands 
as the result of an agreement between Great Britain and Germany to alleviate the 
situation in their own prisoner of war camps. A book which does covers all forms of 
internment is Het Informatiebureau van het Nederlandsche Roode Kruis (1924) by 
Th. H. L. Leclercq. " This unique little book is a complete history of the working of the 
Information Office of the Dutch Red Cross, set up under the control of the Dutch 
9s Bosboom, in Moethjke Omstandigheden. 
96 Leclercq, Th. H. L, Het Informatiebureau van het Nederlandsche Roode Kruis, (The Hague: 
Blommendaal, 1924). 
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Ministry of War to maintain lists of any Dutch military personnel who were killed or 
captured during the war. In 1914 it soon changed its main function to that of collecting 
and maintaining information about all of the Foreign Service personnel who were 
interned in the Netherlands. As most of the actual records of the Dutch Red Cross for 
World War One were destroyed during World War Two it is fortunate that this book 
remains. Not only does it provide a history of the Red Cross Information Office 
organisation during the war, it also provides an independent record of the numbers and 
nationalities of all the internees. Written, as all post war histories were, by a retired 
army officer, in this case one who worked for the Dutch Red Cross during the war and 
was himself involved in the events described, this volume is not intended as a history of 
internment and yet, within the statistics so faithfully recorded, is a wealth of detail and 
insight. Coupled with the narrative history of the Red Cross in H. Ch. G. J. Mandere's 
Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche Roode Kruis 1867-1917 (1917) it is possible to 
see how the fate of the internees is inextricably linked to the history of the Dutch Red 
Cross during 1914-18 and the ongoing conflict with the Dutch Army medical services 
that resulted from Red Cross involvement with the internees. ' 
Later works on internment may make more of an attempt to analyse the results of 
internment but they have also become scarcer and more specialised. Such work as has 
been produced has tended to be restricted to either one of the involved nationalities, 
such as the very comprehensive and readable, Vluchten voor de Groote Oorlog (1988) 
edited by Bossenbroek and Kruishoop which looks primarily at the Belgian internees, 
9' Mandere, H. Ch. G. J., Geschiedenis van het Nederlandse Roode Kruis (1867-1917), (Algemeene 
Uitgevers-Maatschappij, 1917). 
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or works which are concerned with a specific geographical region. " Harderwijk, 
(1994) produced by the Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis is a good example of this. ' 
Included in a general history of the military base at Harderwijk is a factual chapter on 
the four years it was used to house Belgian internees. Many of the recent, 
geographically based histories are short and anecdotal, produced by amateur historians 
using oral history, much of it second hand, as the basis for their information. Where 
more reliable sources have been used, such as those for Interneringsdepot Gaasterland, 
Belgische vluchteling 1914-18 (1996) written to accompany an exhibition in 
Oudemirdum, they often revisit sources already available, for example, from other 
books on the subject, or old newspaper reports. 100 This is not to say that no serious or 
original work has been attempted on internment. Vluchten voor de Groote Oorlog 
mentioned above is highly creditable as well as being very readable and comprehensive 
in its coverage of a selected area of internment. Klinkert's work on the internment of 
exchanged prisoners of war also draws upon archive material that has not been 
previously presented. 1°1 De Vries, writing in 1980 prior to Laporte, also uses archival 
material in his study of Belgian internees using Dutch sources. "02 The most recent work 
on both internees and the exchanged prisoners of war is de Roodt's Oorlogsgasten 
which covers not only the military `guests' in the Netherlands during the war, but also 
the large number of refugees that crossed the border. 103 Unlike some other books on 
'8 Bossenbroek, M., Kruishoop., (ed), Mochten voor de Groote Oorlog (Amsterdam: De Bataafsche 
Leeuw, 1988) 
9' Elands, M. & Bossenbroek, M. P., Harderwijk, als militaire stall en de Geschiedenis van, (The Hague: 
Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis, 1994). 
'OD Doelman, Henk, Dijkstra, Henk & Oosterhof, Jan,. Interneringsdepot Gaasterland, Belgische 
vluchteling 1914-1918, (Oudemirdum: Mar en Klif 1996). 
10' Klinkert, W. 'Internering van vreemde militairen in Nederland gedurende de Ferste Wereldoorlog', 
Mars in Cathedra, No 71, (1987), p. 2447. 
'02 De Vries, 'Nederland als Non-beligerente Natie en de Internering van Buitenlandse Militairen 
Gedurende de Eerste Wereldoorlog'. 
1° Roodt de, Evelyn., Oorlogsgasten, (Zaltbommel: Europose Biblioteek, 2000). 
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this topic it puts the position of the internees and POWs into context alongside the 
refugees. 
In this thesis I will attempt to provide a complete picture of both the internment of 
foreign nationals that entered directly into the Netherlands during the First World War 
and the POWs that were accepted into internment in the Netherlands under the terms of 
the international treaties signed during the war. Although in many respects these are 
two distinct groups the impact that they had on Dutch daily life, and both international 
and domestic politics, was very similar. It is difficult to assess the importance of one 
group and its impact and influence on the Dutch neutral status without taking into 
account the second group. 
Internment, whether of internees or POW's was not only a new venture for the Dutch it 
was a relatively new concept for the entire international community. Whilst the 
overarching principles had been laid down in the two Hague treaties, the day to day 
minutiae of feeding, housing, clothing and, perhaps most importantly, occupying, many 
thousands of foreign troops was something that had not been prepared for at all. The 
Dutch, and to a lesser extent the other European neutrals, made decisions about their 
internees as problems arose. It was impossible to plan too far ahead when the 
Netherlands could not even be certain of the security of its own borders and the 
constantly changing fortunes of the belligerent nations impacted on the welfare of their 
troops held in Holland. For this reason I have chosen to present this as a mainly 
chronological record. 
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N Chapter 2 
The Netherlands in World War One 
One of the most significant aspects of the war for the Netherlands, especially in 1914, 
was the mass movement of people it engendered. Not only the movement within its 
borders, as the army mobilized and regiments left their peacetime barracks to take up 
more defensive positions, but also the colossal number of refugees that entered or 
passed through the Netherlands as they tried to escape the advancing German forces. 
As a neutral nation, Holland had an obligation to intern any soldiers from the 
belligerent forces that crossed its border and prevent them from re-entering the war. 
Internees were not the only ones fleeing the German advances. During a few short days 
in October 1914 over one million Belgian refugees also entered the Netherlands. Many 
of these were in considerable distress, hungry, injured and very tired. Families had been 
separated and large numbers of children were wandering alone. This is one of the best- 
documented areas of Dutch World War One history and one of the few events from this 
time that holds any place in popular memory of the period. ' The response of the Dutch 
authorities was immediate and open hearted. Any and all buildings in the border areas 
were pressed into service. Blankets and food were gathered as quickly as possible and 
'Chapters on the refugees are to be found in most of the books concerning the Netherlands and the First 
World War whilst other books are devoted entirely to the plight of the refugees. Some that I have found 
to be useful are: Kruishoop & Bossenbroek, Wuchten voor de Grote Oorlog: Belgen in Nederland 1914- 
1918, Bruijnseels, A., Het Godsdienstig Leven der Belgen in Nederland h jdens de oorlogsjaren 1914- 
1918, (The Hague: 1919) and Roodt, Oorlogsgasten. 
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distributed amongst the cold and the hungry. Help came from charitable organizations 
and institutions as well as private individuals who simply opened their homes to those 
in need. Writing in his diary on 8th October 1914 a resident of Roosendaal, a town close 
to the Belgian border, says, 
The situation by us in this place is indescribable. Ten thousand refugees fill the 
streets, everywhere is full of unlucky people, everywhere - with no exceptions - 
has refugees in their house, and still there are hundreds begging for just a place 
to sit, just to be able to rest for a while. ' 
When the numbers became so great that the border regions could no longer cope then 
the refugees were sent in special trains to other parts of Holland. Some continued their 
journey even further by embarking on a boat at Vlissingen and traveling on to Great 
Britain. Most, however, stayed in the Netherlands. The Dutch press were remarkably 
slow to pick up on the numbers of Belgians crossing the border in the first few days 
after the fall of Antwerp. They consistently underestimated the numbers, especially the 
number of internees, and put reports of the border crossings on the inside pages rather 
than the front page. The Telegraaf soon picked up on the plight of the refugees, many 
of whom had been separated from their families, and began a `contacts page' giving 
details of missing people and trying to reunite families. In time a special section was 
developed specifically for internees. Understandably this huge influx of refugees 
caused a great strain on Dutch resources, which although not as limited as they would 
become later in the war, were already stretched because of the recent mobilization. The 
Dutch government negotiated with the German commanders at Antwerp for the 
2 Helvert-Weijernnans, E. H. B. Van,. Uit Bange Oorlogsdagen. Dagboek van een Roosendaeler Afevering 
II, (Roosendael: unknown publisher, no date), p. 63 
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refugees to be allowed to return home. Although many were uncertain if the new 
German commanders in Belgium could be trusted, more did take advantage of the 
special trains laid on by the Dutch government for their repatriation. Despite efforts to 
persuade most of the refugees to go home some 100,000 opted to stay in the 
Netherlands for the duration of the war. Many of these were the families of Belgian 
soldiers already interned in the Netherlands; some simply had nowhere else to go. A 
great deal of support was given to those that decided to stay, a large proportion of it 
initially funded by the Dutch authorities. Special refugee camps were constructed, 
schools established, workshops started. Charitable committees in every part of Holland 
found in the Belgian refugees an outlet for all of their good work. 3 The presence of 
these refugees, frequently featured in the Dutch press, was a constant reminder to the 
Dutch people of what their near neighbours had suffered and what they, so far, had 
managed to escape. 
This mass influx of refugees has become one of the cornerstones in the Dutch memory 
of their involvement in the First World War. The reception, care and eventual 
repatriation of the Belgian refugees have effectively overshadowed the history of the 
military internees in the Netherlands during the war. Although the influx of such a 
large number of refugees in such a short time is clearly an event worthy of note it does 
not bring with it the same political and military issues as the internment of 35,000 of 
soldiers from several different nations. Much of the published work that deals with the 
refugees includes the military internees as a small part of the same subject and fails to 
3 Much of what has been written about the influx of Belgian refugees into the Netherlands is anecdotal. 
More academic studies include Zanten. J. H. van, `De Zorg voor vluchteling uit het buitenland tijdens den 
vorlog', in Brugmans, Nederland in den Oorlogstijd, p. 317-352, Dunk, Vluchten voor de Groote Oorlog. 
Belgen in Nederland 1914-18, and Roodt. Oorlogsgasten. 
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highlight the diplomatic minefield that their presence in the Netherlands created. In the 
following chapters the political issues surrounding these internees as well as their 
welfare will be dealt with in more detail. It would, however, be wrong to assume that 
the mass movement of refugees and internees was the only major impact that the First 
World War had on the Netherlands; nor would it be correct to view the Dutch reaction 
to this mass movement of people against a normal peacetime backdrop. The Dutch 
were not combatants in this new global war but they were certainly not unaffected by it. 
The impact of the war on the Dutch, at all levels, very much influenced their response 
to the demands placed upon their country by the internees and refugees. 
As the summer of 1914 wore on and the prospect of a major European conflict looked 
ever more likely, the choices facing the Netherlands were bleak. Tentative efforts to 
form a defence union with Belgium had floundered when German forces crossed the 
Belgian border, and the Dutch government was placed in the unenviable position of 
having to chose between joining one of the two belligerent powers or attempting to 
maintain its neutrality for however long the war lasted. After the German ultimatum 
was issued to Belgium, the Belgian ambassador in The Hague, Fallon, tried to forge a 
cooperative stance between the Belgian commander in Luik, General Galet, and his 
Dutch opposite number in Maastricht. Despite initial interest in such an alliance 
Loudon suddenly lost interest in promoting it. Laporte alleges that this was because the 
Netherlands had received fine assurances from Germany that their neutrality would be 
respected. 4 Joining one of the belligerents from the outset of the war was never an 
option. As Abbenhuis has said, 
4 Laporte, Belgische Geinterneerden in Nederland Gedurende De Eerste Wereldoorlog, p. 42 
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Neutrality formed a central tenet of Dutch foreign policy and its interests prior 
to 1914. Neutrality seemed to best guarantee the security and welfare of the 
nation and its economy, both on the continent and in its colonies. In fact, 
neutrality had become a celebrated part of the Dutch national psyche and 
promoted the international face of the Netherlands as a paragon of peace and 
prosperity in an increasingly unstable world. ' 
The odds were indeed stacked against the chances of this small nation holding out 
against the mighty powers positioned on either side of it. Geographically, as well as 
politically it was sandwiched between the two main belligerents, Britain and Germany, 
dependant on both of them for trade and for free passage for the ships on which that 
trade, and the economic viability of the Netherlands relied. Whether the Dutch 
themselves preserved their neutrality by affirmative political action or whether the 
belligerents merely allowed them to retain their neutral status because that best suited 
their plans, is a question that has not yet been fully addressed by Dutch scholars and is 
one which lies outside the scope of this study. What can be said with some certainty, 
however, is that although the Dutch managed to preserve their neutrality and actually 
avoid fighting in the war, in no way can they be said to have been unaffected by it. 
Orvik cites the events of 1914-18 as the start of the decline of neutrality as a credible 
option for small states. In 1914, however, despite the outbreak of hostilities it was still 
a policy that many in the Dutch government, and certainly most of the Dutch public, 
felt was viable. ' The Netherlands did not have to endure the horrific loss of life 
experienced by those countries that sent their sons to fight on the front lines, 
3 Abbenbuis, The Art of Staying Neutral, P. 18 
6 Orvik, Nils, The Decline of Neutrality 1914-1941. With special reference to the United States and 
Northern Neutrals, (Oslo: Johan Grundt Tanum Forlag, 1953). 
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nevertheless, the years 1914 to 1918 were as difficult for the Netherlands as they were 
for the rest of Europe. ' 
The Dutch do not now, and in 1914 certainly did not, consider themselves to be a 
warlike nation. Speaking in his chronicle of the war years De Donkere Poort, Dr 
P. H. Ritter says `our people were - what they still are -a peaceful people. We do not 
have the ability to hate other people, and militarism is not only unpopular but also 
rare'. 8 The partial mobilization of Dutch troops ordered on 30 July 1914, followed by a 
general mobilization one day later were therefore not steps taken lightly. Although the 
Dutch army in 1914 was a reasonable size relative to the population it served, it was 
nevertheless tiny compared to the armies of Britain, France and Germany. Thanks to 
the foresight of the then Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General C. J. Snijders, it 
had spent much of 1913 exercising against possible attacks on its borders. It relied, 
however, on conscripts and reservists to boost its numbers and so, in the light of the 
gathering storm clouds over Europe many of those who would have completed their 
military service in mid 1914 were kept in uniform indefinitely. As a result of this 
measure some 200,000 troops were available to be sent to guard the Dutch frontiers 
against a possible attack. 9 How effective these troops would have been against a 
concerted German attack is debatable. Snijders, who was appointed as Commander-in- 
Chief of the Dutch Army and Navy on 31 July 1914 and then promoted to General the 
For a comprehensive summary of the diplomatic events involving the Netherlands in 1914 and the latter 
stages of the war see Leeuw. A. S. de., Nederland in de werldpolitiek van 1900-36. 
e Ritter. De Donkere Poort, p. 30 
9 Munnekrede. PJ. Van., 'De Mobilisatie van de Landmacht', p. 5, in Brugmans, Nederland in Den 
Oorlogstijd. This chapter also contains details of the composition of the Dutch army at the time of the 
mobilization. See also Tuinen., 'De Militaire Handhaving van Neutraliteit en Gezag' p. 65 in the same 
book. De Vries claims that guarding the frontier was by far the most important task given to the army. 
De Vries, 'Nederland als Non-beligerente Natie en de Intemering van Buitenlandse Militairen 
Gedurende de Eerste Wereldoorlog', p. 86. 
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following week, clearly recognized the inadequacies of the situation and by the end of 
the war had succeeded in persuading the government to more than double the number 
of men under arms to a total of 450,000 and to invest heavily in equipment. 
Despite Snijder's foresight and his efforts to both prepare and increase the capabilities 
of the Dutch armed forces there can be little doubt that either of the two main 
belligerent powers situated along the Dutch borders could have successfully invaded 
and occupied the Netherlands at any time during the war had they so wished. 1° To 
maintain a visible position of neutrality the Netherlands not only had to adhere to the 
existing international laws governing neutrality it also had to maintain an 
evenhandedness in all of its dealings with the belligerents so as not to provoke them 
into an attack. Unfortunately maintaining neutrality in this way did not always allow 
the Dutch government to put the best interests of its population first. Although the 
Dutch government as a whole declared its self to be neutral some individual politicians 
had, in the decade up to 1914, demonstrated leanings towards either Germany or Great 
Britain " 
The powers of the army were strengthened shortly after mobilization when areas of 
strategic importance, such as the border areas and regions that housed internment 
camps or other sites of military significance, were declared to be in a staat van beleg 
(state of siege) or stoat van oorlog (state of war). Both of these orders gave the military 
10 See Van Tuyll van Serooskerken, Hubert, P., `On the Edge of the Gunpowder Barrel: The Netherlands 
and the coming of World War!, 1870-1914", 
http: //raven. cc. ukans. edu/-kn_nsite/ww onelcomment tuy ll. ht_m__/, (accessed 2000) 1995. for a more 
detailed insight into the strength of the Dutch army in the years upto 1914. 
" See Leeuw, Nederland in de wereldpolitiek van 1900-36 and Langeveld, 'Abraham Kuyper, Hendrikus 
Colijn, and the Dutch Foreign Policy, 1901-1914'p. 5-19. 
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authority over the civilian population and institutions. The 1899 Oorlogs Wet (war law) 
allowed the Dutch government to place all or parts of the country under the control of 
the military authorities in time of war. This gave the military very comprehensive 
powers to put the safety of the nation before any other consideration. The first 
opportunity for this law to be invoked was in 1914 when the Holland's water line (an 
established line of defence) was placed in a `state of war'. As the war progressed many 
areas of strategic importance, including the areas around internment camps, were 
placed under the control of the military by the use of this law. Snijders was constantly 
at odds with the cabinet over plans for a possible attack. Politically he favored an 
alliance with Germany over one with the Entente powers. This view was strengthened 
by his military experience which led him to believe that in the event of an attack the 
only way to ensure that the Netherlands was on the winning side was to make an 
alliance with the only side which he believed could realistically win a battle for Dutch 
territory, Germany. 12 This was in direct opposition to the cabinet's view which was that 
an attack by one side would not automatically mean that the Netherlands would join 
forces with the opposing side. '3 The prospect of an independent Netherlands fighting 
both England and Germany at the same time was one that Snijders, understandably, 
found to be totally unrealistic but this was the only option for which the Dutch 
government was prepared to plan. 
The mobilization of the army had an immediate effect on Dutch domestic life. 14 Ritter 
12 Abbenhuis, The Art of Staying Neutral p. 81 & 82. 
" Smit, Nederland in de Eerste Wereld Oorlog. Part 2 p. 14. 
14 Both Abbenhuis and Moeyes have written comprehensively on the impact of the mobilisation on the 
Dutch population and the expectations of the Dutch during the first few weeks of the war. Abbenhuis, 
The Art of Staying Neutral, chapter 5, p. 61 and Moeyes, Buiten Schot. chapter 2, p. 45. 
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writes of women and children weeping as they waved goodbye to husbands and fathers 
who were transported to the borders on one of the many trains laid on especially for the 
occasion. He also speaks of the young men who were clearly excited at the thought of 
military action. '5 Life also changed for inhabitants of the border regions who suddenly 
found themselves with soldiers billeted with them, or a tented army camp appearing in 
their village overnight For the inhabitants of Limburg in the south of the country the 
presence of the war was especially evident. They could hear the guns, and from the 
high ground near Maastricht they could stand and watch the battles. A report in De 
Telegraaf dated 7' August 1914 gives details of a visit by Prins Hendrik to Maastricht 
where he spent time with the mobilized Dutch troops and visited the wounded German 
and Belgian troops that had already, even this early in the war, found themselves in a 
Dutch hospital. He was so moved by their plight that he lent the Red Cross his car to 
collect more wounded. 16 
In the short term, the perceived threat to the Netherlands and its neutral stance resulted 
in the population of the Netherlands uniting behind the government and, difficult 
though it was, supporting the mobilization. This support was made more possible by 
the underlying belief that the Netherlands would never actually be involved in the war. 
Marwick asserts that war unites a country and promotes nationalism and not 
internationalism. This was certainly true of the Netherlands in the summer of 1914. " 
As the eminent historian Brugmans has said speaking of his countrymen in 1914, `In 
general terms people believed that war was a wholly redundant institution, which 
`s Ritter, De Donkere Poort, p. 54. 
16 De Telegraaf dated 7 August 1914. See also Kruishoop and Bossenbroek (eds), Vluchten voor de 
Groote Oorlog p. 15. 
" Beckett, `Total War', p. 30. 
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people in these times did not need to fear and in which in any event the Netherlands 
would remain uninvolved. "8As the war progressed, however, and the contingencies 
that had been introduced began to bite then this support became less unified. "' The 
problems created by removing a large section of the working population soon became 
obvious. Military pay, averaging Dfl 1.50 a day, was less than the pre-war income that 
most families had enjoyed 20 Many small businesses were left without their 
management or workforce. Farms had no one left to bring in the harvest. The 
government was not unsympathetic and, excepting times when the threat to Dutch 
borders was perceived to be particularly high, long periods of leave were allowed for a 
variety of reasons including business, study and domestic crises. In addition, those 
troops not on leave participated in a large number of events specially created to 
alleviate boredom and therefore avert dissention or desertion. These were mainly 
sporting in origin, sports days, long walks, football or rugby matches, but also included 
concerts and dances. Full coverage of these events was given in the national and local 
press, especially the picture magazines. It would not, however, accede to some 
elements of the government and public who called for the troops to be de-mobilized 
once, in their opinion, the immediate threat to the Netherlands had passed. For all of its 
belief in the Netherlands' political ability to remain neutral throughout the war, the 
Cabinet clearly believed that the deterrent of well-guarded borders was also essential. 
This policy was not without its drawbacks, in October 1916 Snijders wrote to the 
Brugmans, Geschiedenis van Nederland onder de Regeering van Koningin Wilhelmina, p. 120. 
19 These changes in Dutch daily life are addressed later in this thesis. For a general overall view of the 
Netherlands between 1914 and 1918 see Moore, Bob, Wolf, Susanne, Binding, M. Paul,. 'The 
Netherlands and Sweden: the experience of neutrality' in Liddle, Peter. Bou ne, John. Whitehead, Ian. 
(eds), The Great World War 1914-45,2 vols, p. 309-328 (London: Harper Collins, 2000-2001). 
21 Verberne, L. G. J., Geschiedenis Van Nederland, Deel111, (Amsterdam: Uitgeversmaatschappij Joost 
van den Vondel NV, 1938), p. 340. 
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Minister of War complaining that 61per cent of the mobilized soldiers were in fact 
unavailable for duty because they were on some form of leave. 21 
Although the Dutch were not actually fighting in the war and her troops were only 
employed in a defensive role, there were still some Dutch casualties, most of them 
civilians, which were directly attributable to the war. The largest group to suffer was 
fishermen. Many lost their livelihoods or even their lives because of encounters with 
mines that had been laid in the seas around Holland. Similarly affected was the 
merchant marine and the commencement of unrestricted submarine war in early 1915 
swiftly claimed two such casualties, the SS. Medes on 25 March 1915 followed by the 
SS. Katwijk on 14 April. Both were sunk by a German U boat. This loss of shipping 
was a trend that continued until the end of the war. In February 1916 the SS. Rijdam 
limped back to port with a large hole in its bow and the loss of two crewmen. ' Less 
than a month later the newly commissioned SS. Tubantia from the Koninklijke 
Hollandsche Lloyd Company was sunk just off of the Noord-Hinder lightship. Public 
outcry was enormous, especially when the Germans refused to accept responsibility for 
the sinking despite the presence of German submarines in the vicinity. Only later, 
when fragments of a German torpedo were found amongst the Tubantia's wreckage did 
the Germans agree to pay compensation for this last incident. Von der Dunk estimates 
that some 36 merchant ships and 26 fishing vessels were sunk during the war at the cost 
Z`. Snijders to Minister of War Bosboom, 11 October 1916 ARA 2.13.70 inv 411 in Abbenhuis, The Art 
of Staying Neutral, p207. 
2' Panorama No 13,14 February 1916. 
2' Beaufort, J. A. A. H., Vi, tig Jaren Uit Onze Geschiedenis 1868-1918, Vol 1, Amsterdam: P. N. van 
Kampen en Zoon, 1928, p. 247 
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of some 200 lives. ' The Eindhovensche Dagblad echoed the thoughts of many in 1917 
when it responded to the latest attack with this editorial 
How long will Germany treat us this way? How long will the conflict for free 
sea impose on our rights and cramp our freedom? Hundreds of German children 
are lovingly saved from starvation every week by the Netherlands and still her 
cold-blooded Navy turns her powerless rage on simple, poor fisher folk. 25 
Nor were the families of these sailors safe on land either, as stray British and German 
torpedoes damaged Dutch costal villages on more than one occasion. 
The threat to Dutch civilians came not only from the sea but also from the air as lost 
and damaged aircraft from both sides dropped explosives onto Dutch property or 
caused damage by crash landing on the Dutch side of the border. Casualties from these 
incidents were not heavy, such as on 22 October 1916 when a lost German airship 
dropped two firebombs over Gorkum, startling, but not injuring the inhabitants. On the 
night of 29/30 April 1917, however, bombs dropped from a British aircraft on 
Zierikzee killed three civilians, an event for which the British government eventually 
paid £10,000 in compensation-26 In an attempt to reduce Dutch casualties the Cabinet 
ordered the army to open fire on any non-Dutch aircraft crossing the border. This 
resulted in several aircraft being brought down and a decrease in the amount of damage 
to Dutch property. 
Despite assurances to the Dutch public that all was well with the Dutch banks, 
precautions were taken to preserve the financial institutions. On 3 August 1914, the 
u Dunk, H. W. von der., 'Nederland ten tijd van de eerste wereldoorlog', in Algemene Geschiedenis der 
Nederlanden, deel 14, Haarlem: Fibula-Van Dishoek, 1979, p. 46. 
25 Eindhovensch Dagblad quoted in Ritter, De Donkere Poort, P. 231(vol II). 
26 Beaufort, Vifflig Jaren Uit Onze Geschiedenis 1868-1918, Vol 1, p. 244. 
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Minister of Finance M. W. F. Treub introduced a law prohibiting the export of key items 
such as grain, horses, coal and gold. This was aimed at preserving stocks of essential 
products for domestic consumption. " Despite this foresight the control of goods 
moving in and out of the Netherlands at the behest of the belligerent powers was to 
prove one of the biggest headaches for the Dutch authorities as they tried to negotiate 
their way through the diplomatic minefield created by the outbreak of the war. The 
problem with trade was twofold. Firstly, there were suspicions in both Britain and 
Germany that the Netherlands was trading more favorably with their enemy than with 
them, which caused them to restrict exports to the Netherlands. Secondly, there was the 
more basic problem of shipping being unable to negotiate seas that were mined and 
patrolled by belligerent warships and submarines. The result of these two problems was 
that as the war progressed Holland became less and less able to import sufficient 
essential supplies for its population. 
A prime example of Dutch concern was the supply of wheat. The majority of wheat 
was imported. Available stocks would only last two or three weeks and the September 
harvest would only provide a few more weeks worth. ' Rationing became a way of life 
in the Netherlands as the war progressed, as did more and more stringent measures to 
control an ever-growing black market. " The Allies attempts to impose a blockade on 
Germany resulted in the formation of the Nederlandsche Overzee Trustmaatschappij 
(NOT), an organization designed to oversee that all goods imported into the 
Netherlands were for home consumption and were not for re-exportation to Germany. 
The NOT soon became very powerful and although not without its critics, to a large 
2' Treub, Oorlogs t{1'd P. 43 
2` Van Dijk, The Netherlands Indies and the Great War, 1914-1918, p. 125. 
2. The issue of food shortages is dealt with in more depth later in this thesis. 
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extent achieved its aim 30 Unfortunately the prices that Germany was prepared to pay 
for supplies meant that despite the best efforts of the Dutch government smuggling was 
rife. De Vries claims that by the end of the war the Netherlands had some 23,000 men 
involved in the fight against smuggling, although to little effect' Once the Germans 
closed the Dutch/Belgian border in 1916 smuggling became more difficult and lives 
were lost on the electric fence erected by the Germans along the entire length of the 
border. 32 
30 The most well known study of the workings of the NOT is Maanen, Charlotte. A., De Nederlandsche 
Overzee Trustmaatschappij. Middelpunt van het verkeer van onzijdlg Nederland met het buitenland 
tijdens den wereldoorlog, 1914-19, (The Hague: unknown publisher, 1935), although the more recent 
work, Frey, M., 'Trade ships and the neutrality of the Netherlands in the First World War', in 
International History Review, vol 19,3 August 1997, p. 541-562 is also of interest. See also Frey, 'Anglo- 
Dutch Relations During the First World War' for an overview of the wartime ecconomic relations 
between Great Britain and the Netherlands. 
" De Vries, 'Nederland als Non-beligerente Natie en de Internering van Buitenlandse Militairen 
Gedurende de Eerste Wereldoorlog', p. 86. 
32 Interest in this fence by historians has resurfaced in recent years but as yet few works exists that cover 
the impact of closing the border on the Netherlands as a whole. Most work that has been published 
concentrates on specific, localized effects. For an overview of the impact of the fence see Abbenhuis, 
The Art of Staying Neutral p164-169. Abbenhuis points out that the fence is rarely mentioned in archive 
documents and I would agree with her findings. The one exception to this is illustrations. The impact of a 
deserting soldier or smuggler caught on a barbed wire fence was irresistible to cartoonists of the time of 
all nationalities. There are several good examples in the KLM in Brussels and the LM in Delft 
Photographs can also be found in many of the picture magazines of the time. The fence its self became a 
tourist attraction. During the last two years of the war many day trippers went to view this new and 
controversial sight. De Vries, 'Nederland als Non-beligerente Natie en de Internering van Buitenlandse 
Militairen Gedurende de Ferste Wereldoorlog', p. 86. 
58 
The electric fence33 
http: //www. greatwar. nl/ 24.08.2008 
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Food and fuel were soon in short supply and as they and other goods became scarce 
their price increased. To counteract this, the government brought in the `distributiewet' 
(distribution law), a policy designed to ensure a basic supply of goods at a reasonable 
price. ' Local councils were responsible for buying in goods, often at a vastly inflated 
price, and then organizing the redistribution of rations at a lower, fixed, price. Central 
government met 90% of the resulting losses and local government the remaining 10%. 
This distribution system, although sound in theory, did not work well in practice and 
was subject to a barrage of public criticism. Firstly it was expensive. 35 Not only were 
goods bought in at a loss but there was also an increase in the number of civil servants 
needed to administer it. Many of these were hastily recruited and proved to be either 
incapable of performing the job or open to corruption. Secondly this huge bureaucratic 
system was cumbersome and very slow; food was sometime rotten before it was 
distributed. 
The winter of 1916-17 was very hard. Gas and electricity were both rationed which 
gave added emphasis to the food crisis. A growing housing shortage meant that 
overcrowding, with all of its inherent health risks, compounded the problems of many 
ordinary Netherlanders. The increased submarine activity in the North Sea meant that 
very little food was getting through and so in early February 1917 the bread ration was 
set at 400g per person per day. A form of bread ration had been in place since 1915 but 
this was now tightened. On 24 March 1917 this ration was reduced to 300g per person 
per day and by April this reduced amount was only available for seven out of nine 
'` Staats Blad No 416,19 August 1916. 
35 Verberne estimates the cost up to the end of1917 at Dfl 350 million. Verberne, Geschiedenis Van 
Nederland, Deel Ill, p. 361. 
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days. With the entry of the United States into the war all hope of further grain 
supplies disappeared and such potatoes as were available had to be exported to 
Germany in exchange for coal. This proved to be too much for the Dutch population 
and riots broke out in many of the larger towns protesting about the food shortages in 
general and the lack of potatoes in particular. Unusually these riots were led by women, 
the unfortunate Dutch housewives who were unable to find food to feed their families. ' 
Despite the declaration of neutrality issued at the start of the war there was never really 
any serious prospect of the Netherlands remaining unaffected by the outbreak of World 
War One. Even if, as seemed very unlikely in 1914, the Dutch cabinet succeeded in 
maintaining the neutral position they had adopted and remained outside of the actual 
fighting then the geographical position of the Netherlands in conjunction with its strong 
trading links with both Germany and Great Britain meant that it would be involved in 
many other ways. Indeed it is possible to argue, as some did at the time, that many 
Netherlanders benefited from the war as the national income rose in real terms despite a 
fall in the value of the guilder. 
Henrietta Roland Holst the revolutionary poetess, writing in 1926 about the 
Netherlands during the war said, 
In no other country did the bourgeoisie make capital out of the catastrophe of 
the war with such shameless cynicism, by all possible means, even the lowest 
and most despicable. 
36 Verberne, L. G. J., Geschiedenis Van Nederland, Deel 111, p. 361. 
" Flier, War finances in the Netherlands up to 1918 p. 108. 
38 Kossman, EH., The Low Countries, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978) p. 552. 
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Kossman makes the point that Holst's political opinions were known to be extreme and 
that at best this statement must be regarded as arbitrary as it cannot be proven and in 
the latter stages of the war even wealthier Netherlanders faced some drop in their 
standard of living 39 
As in those countries actually fighting in the war it was the poor that felt the effect of 
the food and fuel shortages the most. Those that did not have the financial resources to 
pay for goods on the black market were the ones who spent the last two years of the 
war cold and hungry. For the wealthier members of Dutch society rationing was an 
inconvenience but as compensation they were able to enjoy the more varied social life 
brought about by the influx numerous foreigners to The Hague and other major cities, 
including many of the interned officers who were allowed to live outside of the 
internment camps. Another similarity with many of the belligerent nations was the 
increase in the number of women who found employment outside of the home in the 
period 1914-18. Dutch men were not fighting in the war but many of them were 
mobilized and away from home leaving their womenfolk to take over, albeit 
temporarily, responsibilities normally held by men. 
It would be wrong to assume that all of Dutch life was disrupted by the war and sport 
was one area that blossomed in spite of the conflict. The number of competitions, 
tournaments and sports events in general increased during the war years, partly with an 
eye on keeping the mobilized troops occupied. When the 1916 Olympic Games were 
cancelled because of the war, a national Olympic games was held in Amsterdam. 
Likewise, despite the problems that the very cold winter of 1917 brought, it also 
39 Quoted in Kossman, The Low Countries, p. 553. 
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provided the chance to stage an Eifstedentocht; an event that even a world war would 
not stop the Dutch holding once the ice was available! 40 
Coen de Koning leaving Hindeloopen on his way to winning the 1917 Elfstedentocht. 
He was one of only two skaters ever to have won the Elfstedentocht twice. 41 
Politically, even though the war remained a time consuming and important item on the 
government's agenda, it did not completely monopolise Cabinet thinking and time was 
found for other domestic legislation to be debated and passed, including significant 
changes to both tax and suffrage law 
41 The Elfstedentocht, which literally translates as the eleven towns race is a long distance skating event 
that is only held in winters that are cold enough to freeze the canals and waterways that connect the 
eleven towns. The vagaries of the weather mean that the race is held infrequently and when a cold winter 
does produce the correct conditions for the race the day becomes an unofficial public holiday. 
41 http: //geschiedenis. vpro. nl/artikelen/33274984/ 24 August 2008. Evert van Benthem was the second, 
winning in 1985 and 1986.1 am indebted to Prof. Dr. Peter Romijn for this information. 
63 
Chapter 3N 
The first few weeks: applying the rules in practice. 
The Dutch had very little time to ponder the niceties of their neutral status and its 
inherent responsibilities as the first candidates for internment crossed the Dutch border 
within days of the outbreak of the war. ' The proximity of the fighting to the Dutch 
frontiers made it inevitable that some soldiers from both sides would, either 
deliberately or inadvertently, cross into the Netherlands. The initial response of the 
Dutch border guards was mixed: this was a new situation and in the confusion of the 
mobilisation clear orders for the processing of foreign soldiers had not been given a 
high priority. Formal declarations of neutrality and the rules relating to internees were 
published in the Staatscourant within days of the outbreak of hostilities. It took a little 
longer for these to be converted into orders and communicated to the Dutch border 
guards. The numbers involved were small and as these first potential internees entered 
Holland they were sent, regardless of nationality, to the garrison commander at 
Maastricht for his attention. 2 In the months of August and September 1914 some 52 
Belgians and 179 Germans arrived at Maastricht of which 15 and 130 respectively were 
wounded. 3 At this stage detailed instructions for how to deal with these potential 
'On Sm August 1914 the Netherlands confirmed its status as a neutral in a special edition of the 
Staatscourant. Smit, Nederland in de Eerste Wereldoorlog Vol 11 p. 12. 
2 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering p. 4. 
3 Oosterman, `De Intemeering hier to lande' p. 805. 
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internees had not yet been issued. Indeed many situations that were to occur over the 
next four years had not even been anticipated. Languages were also a problem. Very 
few of the Dutch soldiers assigned to protect the borders spoke English, French or 
German and very few potential internees spoke Dutch. Confusion was inevitable. 
The first German internees were part of the 27th and 34th Infantry Brigades, whilst the 
Belgians were an assorted group who crossed into the Netherlands in order to escape 
falling into the hands of the Germans. The first Belgians to cross the border in any 
number did so as a result of the German attack on Liege. ,5 Many, from both sides, who 
entered Holland in those first few days, were simply separated from their units by the 
speed of the German advance. Once in Maastricht these first internees were segregated 
by nationality and held in the army barracks, under the same conditions as those 
enjoyed by the Dutch army. 6 Unfortunately for Dutch assertions of neutrality, not all 
unintentional crossings of the border resulted in internment. Two German officers 
travelling by car to Aachen took the wrong road and ended up in Maastricht, where the 
helpful Dutch border patrol not only let them refuel their car but also provided 
directions for the correct road before allowing them to continue on their journey. This 
particular incident came to the attention of the French government who sent a rapid and 
strongly worded reprimand to the Dutch government that resulted in more formal 
guidelines being issued. Although the most public, this was almost certainly not the 
only instance of genuinely lost troops being allowed to leave Dutch territory. 
4 On 7 October 1914, in anticipation of the imminent fall of Antwerp, Snijders sent a letter to all of his 
army commanders in the field with a very clear and workable set of instructions regarding the handling 
of potential internees. ARA 2.13.17 inv no 113. 
s. Laporte, Belgisch Geintemeerden in Nederland Gedurende De Eerste Wereldoorlog, p. 10. 
'LM Geschiedenis der Interneering p. 10. A copy of the orders that were eventually issued can also be 
found in De Vries `Nederland als Non-beligerente Natie en de Internering van Buitenlandse Militairen 
Gedurende de Eerste Wereldoorlog' as appendix iii. 
65 
On 17 August 1914, some time after the first internees had already been identified and 
incarcerated, attempts were made to ensure that all border guards were aware of their 
responsibilities with regard to potential internees. The Commander of the Field Army 
issued instructions to the commanders of the III and IV divisions of the III Infantry 
Brigade and the Cavalry Brigade on how to deal with foreign soldiers crossing into the 
Netherlands. The salient points of these instructions were that i) those that were about 
to cross should be warned of the consequences and ii) those who had crossed in error 
and were discovered very close to the border should be asked to leave and interned 
only if they chose not to comply. In order to minimise any possible confusion Dutch 
soldiers who were fluent in German and French were to be used at the borders to ensure 
that all instructions and warnings were properly understood. 
The medical services of the Dutch Red Cross were also present along the Dutch border 
at the points closest to the fighting. They had been given permission to cross into 
Belgium, up to one hour's travelling distance from the border, in order to give aid to 
injured soldiers where no other medical help was available, and this they did on the 
first few days of the war. In reality the initial wave of humanitarian action by the Dutch 
Red Cross was halted by their Commander-in-Chief, Snijders, as soon as he realized 
the implications of bringing unconscious soldiers across the border. Despite a few 
complaints from German soldiers who found themselves interned, both the Germans 
and the Belgians had appreciated the actions of the Dutch Red Cross. Official 
permission was sought from both German and Belgian governments to offer assistance 
to wounded soldiers, regardless of nationality, who were lying close to the Dutch 
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border. Both governments agreed without hesitation and the Dutch medics were able to 
resume their activities. ' Some casualties were obviously treatable on the spot, but 
others required attention that could only be provided in a hospital. These more serious 
casualties were brought back into the Netherlands. The rule applied here with regard to 
internment was that any injured soldiers who were given treatment in a Dutch hospital 
were offered it under the condition that once recovered they would be liable for 
internment. ' Those that were unwilling to accept this condition were, theoretically at 
least, left on the battlefield. Those that were unconscious when they were brought into 
the Netherlands were deemed not liable for internment because they had not willingly 
crossed the border. Simple rules when written out, but there were to be many inquiries 
during the course of the war as former patients claimed that they had been wrongly 
interned, that they had been unconscious when entering the country or that they had not 
been warned of the consequences of accepting Dutch medical help9. Given the 
appalling state that many of the casualties were in when found, often without 
identification, the confusion is hardly surprising. An example of the sort of problem 
that could occur is the case of Captain Bouvier, a member of the Belgian army who 
was brought `dying' to the military hospital in Waesmunster. Later he was removed by 
Belgian sisters to St Jean Steen where he was given over for further nursing to the 
Maristen-klooster. 1° On 21 November the convent was raided by Dutch soldiers 
looking for Belgian military personnel. It seems that many other Belgian soldiers had 
' LM Geschiedenis der Interneering p. 20, Mandere. Geschiedenis Van Het Nederlandse Roode Kruis. p. 
129-132 and De Vries, 'Nederland als Non-beligerente Natie en de Internering van Buitenlandse 
Militairen Gedurende de Eerste Wereldoorlog', p. 92. See also Tuinen, 'De Militaire Handhaving van 
Neutraliteit en Gezag' p. 72. 
'The Ministry of War issued 'Regels omtrent de Intemeering van oorlogvoerenden en verpleegd 
gewonden' (Regulations for the internment of belligerents and wounded that had received medical care) 
published in the Nederlandse Staatscourant no 185 on 9 August 1914. 
9. ARA 2.05.04 box 742 inv no 35966. Letter from General Snijders to Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated 
18 December 1914. 
'o It is unclear whether these sisters were nuns or nurses. They may well have been both. 
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been helped there and the nuns had failed to inform the military authorities. A lot of 
confusion surrounds the position of Capt Bouvier but eventually Snijders ruled that 
because Bouvier had crossed the border alone and in civilian dress he would allow him 
to be released. Snijders seems to give more weight to these two factors than to 
Bouvier's claim that he should be released because he was unconscious when brought 
over the border. " Despite the general confusion the Dutch did endeavour to abide by 
the rules, trying to offer humanitarian help without prejudicing their neutral status. The 
Dutch Red Cross not only collected wounded from the battlefields, in a visit to a 
hospital just across the Belgian border in Eysden they persuaded to German authorities 
to allow them to remove some of the very severely wounded for care in the 
Netherlands. The Germans were initially reluctant to agree to this but the overcrowding 
in the hospital was a major problem and so eventually they agreed. 12 
A further problem for the Dutch authorities during the initial stages of the war was the 
status of aircraft from the belligerent forces that, for a variety of reasons, found 
themselves either over, or forced to land in, Dutch territory. The Germans argued that 
aircraft should be treated as ships, so that aircraft experiencing technical problems 
could land in the Netherlands in the same way that a sinking ship could seek shelter in 
a neutral harbour. The Dutch did not agree with this position. In their eyes aircraft were 
another form of war weaponry and any transgression of Dutch territory was an 
infringement of their neutrality. Accordingly any aircrew entering the Netherlands were 
interned, as were their aircraft. In his discussion of the legal basis for the Netherlands' 
declaration of neutrality Bosboom concedes that it was an error to omit aircraft from 
" ARA 2.05.04 Inv No 35966 Letter from General Snijders to Minister of Foreign Affairs dated 18 
December 1914. 
12 De Telegraaf 7 August 1914. 
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the declaration of 30" July 1914. A mistake, which he says, "was not repeated in the 
next". He ensured that the Royal Decree of 3`' August 1914 made full reference to 
transgressions across Dutch borders by foreign aircraft. " 
This ruling was not yet in accordance with contemporary Dutch law. The Oranjeboek14 
of 1915 says: when foreign airships and aircraft, for whatever reason, are found on 
Dutch territory or in Dutch territorial waters they, and their crew, are liable for 
internment. '-5 This was a classic example of events and technology overtaking the 
lawmakers. Nothing existed in either international or Dutch law to cover this 
eventuality because, quite simply, the extensive use of aircraft had not been anticipated 
when existing treaties and laws had been agreed. 16 Where aircraft landed in the sea then 
the same rules as for shipping were applied. For example a British aircraft manned by 
two crewmen was rescued some 10 miles east of the lightship Galloper, in neutral 
waters, by a Norwegian steamship and brought into the Hook of Holland. The crew 
were released but the aircraft was interned. During the early years of the war it was not 
uncommon for regulations to be put into effect on the authority of the Commander-in- 
Chief before the appropriate legislation had been finalised by the government. This is 
not to say that the Dutch Army was acting contrary to the wishes of the government or 
outside of the spirit of the peace treaties, but simply that the speed of events on the 
ground was considerably faster than the speed of the administration in The Hague. In 
April 1916 Lambertus Carsten, a reserve first lieutenant in the Grenadiers published his 
doctoral thesis from the University of Leiden entitled Maatregelen ter Handhaving 
Bosboom, in Moeflijke Omstandigheden p. 324. 
14 The official record of Dutch parliamentary proceedings. 
's Carsten, Maatregelen ter Handhaving Onzer Onzijdigheid in Den Huidigen Oorlog, p. 122. 
16 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering p. 26. 
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Onzer Onzijdigheid in Den Huidigen Oorlog (Regulation for Upholding our Neutrality 
in the Present War). This well written document summarised all of the new situations 
that had occurred since July 1914 and the new laws that had been enacted to deal with 
them. It illustrates just how much had to be dealt with in 1914 and 1915, especially as 
this was not the only new legislation brought before the Dutch Parliament in this time. 
They also had a domestic agenda to deal with. " 
The first internment camp 
As the number of internees increased the need for a permanent internment camp 
became evident and a suitable site was sought. There were several criteria to be 
considered. The site needed to be well away from the border area but still easily 
accessible. It needed to be easy to guard with a peaceful local population that were 
unlikely to react in an adverse manner to having foreign soldiers living in their midst. 
Finally there had to be a source of good drinking water in the locality. Alkmaar was 
chosen and a Royal Decree of 9th August 1914 confirmed the choice. W. H. de 
Lussanet de la Sabloniere, a former officer in the Koninldijke Nederlansche-Indische 
Leger, (KNIL) (Royal Dutch-Indian Army) was named as commandant and was 
confirmed in post as a member of the army reserve and given the rank of Colonel in the 
Infantry. "' He arrived at the new camp on 8 August and the first internees were 
transferred from Limburg one day later. The instructions for the commandant of an 
internment camp were issued by Ministerial Decree on I Ith August 1914. 
17 Carsten, Maatregel ter Handhaving Onzer ontijdigheid in den Huldigen Oorlog has a good overview 
of Dutch domestic legislation of the time. 
18 Oosterman, `De Interneering hier to lande' p. 805. 
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The German attack on Liege in the first week of August and its eventual capture had 
increased the numbers of German and Belgium troops arriving in Holland, many of 
whom were injured. These included a patrol of Belgian lancers, consisting of one 
officer and 24 men who had been cut off by the speed of the advancing German army 
and had opted to flee into the Netherlands to avoid falling into enemy hands. 19 These 
men were sent to the care of the garrison commander at Maastricht, from where they 
were transferred by train to the newly established internment camp at Alkmaar. The 
speed with which events were overtaking the Dutch at this stage in the war is shown by 
the fact that the first internees arrived at Alkmaar on the same day as the Royal Decree 
was issued formalising its creation. 20 By 17 August 1914 Camp Alkmaar had 111 
occupants, 42 Belgians (2 officers and 40 other ranks) and 69 Germans (4 officers and 
65 other ranks). 21 On 11 August 1914 the government issued the `Aanwijzingen voor 
den Commandant van het Interneeringsdepot' (Instructions for the Commandant of the 
Internment Camp) a very common sense set of instructions that still left a large degree 
of flexibility for the commandant to deal with the unexpected as he saw fit. 
The Belgians at Alkmaar were housed in an empty warehouse belonging to the 
Ministry of Food after permission had been given for this by the Department of Justice. 
In the absence of anything more suitable the Germans found themselves housed in the 
gymnasium of the local secondary school. It was obvious that this could only be a 
temporary solution to the problem, not only was the accommodation unsuitable but it 
19 Oostermans, 'De Interneering hier to Land' p. 803. 
a" Royal Decree dated 9 August 1914 nominated Alkmaar as the site of the first internment camp and 
fixed the strength of its staff. See also Oostermans 'De Interneering hier to Land' p. 805. 
21 Ostermans 'De Interneering hier to Land' p. 805 and Smit Nederland in de Eerste Wereldoorlog Vol 1!, 
p. 32. 
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was also considered desirable that the two nationalities be housed in different 
locations. ' The decision was therefore taken to move the Germans to a new, tented 
camp that was to be established near Bergen. This was done on 17th August, at which 
time the Belgians took their place, moving from the warehouse into the gymnasium of 
the school. " Even this arrangement was to be temporary as it was still considered that 
Alkmaar and Bergen were too close to each other and any further increase in the 
number of internees could result in disorder between the two. 
The location and establishment of a new camp for the Belgians was put in the hands of 
Kolonel der Infantrie Jhr Teding van Berkhout who selected Gaasterland as the site of 
the new camp and became its first commandant. Once again, the organisation and 
administration of the internees lagged behind the speed of events, as Belgians were 
transferred there on 24th August 1914 - before the camp was ready for occupation. The 
Germans had already left Alkmaar the week before for their new camp in Bergen. 
Initially a tented camp and later equipted with barracks, this was to remain the main 
location for German internees until the end of the war. The new wooden 
accommodation was eventually built with assistance from funds from Germany. All 
new internees were now transferred directly to either Bergen or Gaasterland and 
Alkmaar was formally closed on 24th August 1914.1 
Not all foreign soldiers crossing into the Netherlands, however, were liable for 
internment. In accordance with existing international law, escaping POWs were 
22 Leir, F. J. van., `Internering van vreemde militairen in Nederland tijdens de eerste wereldoorlog', Ons 
Wapen, 14 jaargang, No 2. (1967), p. 50-57. p. 52. 
' Oosterman, 'De Intemeering hier to lande' p. 805. 
24 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering p. 15 
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allowed to transit through the Netherlands on their way home and were frequently 
given assistance to speed them on their way. The Dutch press, especially the illustrated 
press, often carried stories of improbable or exciting escapes, usually supported by a 
picture of the individuals concerned side by side with the Dutch border guard who had 
allowed them entry into Holland. Interestingly, this was not the case in Switzerland. 
Like the Netherlands, Switzerland was a neutral country that offered shelter to POWs 
from both sides as part of an official exchange treaty but it had existing legislation in 
place that allowed it to send back escaping POWs that crossed its borders. " 
Deserters were another problem. Almost exclusively German, the number of deserters 
increased as the war progressed and presented the Dutch authorities with several 
problems. Not least was that of identifying a true deserter as opposed to someone 
merely wishing to avoid internment. In 1917 (the only year for which figures are 
available) at least 488 German soldiers were interned and then released as deserters ' 
Undoubtedly many more never even reached the stage of being interned. Precise 
figures are unavailable but one estimate put the number of German deserters living in 
the Netherlands by the end of the war as high as 20,000. This figure is taken from an 
anonymous article published in a New York magazine in 1918, which claims to have 
been written by a German deserter who had made his way through the Netherlands to 
America. It is, however, difficult to verify this figure; the actual number may have been 
considerably less. These were soon to be joined by many former prisoners of war who 
took the opportunity to escape when being repatriated through the Netherlands 
immediately after the war, because they had no wish to return to a defeated Germany. 
'Gegevens betreffende de Interneering p. 4 MRA Inventaris de Archieve fonds 1914-1811 Personalia 
box 17 No 89. 
2' Numbers taken from ARA 2.05.04 various documents. 
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These, and the status of the German deserters, will be dealt with in more detail later in 
this thesis. 
In the early months of the hostilities there were a number of complex, and often high 
profile, cases that served to codify Dutch practices on internment and set precedents 
that could be followed in the future. The Dutch authorities were not only faced with 
interpreting the law of internment with regard to belligerents crossing its land borders. 
As early as September 1914 they were confronted with an incident that required 
interpretation of the laws concerning their responsibilities at sea. 2' 
The sinking of HMS Cressy, HMS Hogue and HMS Aboukir 
The law with respect to the status of shipwrecked and wounded sailors had been 
incorporated in The Hague Convention in an attempt to bring the rules governing war 
at sea in line with the principles of the Geneva Convention. They were not simple, nor, 
as time would prove, were they completely comprehensive. In plain language, any 
sailors from belligerent navies, shipwrecked or wounded within neutral waters, that 
were rescued by a neutral ship were liable for internment without regard to any other 
shipping in the area. In international waters the situation was more complex. 
Vandenbosch offers a concise summary of the rules applicable when a neutral vessel 
affected a rescue of sailors from one or other of the belligerent forces 
The sinking of the Cressy, Hogue and Aboukir was not the only time when the Dutch Government had 
to interpret ate the laws of internment with regard to shipping. There were many others. Some are 
illustrated in Smit, Bescheiden betreffende de buitenlandse politiek van Nederland 1848-1919, Werde 
dee11914-17, No's 131,132 and183 relate to German commercial shipping in the Dutch colonies. No 
265 concerns a German submarine that was sighted, followed, but not interred. 
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Article 12 of this (the Geneva) Convention deals with wounded, sick, or 
shipwrecked, found, among others, on neutral merchant ships. In regard to these 
persons this article recognises the right of belligerent warships to demand that 
they be handed over. Article 14 stipulates that such persons falling into the 
power of the other belligerent are prisoners of war, and the Article then further 
stipulates what may be done with them. One of the possibilities cited is that 
they may be taken into a neutral port. In this event, Article 15 then further 
provides that the shipwrecked, sick or wounded, who are landed at a neutral 
port with the consent of the local authorities, must, unless an arrangement is 
made to the contrary between the neutral and the belligerents, be guarded by the 
neutral state so as to prevent them again taking part in the operations of the 
war. 28 
The failure of the still skeletal international law with respect to internees to cover all 
eventualities was illustrated with the sinking of the British Men of War the HMS 
Hogue, the HMS Cressy and the HMS Aboukir to the north west of the Maas Light 
Vessel, some 30 miles off of the Dutch coast on 22 September 1914. ' The unfortunate 
crews of these three ships were woken in the early hours by an attack from the German 
submarine U9. Taken by surprise there was little that the British crews could do and all 
three ships were sunk. Many lives were lost in the attack and the few survivors that 
remained took to the lifeboats. Fortunately for the shipwrecked sailors a Dutch 
merchant ship from the Koninklijke Nederlandsche Stoomboot Maatschappij, the SS 
Flora, saw the sinking of the Cressy and rushed to assist the crew. At the same time her 
captain contacted a sister ship from the same line, the SS Titian, that was also in the 
vicinity and which similarly came quickly to the scene. As the last of approximately 
125 survivors were being transferred to the Flora two German submarines were sighted 
in the distance, a fact which convinced the captain of the Flora not to attempt to land 
his passengers in England as requested, but instead to return directly to Ijmuiden in the 
ffi Vandenbosch, The Neutrality of the Netherlands during the World War, p. 154. 
'9 Hogendijk, J. H., De Nederlandsche Koopvaardij in den Oorlogstijd (1914-18), (Amsterdam: Van 
Holfema & Warendorf, 1930). p. 423. 
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Netherlands. For the same reason it was not considered safe for the survivors to be 
transferred to the British destroyers that had by now also made their way to the scene 
but who then left to give chase to the two German U-boats. 
The Titian rescued a further 114 men and two Dutch fishing vessels, which had also 
seen the sinking and had held off for fear of mines, now also moved in and collected 
the last few survivors. On the way back to port the Titian passed a British warship, the 
Lucifer, who relieved it of most of its passengers leaving only 20 survivors and five 
bodies to be offloaded at the Hook of Holland. 
Many of the shipwrecked crew required immediate medical attention, indeed several 
died before reaching the Dutch coast. Even those that were not injured needed dry 
clothes and food. The plight of the shipwrecked sailors captured the imagination of the 
Dutch public and they were quickly re-clothed and fed. 30 The injured that survived the 
transfer were taken to hospital on arrival, whilst their able-bodied colleagues were 
placed in internment. At this early stage in the war there was no separate internment 
camp for the British and so they were interned with their Belgian allies in the newly 
established camp at Gaasterland. This was confirmed in the Nieuwe Courant on 23nd 
September 1914 in an article that also informed its readers that the dead would in all 
probability be buried in the Netherlands, although the British Consulate was trying to 
arrange for the bodies to be shipped back to England 31 
The Dutch government immediately began to examine their liability to intern the 
3" LM Plakboeken deel 3 Q193-40. 
31 Nieuwe Courant 23 September 1914 
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sailors and, to the delight of the British, swiftly came to the conclusion that any 
internment would be unlawful. These sailors fell into a category that was not clearly 
covered by The Hague Convention, that of belligerent crews rescued by a neutral ship 
that did not then pass a belligerent warship on its way to a neutral port. Although not 
taken up in the main body of the convention, Professor Renault, an advisor to the 
Commission who drafted the Convention, had anticipated this eventuality. In his 
opinion shipwrecked sailors picked up by a neutral ship, who did not encounter a ship 
from any of the belligerent nations on their way to a neutral port, were not liable for 
internment by the neutral power. Professor Renault's views on the subject were much 
quoted in the press reports concerning the release of the British sailors. 
A report from Captain Nilmont Nicholson, the captain of HMS Hogue, to Vice Admiral 
GF Tydeman, the director and Commandant of the Navy in Amsterdam written on the 
day after the sinking confirmed the essential facts of the case. In his report Captain 
Nicholson makes every effort to establish the fact that no contact was made with any 
German vessel in the area. 
I wish particularly to bring to your notice that this was the only occasion on 
which the Germans were seen and that no communication of any kind, either 
32 verbal or by signal passed between these vessels and the SS Flora. 
Having made this point Capt Nicholson went on to commend the bravery of the 
captain of the Flora, Captain RP Voorham, who having seen the Cressy sink and 
32 ARA 2.05.04 box 745 nr 3303 Letter from Captain N. N. Nicholson of HMS Hogue to Vice Admiral 
G. F. Tydeman dated 23 February 1915. Also a statement from Captain J. A. Berkhout, captain of the 
Dutch ship Titan dated 24 September 1914. 
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although unaware of whether the cause was mines or torpedoes, immediately steamed 
to the scene of the disaster and was instrumental in saving no less than 276 lives. ' 
Clearly the Dutch had acquitted themselves well, as a letter of thanks from the British 
Ambassador to The Hague, Sir Alan Johnstone, to Loudon dated 25 September 
confirms. Indeed the Dutch played the gallant saviour card to maximum effect insisting 
that once released from internment the shipwrecked sailors were to be considered as 
guests of the Dutch government until arrangements could be made for their return to 
Great Britain. The only bill later presented to the British government was for the 
services of the Zeeland Steamship Company who charged Dfl 3893.60 to transport the 
men home. In a further letter to Loudon dated 11 November 1914 Johnstone also 
thanked him for the loan of 255 overcoats, which had now been return to the Dutch 
government 3` The bravery and generosity of the Dutch caught the imagination of the 
British public and one; Mr M Stephenson of Southport, Lancashire, was so inspired 
that he wrote personally to Loudon saying `Please accept this postal order as a gift for 
the kindness of the Holland nation to our sailors. It is good of the Dutch people to keep 
neutral in his struggle' (The amount was for three shillings). 35 
Following the problems of August and the trespass of German soldiers into the 
Netherlands, which had prompted such a swift and virulent complaint from the French, 
the Dutch authorities were keen to abide by the letter of the law in this instance. 
Initially there appeared to be very little controversy, the ships had been sunk as a result 
'3 ARA 2.05.04 box 745 nr 3303. Letter from Captain N. N. Nicholson of HMS Hogue to Vice Admiral 
G. F. Tydeman dated 23 February 1915. 
34 ARA 2.05.04 box 745 nr 3303 Letter from Johnstone to Loudon dated 11 November 1914 and again a 
further letter dated 08 January 1915 enclosing a cheque for the transportation costs. 
35 ARA 2.05.04 box 745 nr 3303 Letter from Mr Stephenson dated 30 September 1914. 
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of a legitimate act of war, the Dutch merchant men had behaved not only correctly but 
also very bravely in making the rescue and there seemed to be little disagreement with 
the Dutch interpretation of the law. In a file note sent to the Ministry of War dated 12 
October 1914 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that the German ambassador 
in the Netherlands had given his verbal agreement to the release of the British sailors .3 
This opinion was strengthened by the receipt of an official note from the Germans 
dated 28 September 1914, 'some six days after the rescue, that again confirmed their 
agreement to the release from internment provided that any German sailors found in a 
similar position would be treated in exactly the same manner. 
By 28 October, however, the German position had changed and a formal complaint 
was lodged. Even before the formal complaint was lodged the matter was being hotly 
debated in the German press. The Kölnische Zeitung was fully in favour of the British 
sailors being interned in the Netherlands and the Dutch government was clearly 
concerned about its position and German public opinion on the stance it had taken. 
Copies of several newspaper reports, sent by Dutch diplomats in Germany are lodged 
in the archives alongside the official correspondence. The German stance was also 
discussed in Dutch newspapers although there appears to have been no inclination to 
take sides ' The German case was based on several points. Firstly it argued that as the 
British had not signed The Hague Convention on Naval Warfare, the law being applied 
by the Netherlands was in any event invalid. The Dutch response was that as the 
Netherlands had ratified the treaty the status of the British in this instance was 
' ARA 2.05.04 box 745 nr 3303 File note from Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Ministry of War dated 14 
October 1914. 
"ARA 2.05.04 box 745 nr 3303 Official note from German Embassy to Dutch Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs dated 28 September 1914. Unsigned. 
'ARA 2.05.04 box 745 inv 3303 various documents. 
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irrelevant. A more crucial objection, and one which had potentially far reaching 
consequences for Dutch impartiality during the rest of the war, was that the British had 
been released without German consent-391n a stinging reply The Dutch government 
said, 
The Dutch government is of the opinion that its position as a neutral 
government does not permit it to ask advice from one of the belligerent powers 
about measurements for maintaining its neutrality, much less so that the taking 
of such measurements should be dependent on the permission of one of these 
powers. 
It softened the blow by adding that; 
It (the Dutch government) cannot contradict the duties of a neutral if it then 
follows the same line towards the other belligerent power. 
The Dutch government also quoted the findings of the Renault report as a justification 
for their action. 40 
The German government were, however, reluctant to let the matter drop and continued 
to lodge objections with the Dutch although the Dutch consistently refused to alter their 
position. When the Dutch wished to publish the correspondence on this matter in the 
Orange Boek (the official record of Dutch government actions) in April 1916 the 
Germans refused to give their consent on the grounds that, in their view, the matter was 
still open. 4 
3' Smit, Bescheiden betreffende de buitenlandse politiek van Nederland 1848-1919, Vierde deel 1914-17. 
nr 505 p. 521. 
4D ARA 2.05.04 box 745 nr 3303 undated but after 27 January 1915, also Smit, Bescheiden betreffende de 
buitenlandse politiek van Nederland 1848-1919, Vierde dee11914-17. p. 521. 
" Vandenbosch, The neutrality of the Netherlands during the World War has a more detailed 
consideration of the laws regarding the internment of English crews in chapter 10. It also cites several 
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Eenige der geredde matrozen, voorloopig gekleed in de uniform 
van onze soldaten. 
A few of the rescued sailors, temporarily clothed in uniforms from our soldiers. 
The fall of Antwerp 
Until the end of September 1914 the problem of the internees had been a minor one. 
Clearly the main preoccupation of the Dutch armed forces was the defence of its 
country's borders and any manpower or equipment that had to be diverted from this 
task to guard internees was to be regretted, but as the numbers were relatively small it 
was a manageable problem. This was soon to change. 
In his top secret report to the cabinet on the current political and military situation 
other scenarios where either the Germans or the Allies called the actions of the Dutch Government into 
question. 
81 
dated 20 August 1914 General Snijders considered the possibility that the Germans 
would attack Antwerp. 
When the fortifications at Antwerp are attacked or captured by the Germans, we 
must take steps to deal with the situation because the fortifications on the north 
side are very close to our border. Trespass onto our land, by Germans or 
Belgians, must be repelled with force. ' 
Snijder's main fear was the infringement of Dutch neutrality that might occur if the 
fighting spilled over onto Dutch territory, including the waters of the Schelde. Given 
the example of the recent German attack on Liege, he must also have been aware that 
even if the Netherlands was not drawn into the war by the need to actively defend her 
borders, then there was the possibility of a sudden increase in the number of internees. 
Press coverage of the German attack on liege had not been favourable to the Germans. 
There was much anticipation of what would happen if Germany attacked Holland. ' It 
is unlikely that even he, who had anticipated most of the key events of 1914 with 
remarkable foresight, could have predicted exactly how many servicemen and civilians 
would cross the Dutch frontier as a result of the fall of Antwerp. Snijders was well 
aware of the possible risks to the Netherlands neutral status if Antwerp fell, and that the 
fall of Antwerp was a very strong possibility. As early as 20`h August 1914 he wrote to 
his commanders advising them of the steps to be taken if such a situation occurred. ' 
Nevertheless on 7 October 1914 he wrote a long letter to all of his land and sea 
commanders clarifying some of the more intricate details of the internment regulations 
and cautioning them against those (clearly Belgians although not actually named as 
'n ARA 2.13.70 Report by Gen. Snijders to the Commander of the Field Army dated 20 August 1914. 
43. Moeyes, Buiten Schot, p. 91. 
44 ARA 2.13.70 Dutch Commander-in-Chief to the Commander of the Field Army 20 August 1914. 
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such) who would try to avoid internment by claiming that they were not from a 
belligerent country but merely a country that had been attacked by a belligerent. ' 
Antwerp, with its double ring of inner and outer fortresses, had not been attacked in the 
main German push through Belgium to reach the French troops. After the fall of Liege 
in mid August, 65,000 members of the Belgian field army had retired to Antwerp and 
these supplemented the 80,000 reservists that were already based there. A series of 
Belgian sorties to attack the German flank, which was under the command of General 
von Muck, convinced the Germans that the city had to be taken. 6 They commenced the 
bombardment of the outer fortresses on 28 September and took them with relative ease. 
The British government, mindful of the importance of securing the channel ports and 
the Schelde sent Winston Churchill, then Minister for the Navy, to Antwerp to 
investigate the situation personally. Unconvinced of the Belgian ability to hold 
Antwerp long enough for the British expeditionary force to reach and reinforce the 
channel ports, the British government dispatched an emergency force consisting of 
2,000 men from the British Naval Division to Antwerp on 4 October and a further 
4,000 more the day after. 47 
The tale of the British involvement in the fall of Antwerp was, with hindsight, never 
going to be a glorious one despite the best intentions of those involved. The Royal 
Naval Division (RND) sent to Antwerp was not properly prepared for combat. It was a 
mixed unit consisting of naval reservists and a great many volunteers. Moreover these 
'e Gegevens betreffende de Interneering p. 8 and Laporte, Belgische Geintemeerden in Nederland 
Gedurende De Eerste Wereldoorlog, p. 8. 
" Churchill, Winston., The World Crisis 1911-1918, (London: Penguin, 2007). p. 189. 
'7 A summary of the events of early October in Belgium can be found in Charles, Prof. DrJ. L., `Sinjoren 
Onder Vuur', 14-18 De Eerste Wereldoorlog, Band I (Amsterdam, Amsterdam Boek). p. 301-306. 
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were not only naval volunteers but also included ex-miners from the north of England 
who had rushed to join their local army regiments in August 1914 but due to a surplus 
of volunteers had found themselves being diverted to enlist in the RND. The 
commanders and some Senior NCOs were regular soldiers from either the Army, Navy 
or the Marines but many of the naval reservists who had been intended to make up the 
bulk of the enlisted men were transferred out mid-training to take up other 
appointments which left the level of experience in the division very low "s 
The first British troops arrived in Antwerp on 6 October 1914. By 8 October the order 
for retreat had been given and it was with that order that the confusion started which 
was to result in some 1500 members of the RND crossing the Dutch border. The naval 
party in Antwerp consisted of two brigades of three battalions each. The officer 
delivering the order for retreat at 5pm gave it not, as he should have, to the Brigade 
Commander, Commodore Henderson, but instead to Commander Campbell of Drake 
battalion, informing him that Commander Henderson was already aware of the order, 
which in fact he was not. The result was that whilst the Second brigade, comprising the 
Marine brigades and Drake battalion left as soon as possible, Commander Henderson 
and the remaining three battalions Hawke, Benlow and Collingwood of the First 
brigade did not begin their retreat until shortly before midnight. The bulk of the Second 
brigade, hampered by the many refugees travelling on the same road, eventually made 
it to St Gillaes where they entrained and completed their retreat. Because of their late 
start and a combination of bad staff work, poor intelligence gathering and the sheer 
'A more detailed insight into the composition of the Royal Naval Brigade and the limitations of its 
training can be found in Jerrold. D., The Royal Navy Division, London: Hutchinson & Co, 1923. 
(reprinted 1995 &2004 Naval and Military Press Ltd). See also Churchill, The World Crisis 1911- 
1918, p. 199 -200. 
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physical exhaustion of the men, the members of the First brigade were unable to follow 
their colleagues. In the confusion of the retreat the Division became separated, some 
managing to entrain at Kemseke. These, however, were later taken by the Germans and 
spent the rest of the war as POWs. The remainder, some 1500 men, believing, it later 
became apparent incorrectly, that the Germans had already taken the railway line a 
little way down from St Gillaes and that they were in danger of being taken captive by 
the Germans were led by Commander Henderson over the Dutch border. 
Henderson's decision to enter Holland was later upheld by the Admiralty in a formal 
investigation into the occurrences at Antwerp. 49 Whatever the outcome of later 
investigations, however, it was of immense importance to the welfare and treatment of 
the interned British soldiers that right from the start of their internment they were not 
held to be culpable in any way for their internment. Indeed public opinion in Great 
Britain held the incompetence of government responsible for the loss of 1,500 fighting 
men at a time when they were much needed. In the eyes of their countrymen, their 
superiors and the many charitable organisations that supported prisoners of war, the 
British soldiers interned in the Netherlands were considered to be the equivalent of 
POWs and were therefore accorded the same help and support that POWs received. 
This support from the home nation is thrown into sharp relief when compared to the 
relationship between the Belgian government and its interned soldiers. 
The retreat by a large section of the Belgian army from Antwerp into the Netherlands is 
49 PRO ADM 116/1914 The Board of Enquiry into the retreat of the First Naval Brigade from Antwerp 
details the poor condition of the men at the time of the retreat and the limited options open to Henderson. 
See also Churchill, The World Crisis 1911-1918 . p204. 
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an unresolved issue in Belgian historySO The basic facts are undeniable. The Germans 
continued their bombardment of the city even after the withdrawal of the Belgian Court 
and the British reinforcements. The result was inevitable and on 10 October 1914 
Antwerp formally surrendered. The Germans had by this time all but surrounded the 
city, leaving just one exit open, to the west. This was the route taken by the Belgians as 
they made their way to safety in Hollands' The controversy that has not yet been fully 
answered concerns the timing of the retreat and the role played by the Belgian officer 
corps. It was alleged that many of the ordinary soldiers had already left their posts 
before the order for retreat was given and that desertion on a massive scale had taken 
place. It was also alleged in many eyewitness accounts of the retreat given by ordinary 
soldiers, that the Belgian officers abandoned their men and sought safety for 
themselves, a view supported by Bosboom, the then Dutch Minister of War. This 
situation only added to the confusion over who was eligible for internment and who 
was not. One of Oort's criteria for defining a potential internee was that they were in 
the company of a commanding officer. The majority of the Belgians entering the 
Netherlands in October 1914 were clearly not under any form of command and this 
made the job of the border guards especially difficult. ' In his thesis on the internment 
of the Belgians, Laporte disputes the allegation of mass desertion, but not that of 
dereliction of duty by the officers. `3 He asserts that the Belgian actions were on a par 
with the British and that therefore the Belgian internees should have received the same 
treatment from their government as the British enjoyed. Laporte acknowledges that 
For a Belgian viewpoint see Mamet, Major WE M. retrait6., La Chute D'Anvers et L'internment des 
Soldats beiges en Hollande, (S. A. Brugeoise d'Imprimerie et de Publicite). 
S' See Kruishoop and Bossenbroek, Vluchten voor de Groote Oorlog p. 12-15 for a good account and 
interesting photographs of the attack on Antwerp. 
See p. 16. 
s Laporte, Belgische Geinterneerden in Nederland Gedurende De Eerste Wereldoorlog. p. 12. 
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there is insufficient evidence on the subject and further research is needed to arrive at 
the truth. The Belgian government did hold an enquiry into the matter, but not until 
1966 and even then the findings were inconclusive. In fact the truth of the matter is 
largely irrelevant for this study. What is important is that regardless of what actually 
happened, at the time that they were interned, the Belgian soldiers were perceived by 
their countrymen as being deserters and their officers were seen as being at best 
incompetent and at worst also deserters-541t goes without saying that the relationship 
between the interned Belgian officers and other ranks was also very poor. 
This breakdown of trust between the Belgian government and a substantial part of her 
army did little to help either the soldiers themselves or the Dutch government as they 
sought to accommodate this huge influx of internees and it greatly influenced the 
amount of support that the Belgian authorities were prepared to undertake to ensure a 
reasonable standard of living for their interned soldiers. In February 1916 the Belgian 
government authorised a circular to be distributed amongst the Belgian internees that 
absolved them from any blame with regard to their internment. It was a half-hearted 
measure that had little impact on the lives of the internees or the attitude of both the 
Belgian government or the rest of the Belgian nation towards them. -6 
In considering the influx of some 35,000 new internees into the Netherlands it is 
important to remember that these were not the only ones crossing the Dutch border. 
Just as the soldiers had been forced to flee from Antwerp so had much of its civilian 
s` Bruijnseels, Het Godsdienstig ! even der Beigen in Nederland tijdens de oorlogsjaren 1914-1918, d1 III, 
p. 32. 
Laporte, Belgische Geinterneerden in Nederland Gedurende De Eerste Wereldoorlog, p. 104. 
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population and they had also fled in the direction of Holland. Estimates vary as to the 
total number of refugees but a rough average of these places the figure at around 
1,400,000 of which 300,000 continued their journey by taking a boat to Great Britain. ' 
Clearly the impact on the Dutch villages and towns along the Belgian border of this 
mass movement of people was enormous. Most of these places were still coming to 
terms with the newly mobilized Dutch troops that had been billeted on them or who 
had established temporary tented barracks alongside the civilian housing. All of the 
areas along the border had also had a `Staat van Beleg' imposed upon them and now 
found themselves being governed by the military rather than the civilian authorities. It 
was, in short, a time of disruption and uncertainty for the local population. The effects 
of the siege of Antwerp were almost immediately apparent as the number of refugees 
increased as soon as the Germans began their attack. 'g By night the flames of Antwerp 
could be seen easily from the Dutch side of the Schelde and by day the numbers of 
refugees increased even more. The Dutch diplomats based in Antwerp, who had been 
sending regular reports of the situation there, had been told by Loudon on 9 September 
56 The subject of the First World War in the Netherlands has been largely neglected by Dutch historians 
but the main exception to this has been the influx of so many Belgian refugees in 1914. It is a subject 
that has attracted the attentions of serious academics and of amateur historians, most of whom have 
produced work based on their location. Unfortunately much of the work, especially by amateur 
historians, draws upon information already in the public domain and despite the volume of information 
available there is little that is new. The majority is also written from the viewpoint of the Dutch 
experience rather than that of the Belgians. The best accounts can be found in Bruijnseels, Her 
Godsdienstig leven der Belgen in Nederland ttfdens de oorlogsjaren 1914-1918, and Kruishoop, and 
Bossenbroek, Vluchten voor de Grote Oorlog: Belgen in Nederland 1914-1918. Later historians writing 
on the Dutch experience of the First World War as a whole have put the refugee issues into better 
context. Chapters on the refugees and internees can be found in Moeyes, Buiten Schot, Abbenhuis, The 
Art of Staying Neutral and Smit, Nederland in de Eerste Wereldoorlog Vol II. 
' Moeyes quotes the Centrale Commissie tot Behartiging van de Belangen der naar Nederland 
uitgeweken Vluchtelingen (Central Committee for looking after the interests of the refugees in the 
Netherlands). They give the number of refugees asl, 056,000 but only count those that cross at three main 
locations, Limburg, Zeeland and Noord-Brabant. Moeyes, Buiten Schot, p. 101. 
's Oosterman, 'De Interneering hier to lande' p. 807 
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1914 that they could leave. In fact they stayed on until 6 October 1914 when a boat was 
used to take then to safety along the Schelde' 
A resident of Roosendaal who wrote in his subsequently published diary of those 
turbulent days provides a vivid description. b0 On Saturday 3 October 1914 he speaks 
rather jubilantly of the Dutch troops sent to fortify the border in case of attack, 
Around two o'clock we suddenly heard music. We ran outside, and yes, there 
came the 3' Regiment from the Molenstraat, which moved with full music and 
banners flying in the direction of Bergen op Zoom. It was a beautiful view! - 
the men looked splendid. Behind the troops came the inevitable ambulances and 
further turmoil. The citizens enjoyed it; many had never seen anything like it. 
Around 3 o'clock I wanted to go to the Stationweg, and really, music again! 
There the 2nd Regiment moved into Roosendaal with merry sounds, continuing 
61 after a pause towards Breda. 
On 6 October he writes, 
The number of refugees is ever increasing. I can't describe the situation: 
fleeing Belgians, runaway Germans, soldiers; yes, you would not recognize 
Roosendaal. "' 
The following day the position deteriorates even further, 
What this must come to, I don't know! Thousands, I don't lie, thousands of 
refugees from Antwerp and surroundings arrive by trains, cars and on foot into 
Roosendaal. Rich and poor, everybody flees to the Netherlands. 6 
9'. Smit, Bescheiden betreffende de buitenlands politick van Nederland 1848-1919. (deel 4 1914-7), Nr 
182 p. 166. 
60 Van Helvert-Weijermans, Uit Bange Oorlogsdagen. Afl II p. 55 
61 Van Helvert-Weijermans, Uit Bange Oorlogsdagen. Afl II p. 57. 
62 Van Helvert-Weijermans, Uit Bange Oorlogsdagen. Afl II p. 61. 
m Van Helvert-Weijermans, Uit Bange Oorlogsdagen. Afl II p. 62. 
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By 9 October 1914, at the peak of influx of refugees and potential internees the 
situation had become critical; 
The situation becomes unbearable! One of the towns' fair days is known for the 
enormous number of people, so that one can say `from the Town Hall to the 
Schuiven one can walk over the heads'. That is also the case this morning, 
though now they are refugees instead of fairgoers. Rental carriages from 
Antwerp, low trailers, buses, cars, lorries from large Belgian companies; all 
move around. Through the night the trains were running. This morning I saw 
one coming into the station with 64 wagons, full of unhappy people in the first, 
second and third class wagons; with much of their belongings with them. I can't 
think where all those people are going to stay. Last night more than 12,000 
refugees stayed in Roosendaal. All of the churches are full. I have seen it 
myself: in the St. Johanneskerk a high mass was read by a foreign priest in one 
the side-altars, while next to and around the altar stressed, tired people were 
sleeping on beds. 
Washing, cleaning, dressing, it was all done in the church; the same in the 
monastery of 'Eerwaarde Paters Redemptoristen'. In the `Gasthuis' all available 
rooms and corridors are full. These are mainly people who were brought here 
ill. Everybody walks in and out. The Sisters don't have enough hands to supply 
all the help that is necessary. It is an indescribable situation. Women and 
children walk crying around the market and through the streets; children have 
lost their parents, parents have lost their children. And in between all this noise 
and misery are the sneaky Germans, who in earlier days received so much 
hospitality from the Belgian people; they are definitely uncomfortable in this 
situation. Suddenly, around nine o'clock in the morning, the windows rattle, 
just like last night, about eleven-thirty; one supposes that one of the forts has 
been blown up again. Around noon such a large army as I have never seen 
passes by; there was no end to it. Also machine guns on dog sleds. Carriages 
and more carriages, full of blankets and the like, were at the rear. Everything 
went to Hoogerheide and Putte. Nobody knows what is happening. It all has a 
painful and sorrowful uncertainty. ` 
Roosendaal was just one place where the Belgian soldiers and civilians crossed into the 
Netherlands. The pattern was repeated to a greater or lesser degree along the entire 
border. ' The Dutch authorities faced a multitude of problems; not least in maintaining 
"Van Helvert-Weijermans Uit Bange Oorlogsdagen. Afl II, p. 64. 
61 The effect of this mass movement of people was felt all over the Netherlands, not just along the border. 
For example, the effect on the town of Zwolle has been considered by M. Zegers in Zegers, Michael., 
Een levendig Geschiedenis van Zwolle en de Grote Oorlog. Zwolle in dejaren 1914-1919, 
(Eindscriptie, Windesheim, August 1997). 
90 
an appropriate military presence at the border, ready to fend off any attack on Dutch 
neutrality that might result from the fall of Antwerp. A journalist from Het Vaderland 
wrote about those that simply could not find a place to shelter and were reduced to 
living in the forests near Putte. 66 
Belgian refugees crossing the Dutch border in October 191467 
Responsibility for providing relief for this mass of refugees lay with the local councils, 
but in such extraordinary times as these help came from all directions. Ordinary people 
simply opened their homes and took in the weary refugees, any and all large buildings 
were pressed into service as temporary accommodation, churches, barracks, factories, 
anywhere that could provide some form of shelter. As De Vries has said, many Dutch 
Moeyes, Buiten Schot, p. 95. 
67 http: //www. wereldoorlogl418. ni/lokale-noden/index. htmi 24 August 2008. 
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authors consider the help given to the Belgian refugees to be the `schoonste bladzijde' 
(cleanest page) of Dutch history in wartime. 68 
The military medical services were immediately brought into action, as they had been 
when 7,000 Belgians sought shelter in Holland after the fall of Liege. Their concerns 
were twofold. Firstly there was the immediate problem of providing medical assistance 
to those who required it, and secondly there was the need to maintain standards of 
hygiene that would protect the local population, and the nearby-mobilized troops, from 
infection. A further concern for Snijders was the presence amongst the refugees of 
women of `loose morals' and the infections that they might bring with them and pass 
on to the local Dutch troops. He wrote to all field commanders concerning the 
problem. ' Initial plans to undertake some sort of rudimentary medical check at the 
border proved impossible once the numbers of refugees reached its peak. Instead 
centres for medical help were established both at the border at places like Putte, where 
many of the refugees actually crossed into the Netherlands, and at places further inland 
such as Roosendaal and Bergen op Zoom. In Roosendaal for example, the two civilian 
doctors based in the town were normally sufficient to minister to the needs of the 
towns 17,000 souls. However, there was no way in which they could cope with the huge 
increase created by the fall of Antwerp. Consequently a special medical facility was set 
up by the armed forces purely for refugees with an attached, but separate, section for 
wounded and sick internees (of which there were 68 in total). These medics were 
especially looking for infectious diseases such as scabies; however, one of the most 
frequently required medical treatments was in fact assistance at childbirth. Many new 
68 Moeyes, Buiten Schot, p. 96 and De Vries, 'Nederland als Non-beligerente Natie en de Internering van 
Buitenlandse Militairen Gedurende de Eerste Wereldoorlog', p. 87. 
6" ARA 2.13.16 Inv 152 dated 12 October 1914 Letter from Snijders to his field commanders. 
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citizens arrived during the first few days of their mother's arrival in the Netherlands, 
their early appearance sometimes caused by the flight from Belgium. ' 
By the beginning of October the Dutch border guards had become used to dealing 
with soldiers of the belligerent armies that crossed into Holland and they were fully 
aware of the need to intern such soldiers. New orders were issued to supplement those 
of 3 August 1914 clarifying further actions to be taken by border guards. This time 
additional topics such as the movement of local people who crossed the border 
because of their business were dealt with and the responsibilities of the different 
agencies were set out. " With the mass influx of October, however, a new problem 
emerged, that of identifying which of the men crossing the border were soldiers and 
which were civilians. Whilst large numbers of the Belgians and all of the British 
crossed the border in uniform and as part of a large group, many did not. Some had 
merely lost their uniform and colleagues en route, but others had changed clothes in a 
deliberate attempt to evade internment. Men in civilian clothes who identified 
themselves as servicemen were taken for internment and a number of civilians also 
claimed that they were soldiers, presumably in the hope of bed and board, and, 
although these were also interned, once their true status came to light they were 
released. Snijders was worried that any failure to track down Belgian soldiers in 
civilian clothes would be seen as a failure of the Dutch to adhere to the rules 
governing neutrality. n The motivation for such a move also varied. Some wished to 
avoid internment in the Netherlands in order to proceed to Britain, from where they 
7° ARA 2.13.70. Inv 1 `Overzicht van het Genreente in het gebied der III de Divisie doe den Militairen 
Geneeskundigen Dienst verricht, in verband met de aanwezigheid van de uit Belgig hier to lande 
binnengekomen Vluchtelingen', October 1914. 
"ARA 2.13.70. Inv 127 dated 14 October 1914. Orders for the border guards. 
' Bosboom, In Moeilijke Omstandigheden p. 324 and Gegevens betreffende de Interneering p. 13. 
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could rejoin a fighting unit and return to Belgium to continue the fight against the 
Germans. Laporte, quoting Belgian government papers, estimates that some 7,000 
Belgian soldiers who entered the Netherlands and who should have been interned 
managed to continue on to Great Britain. 73 Others simply wanted to keep out of any 
further involvement with the war. Of those Belgian soldiers who did not cross the 
border as part of a large military group some had managed to find their families and 
were travelling with them, whilst others were alone. In the confusion of the many 
refugees it is easy to understand how many who should have been interned were not. 
The control of refugees and the search for out-of-uniform soldiers did not end once 
the border had been crossed. On 14 October, for example 18 Belgian soldiers were 
spotted in Groningen, travelling with a group of civilian refugees. They were 
identified because although they were dressed in civilian clothes they still wore their 
army footwear. 74 Definitive numbers for exactly how many potential internees 
crossed into the Netherlands as result of the fall of Antwerp are difficult if not 
impossible to find. As Oosterman says `the peace and time needed in these busy days 
to list, count and recount the internees was just not available'. 'S 
On 27 October 1914 General Snijders wrote to all of his military commanders warning 
them to be on the lookout for male foreigners, particularly Belgians, who had evaded 
internment and were now trying to return to Belgium to rejoin the army. In this letter 
Snijders alleges that there were in fact some members of the Belgian army working in 
73 Laporte, Belgische Geinterneerden in Nederland Gedurende De Eerste Wereldoorlog, p. 13. See also 
Kruishoop and Bossenbroek, Vluchten voor de Groote Oorlog p. 31. 
74 De Telegraaf 14 October 1914 
n LM Geschiedenis der Interneering p. 45. Tuinen gives quite precise figures but he does not specify 
when they entered the Netherlands nor the source of his figures. Tuinen, 'De Militaire Handhaving van 
Neutraliteit en Gezag' p. 68. 
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secret in the Netherlands to round up any uninterned soldiers and get them back to 
Belgium. 76 Certainly there were those both in the Netherlands and Belgium who were 
actively working to help British and Belgian soldiers return to their units avoiding 
either internment or being taken as a prisoner of war. " The most famous of these was 
the nurse Edith Cavell who was later executed for her role in assisting British 
servicemen to cross into Holland. Escaped POWs were, of course, entitled to transit 
through the Netherlands on their way home without risk of internment, Snijders' 
concern was with those that had never been POWs and should therefore be interned' 
Official figures are also contradictory. According to the border troops between 8 
October and 14 December some 27,862 military internees arrived. However, it is 
apparent from the figures of internees transported in the period 10 to 31 October that 
32,979 men and 381 officers were involved. The second figure, around 32,000 seems 
the more plausible in this instance and it ties in more easily with the numbers arriving 
at internment camps. '9 Laporte gives the figure as 35,000 in chapter 1 but increases 
this to 40,000 in chapter 2 of which 7,000 pass through the Netherlands leaving 
33,000, a figure that is roughly in line with other estimates. 80 Official figures from 
government publications in 1916 are quoted as 35,000 Belgians, 1,500 British and 200 
Germans. " 
76 Gegevens betreffende de Interneering p. 12 
"A difficult topic to provide reliable numbers for, the main evidence that not every soldier that should 
have been interned was, comes from personal memoirs of such escapees. See Beaumont, 
Harry,. `Trapped in Belgium', Durnford, Hugh, et al. Tunnelling to Freedom and Other Escape Narratives 
from World War 1, (New York: Dover publications Inc, 2004). p. 33 and p. 39. 
78 Gegevens betreffende de Interneering p-4- 
79 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering p. 45. 
8D Laporte, Belgische Geinterneerden in Nederland Gedurende De Eerste Wereldoorlog, p. 12 and p. 31. 
81 Smit, Nederland in de Eerste Wereld Oorlog. Part 2 p. 33. 
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The Dutch press, usually slower to report the effects of the war at home than the events 
on the front line overseas, were predictably slow to pick up on the story that so many 
foreign soldiers were crossing the border. In the edition of De Telegraaf on 9 October 
1914 there was only a small article that mentioned 100 Belgian soldiers who crossed 
the border at Heenenveen and who had been sent to Gaasterland. By 10 October the 
figures being mentioned are larger, 600 crossing at Putte and a further 122 landing at 
Middelburg having crossed by boat. "' On 11 October the number of internees was the 
lead story with the number of crossings at Sas van Gent estimated at 12,000 with a 
further 2,000 at Roosendaal. Only a day later De Telegraaf quotes from `a reliable 
source' that the number of new internees has now reached 20,000 with the numbers 
increasing in every edition. "' `Along our border are based strong German patrols, their 
aim is to take the dispersed Belgian troops prisoner or to push them in the direction of 
Dutch territory. '" 
Given the poor state in which many crossed the border the first priority was to provide 
shelter and food. In Oost Zeeuwsch Vlaanderen those interned were sent to Hulst, Axel 
and Sluiskill where attempts were made to house them in barns. Unfortunately many of 
the barns were full with the recent harvest and those that were not were already 
providing shelter for refugees. As a result the internees were accommodated in the local 
"2 Many of those that crossed by boat were injured. Oosterman, 'De Interneering hier to lande'p. 807. 
ffi ARA 2.13.70 Nr 176 dated 12 November 1914. The Germans were clearly concerned about how the 
press coverage of the retreat from Antwerp would affect Dutch public opinion of Germany. This 
document is a transcript of a series of telephone conversations between the German Consultant and the 
German Ambassador concerning the image of Germany being presented in the Dutch newspapers. Their 
conclusion is that little damage has been done. Perhaps of more interest is the fact that the Dutch 
Government was clearly bugging German telephones and was itself concerned about German opinion of 
Dutch public opinion. 
"De Telegraaf 12 October 1914,1" edition. 
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barracks though this meant a great deal of disruption for the local regiments. 85 Indeed in 
Hulst, the need for accommodation was so great that many slept in the streets and these 
were filled with straw in an attempt to provide at least a little comfort. Classrooms in 
local schools were used to house refugees in Sluis, Aardenburg and Ijzendijke. 8' 
A further consideration was food. As a matter of principle and in compliance with 
international law, the internees were fed one warm meal at lunchtime and two bread 
meals, morning and evening. Before being sent on to an internment camp they were 
provided with bread for the journey. All this was very welcome, as the vast majority of 
the internees had entered the Netherlands hungry, what little food they had being 
consumed on the journey. Unfortunately, whatever the intentions of the Dutch 
authorities, the situation on the ground did not always permit the rules to be followed to 
the letter. Wherever possible local supplies were used. In Nieuw Namen, for example, 
use was made of a supply of meat, rice and cake that was found on one of the Belgian 
trains. In Hulst the bread was completely sold out and so the internees were fed biscuits 
and rusks, with brown beans and bacon as a warm meal. In Neuzen the local population 
were ordered by the local garrison commander to provide a meal for some 400 
Belgians. Already the difference between the British and Belgian government with 
regard to their internees was beginning to show. Whilst the Belgians were completely 
dependent on their Dutch hosts the British consul at Vlissingen made arrangements for 
the British internees to receive extra bread. The British always considered internees to 
be a form of POW. In their statistical lists compiled at the end of the war internees in 
LM Geschiedenis der Interneering p. 48. 
" LM Geschiedenis der Interneering p. 49. 
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both Switzerland and Holland are listed alongside more traditional POWs and included 
in the overall totals. "' 
I 
Bread being handed out to refugees by the Dutch army in Roosendaal in October 
1914. 'm 
As soon as possible the internees were moved inland away from the borders, both to 
relieve the situation in that already overcrowded region and to prevent any possible 
attempts to escape back into Belgium. Many internees were taken from Zeeuws 
Vlaanderen by boat to Vlissingen. From there they were sent on to the internment 
camps by train, initially only to Gaasterland but later to other locations as well. There is 
little evidence of any resistance to being placed in internment or any reaction to the 
makeshift conditions under which the internees spent their first few days in 
"" Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire During the Great War / 914- / 920, (London: 
HMSO 1922) p. 329. 
http*//www. werel doorloL, 1418. n1/lokale-noden/-index. html 24 August 2008. 
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confinement Indeed many seemed to hold the view that internment was a small price 
to pay for shelter and food and a means of escaping the German advance. The only 
objections seem to have been from the British officers on behalf of their men, a 
responsibility that the Belgian officers clearly did not feel. "9 It may also have been due 
to the fact that the British were not expecting to be interned. They had fully expected 
that the Dutch would let them continue back to Great Britain. It is difficult to establish 
what the average British soldier believed would happen to him once he had crossed into 
the Netherlands. The Belgian government consistently held the view that their men 
should not be interned. Given the large number of Belgian soldiers that went to 
considerable lengths to avoid being detained it is, however, hard to believe that the 
regulations regarding internment were not widely known. 
De Telegraaf of 13 October 1914 described the arrival of one such group of internees at 
Loosduinen; 
Yesterday morning around 10 o'clock they arrived here, the Belgian soldiers, 
who were disarmed by our troops. These men walked wearily along the road, 
some in clogs, some in slippers, some with their head covered by an old hat or 
cap, a few without any head cover. Almost all carried something: a bundle in a 
colourful clothe, a handbag. Many had a blanket as a bandoleer around the 
shoulders; it was a sad sight, those dirty faces. Some had only just experienced 
their first battle, those from the northerly forts; others had been fighting and 
happened to end up in a different regiment. All were men between 25 and 35 
years old, so the older generation. Near the administration building of the steam 
train the 1,600 men had a rest and afterwards they moved to the camp, where 
everything had been made ready for them. After dinner and a wash the internees 
spread out. First there was a roll call and then everybody was allocated to a tent. 
LM Geschiedenis der Interneering P. M. 
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Information Office of the Dutch Red Cross and the Belgian 
Information Office 
One of the biggest problems in the first few days after the fall of Antwerp was that of 
trying to reunite people who, for all sorts of reasons, had become separated during the 
rush to leave Belgium. Many walls in the Dutch border towns became unofficial notice 
boards where refugees left notes saying who they sought, asking for information about 
their loved ones. De Telegraaf made a more organised and realistic attempt at reuniting 
families by publishing the names of the missing and giving the location of the people 
who sought them. What started out as a single column in the newspaper grew within a 
couple of days to fill several full pages as the number of refugees also increased. 
Attempts to reunite people by De Telegraaf stopped. Instead it advised that all queries 
concerning internees should be directed to the Information Officer of the Dutch Red 
Cross. 
The idea for an Information Office of the Dutch Red Cross had been established in 
1909 and was a direct result of the 1906 Geneva Convention, which, in article 4, 
required belligerent nations to keep a record of their own casualties and to inform their 
enemies of casualties or prisoners found to belong to enemy forces. The 1907 Peace 
Conference took this initiative a step further by requiring that even neutral countries 
should keep a record of foreign soldiers that fell into their care either as internees, 
wounded or deserters. 90 This second requirement was rather put on a back burner by the 
Dutch authorities that could not envisage such a scenario occurring. When the first 
90 Moorehead, Dunants Dream. War, Switzerland and the Red Cross, p. 182. 
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office was opened at Lange Voorhout 6 in The Hague it was with the sole intention of 
maintaining records of soldiers belonging to the Dutch army who were injured or killed 
on Dutch territory. 9' This idea was expanded to include the delivering of mail and 
parcels to all prisoners of war and, where appropriate, ensuring that belongings were 
returned to next of kin. In the Netherlands this idea was accepted with alacrity and set 
in motion by a law of 25 May 1908 (Staatsblad 152) and Royal Decree dated 19 
January 1909 (Staatsblad 14). 92 
It was decided that two organisations were required, one to deal with the sick and 
wounded from the Dutch military and one to deal with the prisoners of war and 
internees. The Royal Decree of April 1909 nominated the Netherlands Red Cross as 
being responsible for the first of these tasks, should the Netherlands ever find itself 
involved in a war. No decision was made over the second organisation beyond the fact 
that it would fall under the responsibility of the General Staff. '3 As the Dutch Red 
Cross was also under the direct control of the Ministry of War this meant that 
effectively both elements were part of the same department although there were no 
plans to activate the office for POWs. 
Once the Dutch troops were mobilized in July 1914 then `Het Informatiebureau van het 
Nederlandsche Roode Kruis' (The Information Office of the Dutch Red Cross, 
hereafter referred to as the Information Office) was put on alert and on 1st August 1914 
came into being. ' Initially the Information Office was to deal only with those members 
v' Leclercq, Het Informatiebureau van het Nederlandsche Roode Kruis. p. 13. 
92 LeClercq, Het Informatiebureau van het Nederlandsche Ronde Kruis p. 8. 
Staatsblad 90A 1909. 
94 LeClercq, Het Informatiebureau van het Nederlandsche Ronde Kruis p. 24. 
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of the Netherlands military that were wounded or captured but with the influx of 
foreign servicemen from the warring nations that began almost with the first shots 
being fired then the task was expanded to include holding records relating to all 
internees. " 
Initial responsibility for the Office was given to the Dutch Red Cross and they took 
advice from Professor Mr. H. W. Methorst, director of the Centraal Bureau voor de 
Statistiek (Central Office for Statistics) with regard to organising the information. This 
was to be in a card index, with a card for each soldier and different colours for each 
branch of the army. 96 The organisation of the Information Office was an administrator's 
dream. A theoretical problem and one that could easily be solved given the right 
amount of little bits of paper, or in this case card. The structure of the Information 
Office was planned, established and then effectively mothballed until such time as it 
was needed which, given the prevailing Dutch policy of peace and neutrality, seemed 
very unlikely. 
It would be wrong to think of the Dutch Red Cross during the First World War as being 
the same as the independent and neutral organisation that it is now. It was funded by 
the Ministry of War, staffed by former military officers and controlled, nominally at 
least, by the supreme military commander. Nevertheless it was clearly a humanitarian 
organisation, well on its way to achieving the status that it holds today. Although 
"This expansion was ordered by the Minister of War on 8 August 1914. LeClercq, Her 
Informwiebureau van het Nederlandsche Roode Kruis p. 16. 
% These cards were sent to the home countries of the internees after the war to supplement their service 
records. Most of the Belgian cards still exist. With the exception of the first and last few letters of the 
alphabet the rest can be found, still in alphabetical order in the archives of the Army Museum in 
Brussels. 
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functionally part of the General Staff it does not appear that this was anything other 
than an administrative position. The Dutch military commanders made no demands of 
it that conflicted with its purpose of aiding all troops. Given the desire of the Dutch 
government to underscore its neutrality at every opportunity any such demands were 
unlikely. ' The Information Office was an excellent advertisement for the official 
Dutch attitude towards the war, a wish to abide completely with all international law 
(in the hope that other nations would do the same), to remain neutral, but to offer aid to 
soldiers of any nationality who had suffered as a result of the war. 
In his excellent history of the Information Office during the war years LeClercq says, 
And then on 1 August 1914, in connection with the mobilisation of the army 
and regarding the threatening war danger, the `Information Office' had to open; 
it was immediately ready and sufficiently prepared to accept its task fully. 98 
In a directive from the Ministry of War on 8 August 1914 point 7 was specifically 
relevant to the Information Ofice. 99 
The heads of the hospitals which are under military rule and where the sick and 
wounded belonging to the belligerent nations are looked after, and also the head 
of the internment camps will send immediately after their arrival and further 
twice monthly, reports to the Information Bureau of the Red Cross containing 
all information that can be used to identify personnel, as well as information 
that could be used to inform and reassure relatives in their home countries. 
9' Such histories of the Dutch Red Cross during the First World War that exist (and there are not many) 
were almost all written shortly after the war by members of the Red Cross who had worked in the 
organisation during the hostilities. An exception is the very comprehensive history of the Dutch Red 
Cross by Leo van Bergen, De Zwaargewonden Eerst?, (Rotterdam: Erasmus, 1994). As with many 
histories of the Netherlands in the twentieth century, however, Bergen devotes very little space to the 
First World War. The bombing of the Red Cross archive in the Netherlands during World War Two has 
also reduced the amount of original documentation considerably. 
' L. eClercq, Het Informatiebureau van het Nederlandsche Roode Kruis p. 16. See also Gegevens 
betreffende de Interneering p. 4 and p. 11. 
99 LeClercq, Het Informatie Bureau van her Nederlandsche Roode Kruis p. 18. 
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At this stage in the war it was still considered that the main function of the Information 
Office would be with respect to Dutch troops if, and in August 1914 this was a real 
possibility, the Netherlands were drawn into the war by an attack on its borders. A year 
later, however, it was clear that the major role of the Information Office would be the 
coordination of internment figures and in September 1915 an amendment to the 
original order was given which emphasised the change in the primary duties of the 
Office and reflects the Dutch experience of internment in the first year of the war. One 
of the key differences in the second year of the war was that the Dutch authorities now 
had the time to monitor the internees and to produce accurate records of just how many 
internees were in each location and to clearly identify each individual internee. The 
orders issued to each camp commandant in September 1915, as shown below, illustrate 
this change. The role of a commandant was not only to guard and care for the internees. 
He also had a responsibility to provide information that could, if requested, be fed back 
to the home government or the internee's family. 
Immediately after arrival of foreign military personnel the commandant of the 
internment camp will send a report to the information Office of the Red Cross 
containing all relevant information that can be used to establish the identity of 
the internees. Also as soon as possible all changes relevant to these military 
personnel, such as change of posting, dismissal from internment, indefinite or 
long leave, gone missing and return, should be reported to the Information 
Office. Also the Information Office should be informed by telegraph of the 
arrival or the escape of officers, or the death of internees, including the cause of 
death and the time of the funeral. Copies of the above and details of the 
numbers of internees in each camp should be send to the above mentioned 
office on the 15th and last day of every month. 1°0 
" LeClercq, Her Informatie Bureau van het Nederlandsche Roode Kruis p. 19. Gegevens betreffende de 
Interneering p. 11. 
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At the same time as the Dutch were recognising a need to form a central information 
point to hold details of all of their internees, the Belgian authorities were coming to the 
same conclusion. On 4 October 1914 the Agence Belge de Renseignements pour les 
Prisonniers de Guerre et les Internes (Hereafter known as the Belgian Information 
Office) was established in The Hague. Its main role was to provide information to 
families on the location and status of Belgian soldiers that had either been taken as 
POWs or internees. "' It had four main aims; information, correspondence, financial 
help and help in general. Its main source of information was the lists of POWs issued 
by the Germans and the lists of internees provided by the Dutch. On 24 October 1914 it 
opened its doors to the public who could submit requests for information on slips of 
paper. Although the idea was sound, the Belgian Information Office was unable to 
fulfil its primary task because of insufficient information. By the end of 1915, although 
it now had around 100,000 records most of them were incomplete and only 5% of 
requests for information could be answered. 102 Both the Dutch and Belgian Information 
Offices would expand their staff as the war progressed and the need for their services 
increased; neither would reach the scale of the Swiss Information Office, which at its 
peak had a staff of 1,200 volunteers. 103 
Just as the role of the Dutch Information Office was expanded to include all foreign 
troops that crossed into the Netherlands the Belgian Office was also expanded to 
include details of any French or British soldiers who were wounded or imprisoned on 
Belgian soil. The German authorities in the occupied section of Belgium were very co- 
Laporte, Belgische Geinterneerden in Nederland Gedurende De Eerste Wereldoorlog p. 75. 
102 Verhaege, J., 'Documneten over belgen die tijdens de Eerste Wereldoorlog in Duitsiand gevangen 
waren of in neutral landen geintemeerd', Revue Belge d'Histoire Militaire, 24 series (1983) p. 746. 
103 Moorehead, Dunants Dream. War, Switzerland and the Red Cross, p. 184. 
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operative and swiftly gave permission for this expansion in the role of the Belgian 
Information Office. 
Volunteers staffed the Belgium Information Office but it worked closely with the 
Belgian Red Cross. In the autumn of 1914 the Belgian Red Cross visited all of the 
internment camps in the Netherlands with a view to not only inspecting conditions but 
also collecting information on the internees. This visit sparked a contact between the 
two Information Offices that was to result in a close and fruitful partnership that lasted 
the entire length of the war. The Dutch Information Office not only provided up to date 
information on the well being and location of internees, it also facilitated the exchange 
of post which, especially after the border between Belgium and Holland was closed in 
1916, was not always easy-'04 
Although the Belgians had an information office in The Hague that dealt solely with 
the internees, the main Belgian Information Office was in Le Havre and this held 
information on all Belgian POWs. It underwent several name changes and mergers 
with other agencies until in November 1917 it found its final form as the Office Central 
Beige pour les Prisonniers de Guerre (Central Office for Belgian POWs). Interestingly 
this office did not include the internees as part of its remit. They were not considered to 
be POWs and so were not afforded any help. Only in July 1918 was formal recognition 
given to the 30,000 members of the Belgian military in Holland and they were offered 
the assistance of the main Belgian Information Office. " 
104 Laporte, G., Belgische Geinterneerden in Nederland Gedurende De Eerste Wereldoorlog, p. 75. 
105 Verhaege, `Documenten over Belgen die tijdens de Eerste Wereldoorlog in Duitsiand gevangen waren 
of in neutrale landen geinterneerd', p. 746 
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By the end of 1914 the Netherlands had undergone another transformation. The threat 
of imminent invasion had receded and although the army was still fully mobilized some 
stability had returned to everyday life. The urgent problems the Netherlands now faced 
were of a political and economic nature rather than military. How could the Dutch 
government maintain its firmly avowed neutrality without jeopardising the crucial 
trading ties with both Germany and Great Britain that were so important to the Dutch 
economy? The problem of the internees was a good illustration of the decisions that 
had to be made. The Dutch government also now had around 35,000 foreign soldiers to 
feed, house and guard for the duration of the war. Although the cost would, or at least 
should, be met by the home nations there was no guarantee that any of the belligerents 
would be in a position at the end of the war to repay any expenses. In December 1914 it 
was also anyone's guess how long the war would last. The initial predictions that it 
would be `over by Christmas' had obviously been wrong but it was still impossible to 
tell. 
107 
Chapter 4 
Administering Military Internment: The Camps 
Given the turbulence of the first few weeks of August 1914 the Dutch government was 
remarkably swift in issuing guidelines for dealing with internees. The Royal Decree of 
8 August 1914 gave instructions for the internment of foreign soldiers that crossed the 
Dutch border and those injured soldiers that were brought across the border for 
treatment in a Dutch hospital. ' It was signed by the Minister of War who, in an order 
signed by the Queen and dated 28th August 1914 was charged with all responsibility 
for the internees. This same order also stipulated that the internees were to be treated in 
the same way as their equivalent rank in the Dutch Army with regard to nursing, 
conditions and allowances. ' Whilst each separate order provides an insight into the 
views of the Dutch government on internment as a whole, it is very helpful in showing 
the priority that each aspect of internment was given. There can be no doubt, for 
example, that internment (unlike the refugees) was considered to be a military problem 
best dealt with by the military and not by the civilian authorities. 
General Snijders was charged by the Minister of War with the day to day running of the 
camps. In order to leave as many regular army officers in position on the Dutch border 
as possible a selection of retired officers were brought back on to the active list and 
' Gegevens betreffende de Interneering p. 1. This pamphlet holds copies of most, if not all, of the 
regulations brought into force by the Dutch Government to deal with the influx of internees in 1914. 
Z Gegevens betreffende de Interneering p. 5. 
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installed as the commandants of the newly formed internment camps. It was made quite 
clear that these officers were to be responsible to the Commander-in-Chief. However, 
what was not made clear was the authority that the commandants would have over the 
troops that they were given to guard the internees. This issue was never really resolved. 
The guard commander was, as a regular officer, ultimately responsible to the 
Commander-in-Chief but whether he was also to accept orders from the camp 
commandant was a moot point. In reality this led to many minor disagreements 
between the camp officials but over the course of the war common sense prevailed in 
most instances and the individuals concerned managed to work together for the general 
good. Van Lier, writing in 1967 about internment from the point of view of the 
Koninklijke Marechaussee (military police) cites 19 January 1915, when areas 
containing internment camps were declared to be in Staat van Beleg, as the point when 
the police guards assigned to the camps came under the authority of the camp 
commanders. 3 With the introduction of the Staat van Beleg the authority of the military 
police now extended to the whole region and not just the camp and activities such as 
assisting an internee to escape by providing clothes or shelter were now prohibited by 
law. 
The decision to locate the first internment camp at Alkmaar in August 1914 set the 
pattern for the establishment of all future Dutch internment camps. In deciding on 
Alkmaar as a location the government was led by several factors, the distance from the 
front line and the borders, the availability of water and other essentials, adequate 
transport links and, perhaps the most important of all, the availability of land on which 
to pitch tents and empty local buildings that could also be pressed into service as 
Lier, `Internering van vreemde militairen in Nederland tijdens de eerste wereldoorlog' p. 54. 
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required. " That the government decided to use a school gymnasium during the summer 
holidays perhaps indicates that they were only thinking of this as an emergency and 
very temporary camps Indeed at this early stage in the war little thought seems to have 
been given to the length of time for which this initial camp would be needed. By the 
end of the first month, however, its first failing had already become obvious; the 
different nationalities could not be housed within the same camp without the risk of 
hostilities breaking out. Consequently by mid August 1914 the need for a second camp 
had already arisen. 
The war of 1914 was, for everyone involved in it, a new type of war and it would be 
unfair to the Dutch government to criticise them for not anticipating the number of 
internees they would be called upon to house. There was no precedent to inform their 
planning or even suggest that plans ought to be made. The establishment of all of the 
internment camps was, therefore, governed by the Dutch need to react to events rather 
than their recognition of potential problems that could be planned for. Of all of the 
criteria listed above that were considered in locating internment camps two were of 
most importance, distance from the border and the availability of empty 
accommodation. One was a security consideration and the other a function of the need 
to create camps quickly, in many cases within hours never mind days. The need for the 
establishment of internment camps was recognised very early on in the conflict with 
the issue of a Royal Decree on 8 August 1914. However, this document had only three 
articles and is indicative of the importance that the Dutch attached to internment at this 
"When reading through the official history of internment (Geschfedenis der Interneering) it is these 
factors that are mentioned time and again when the location of camps is being described. 
'A more detailed explanation of the establishment of Alkmaar as an internment camp is given in chapter 
3. 
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time. Article one dealt with the staffing of the camps and article three placed the whole 
organisation of the camps under the control of the Minister of War. It is article two that 
sheds most light on to the lack of interest that the Dutch government had in internment. 
Article two deals with only one topic and states quite clearly that the commandant of an 
internment camp was not entitled to a military horse. " 
The empty barracks that had previously housed the now mobilized Dutch army 
provided an instant and in many ways satisfactory solution to the immediate internment 
problem. The weight of numbers and the fact that the army would, at some point, need 
the barracks again meant that in most instances these camps could only be temporary. 
A similar caveat applied to the use of empty agricultural buildings, come harvest time 
these would also be needed for their primary function. All of these pressures forced the 
Dutch government into taking a decision to construct purpose built camps that could 
hold the internees securely but also afford them an acceptable standard of living. A 
further consideration was the number of men needed to guard the internees. The 
Netherlands wanted every able-bodied man to be positioned on the border ready to 
repel any invaders. To achieve this it needed camps that could be guarded by the 
minimum number of men. As early as October 1914 orders were given to start building 
permanent internment camps. A farsighted move, this proactive approach may not have 
spared many internees from spending the cold winter of 1914-1915 under canvas or in 
an unsuitable building but it did mean that by 1915 almost all were in far better 
accommodation than previously. Any delay on the grounds of possible cost saving or in 
anticipation of an early end to the war would have condemned many to a second winter 
in temporary lodgings. 
6 Gegevens betreffende de Interneering, p. 5. 
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At this early stage in the war the local population appears to have been supportive of 
the government's attempts to house the internees. In the days after the fall of Antwerp 
there was an enormous outpouring of sympathy for the Belgians especially, and whilst 
the authorities concerned themselves with feeding and housing the internees, many 
local civilian committees were established to attend to other needs that the internees 
may have had, such as education and entertainment. This open-hearted welcome did 
wane as the war progressed and conditions for the Dutch population became more 
difficult. There were the inevitable problems brought about by locating so many 
unaccompanied men near to a local population but these were not extreme. In many 
ways the local population benefited from the camps, not least by the economic 
advantage of supplying the camp and the availability of a workforce to replace the 
Dutch men who had been mobilized. These issues will be dealt with in more detail in 
later chapters. 
When decision to create a further internment camp at Gaasterland was taken in the 
second half of August 1914, the flow of foreign soldiers crossing into the Netherlands 
was steady and internment was clearly going to be an issue for the entire war. The 
numbers were manageable, however, and the prevailing predictions concerning the 
possible length of the war indicated that this was unlikely to be a long-term 
responsibility. With the experience of the camp at Alkmaar to draw upon, the Dutch 
government now moved forward by creating only single nationality camps. ' Although 
some specialist detention centres would, later in the war, be multinational, no further 
attempt was made to house different nationalities in the same camp on anything other 
Laporte, Belgische Geinterneerden in Nederland Gedurende De Eerste Wereldoorlog, p. 3 1. 
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than a temporary basis. This had as much to do with the economics of the situation as it 
did with the politics. Separate camps made it far easier to calculate separate costs and, 
ultimately, to produce separate bills for each of the home nations. In August 1914 costs 
were not high but the speed with which the numbers of internees increased in October 
of the same year underscored the logic of this decision. 
The Belgian Camps 
The next camp to be created was Gaasterland and it was, by any standards, an unusual 
camp. 8 It comprised a group of villages ringed by canals. Colonel E. A. Teding, who 
then became its first commandant, selected its location. It was a very Dutch solution to 
the need for an instant internment camp to house the steadily increasing number of 
internees. The site was chosen because it was high and dry, surrounded by woods and 
further more it was easy to isolate .9 Teding arranged for the bridges at Sloten, 
Woudsend, Galamadammen, Warns and Lemmer to be opened, thereby creating an 
island. Permanent guards were placed on the bridges but otherwise Teding put his faith 
in the natural water barriers forming a deterrent against escape. Clearly the new `camp' 
also now included the Dutch civilians who lived in these villages but who seem to have 
had very little objection to being suddenly placed in the forefront of the Dutch war 
effort. In this rural community many farm buildings were used to house the refugees 
whilst the guards were billeted on the local population. A site on the Elfbergen was 
chosen as being suitable for a campsite and work started on preparing the ground. 
A full and more detailed impression of this unusual camp can be found in the book that accompanied 
the 1996 expedition over the camp. Doelman, Henk, Dijkstra, Henk & Oosterhof, Jan,. Interneringsdepot 
Gaasterland, Belgische vluchteling 1914-1918, (Oudemirdum: Mar en Klif 1996). 
9 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering p. 17. 
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Map of the southwest corner of the province of Friesland 
showing the location of Camp Gaasterland1° 
The first residents of the new camp were the Belgian internees transferred from the 
old internment camp at Alkmaar. They arrived on 24 August 1914 
accompanied by I officer and half a platoon from the First Foot Squadron. The 
previous day the other half of the squadron had arrived to prepare for the arrival of the 
internees. These were accommodated in and around the farm Spitael belonging to S. de 
Vries, the guards sharing the rented accommodation with the internees, officers 
http: //www. wereldoorlogl4l8. nl/refugees/camp%20gaasterland/index. htm 24 August 2008. 
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included. " The only equipment that seems to have been provided for their use was a 
hundred cribs `and accompaniments' that had been sent by boat from Leeuwarden a 
couple of days previously. As the German attack on Belgium continued then the flow 
of internees being sent to Gaasterland also increased. A newly built farm between Rijs 
en Oudemirdum was pressed into service to meet the increased need. The officers were 
accommodated in the farmhouse while the other ranks found a place as best they could 
in one of the farm outbuildings or in one of the 25 specially erected sixteen man tents. 
The internees from Spitael were moved here on 9 September. Even at this early stage 
some effort was made to provide activity for the internees and besides the inevitable 
football matches a large shed on the farm was established as a relaxation area with a 
reading room containing fresh books and magazines. In addition a canteen and a sick 
bay were also created. 
On 24th September 1914 the number of internees was increased by the arrival of 267 
British sailors (243 men and 24 officers), rescued from the recently sunk Hogue, 
Cressy and Aboukir. These took the place of the Belgian internees in the tented 
accommodation, who were themselves swiftly moved to lodgings with several local 
farmers. In the event the disruption proved unwarranted as after further consideration 
the British were released from internment and returned to the UK, leaving Gaasterland 
on 26 September 1914.12 The resulting drop in the number of internees at Gaasterland 
was, however, only temporary and with the fall of Antwerp in October the numbers 
increased again but this time by thousands rather than hundreds. On Ist October 1914 
the number of internees at Gaasterland stood at 2 officers and 65 other ranks with the 
" LM Geschiedenis der Interneering p. 17. 
12 The circumstances surrounding these British sailors are discussed fully in chapter 3. 
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slightly unusual addition of two horses, belonging to one of the Belgian officers, which 
had been transported to Gaasterland and were maintained there at his own cost. 13 (Any 
other confiscated horses were sent into the care of the Dutch army at Breda and later in 
1915 to Utrecht). Many of the officers had private incomes and were not reliant on their 
military salary. For the Belgians this was especially important as their relationship with 
their government was problematic, but it was also true of the British and German 
officers. Once the decision was made to allow officers to live outside the camps, the 
extra income allowed for a far better standard of living than the allowances paid by the 
Dutch government ever would. The keeping of horses was one manifestation of this 
and was more common amongst the German officers who traditionally owned their 
own horses. "' On 8 and 9 October 163 more Belgians arrived bringing the total of 
internees in the camp to around 500. On 17 October this number was quadrupled by the 
arrival of a further 1,500 from Loosduinen and on 19 October another 300 came from 
Amersfoort. '5 
The initial accommodation was now completely inadequate and internees were placed 
wherever there was a space for them under a roof, regardless of the type of building. 
Barns were clearly an obvious source of shelter but workshops, schools and even 
churches were also pressed into service. When this type of shelter became scarce then 
refugees were billeted on the local population, for which they received 60 cents per 
day. A feature of Gaasterland that was unusual, even in the turbulent days after the fall 
of Antwerp, was the many Belgian families that were also there. Refugees in their own 
'ALM Geschiedenis der Interneering p. 18. See also Laporte Belgische Geinterneerden in Nederland 
Gedurende De Eerste Wereldoorlog, p. 54. 
14 Gegevens betreffende de Interneering p. 7. 
' LM Geschiedenis der Interneering p. 85. 
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right, many were the families of internees that had either been travelling with them 
when they crossed the border or who had gone to Gaasterland with the express 
intention of finding their husbands, sons or brothers. At this stage there appears to have 
been very little effort made to separate soldiers who had been interned from their 
families. This may help explain the relatively small number of soldiers who tried to 
escape internment. Although the internees were compelled to go where ever the Dutch 
authorities wanted to send them, the civilian refugees could have resisted attempts to 
relocate them away from the border areas. There is, however, little evidence of any 
resistance. Clearly those refugees that were travelling with members of the Belgian 
military who had been identified for internment were happy to go wherever their loved 
ones were sent. The remaining refugees were for the most part looking for somewhere 
to sleep and eat away from the fighting and trauma of the past few days. The refugees, 
like the internees, were spread amongst all of the villages in the area. Some were 
lodged in the council school in Sloten but a large number of the refugees were housed 
in the brick factory in Rijs. (This suited the owner of the factory. The production of 
bricks was expensive due to the poor quality of local clay. More suitable materials had 
to be brought in from Tzum and Oude-Bildtdijk and so the chance to hire out the 
building to the authorities to provide shelter for the Belgians was too good to miss, 
even if it did result in the work force of 50 losing their jobs). 
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Two views of the interned Belgians at the Steenfabriek in Rijs on picture postcards 
produced at the time. 16 
A further 1,200 were accommodated close by in the buildings of the Tichelwurk, the 
families in the old ovens and peat stores and the single men in the drying sheds. This 
industrial site was to remain as a camp. Initially the only extra facility was a doctor's 
16 http: //www. wereldoorlogl4l8. ni/refugees/camp%20gaasterland/index. htm 24 August 2008. 
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surgery and a washroom but later a shop was created along with two extra barracks for 
families and two more for the single men. This sort of ingenuity was not unusual. All 
sorts of buildings were commandeered, some more suited to the task than others. It is 
difficult, when examining the accommodation used in Gaasterland during this time to 
be entirely sure where internees were placed, where refugees were placed and where 
there was a combination of the two. Oosterman offers the following table and this 
seems to fit as well as any with the other evidence available. 17 
Village Lodging Internees Guards 
Bakhuizen Rented church with kitchen and 250 4 
guardroom 
Lodged with locals Without food 323 
Rijs Open sheds 800 9 
converted to barracks on the 
ground of the brick factory with 
kitchen and canteen 
Unspecified Four farms 59 16 
Oude Mirdum Rented farm with kitchen and 140 6 
canteen 
Mirdum Two farms 49 11 
Sonde] Seven farms with kitchen and 300 6 
canteen 
Balk Rented house 50 9 
Seven lodgings 250 
without food with kitchen and 
canteen 
TOTALS 2223'8 61 
" LM Geschiedenis der Interneering p. 86 Laporte also claims that some 2,200 internees were held here 
spread out over 5 villages. Laporte, Belgische Geinterneerden in Nederland Gedurende De Eerste 
Wereldoorlog, p. 39. 
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The cost of this accommodation varied. The church at Bakhuizen was rented for Dfl 
200, the farm at Oude Mirdum for Dfl 1,200 and the house at Balk for Dfl 120. Where 
internees were placed in lodgings without food their hosts were paid an allowance of 
10cts per day (sometimes an increased rate of 20 cents per day was paid for the first 14 
days). In Rijs the cost of accommodation was set at the higher rate of 20 cents per day 
until the costs of clearing and converting the open sheds had been recovered. 19 
Initially most of the refugees and internees accepted their accommodation 
without comment. After several days on the road and the terror and disruption of the 
German attack prior to that, most were pleased to be anywhere that provided a roof, a 
bed and regular food. As winter approached, however, the drawbacks of the makeshift 
accommodation became more obvious. Most of the bedding was straw, susceptible to 
the damp and, despite being frequently burned, also a breeding ground for fleas and 
lice. Many of the roofs leaked. The sheds at Rijs had only been closed by the use of 
loose planks that let the draughts in. The distance between the accommodations was 
also a problem. Not only were the internees spread out over several villages, the 
accommodation within a village was also spread over a large area meaning that the 
internees had some distance to walk for their meals and other facilities. The refugees 
had the choice of accepting the conditions or going elsewhere, the internees did not. An 
added problem for the majority of the internees was that they had only one change of 
clothing with them. Personal hygiene, even ignoring the fleas and lice, was a problem 
and not one that did much to improve morale. It was apparent that Gaasterland as it 
then stood could only be regarded as a temporary camp and was unsuitable for 
19 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering p. 86. 
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occupation during the winter. Complaints were made such that in the beginning of 
November the Minister of War made a personal visit to Rijs and as a result wood was 
provided to enable sleeping platforms to be erected above ground level, therefore 
avoiding the worst of the cold and damp. Not all reactions to the situation were 
negative; however, the internees in Harich and Balk were so happy with not only their 
accommodation but also the food they were given, that they also wrote to the Minister 
of War, this time asking that they be allowed to remain in the villages. 
Guarding a camp such as Gaasterland was always going to be problematic given the 
large area that it covered, the nature of the terrain and the way in which the internees 
were distributed over many different locations. The number of guards provided, even 
though this was increased in November 1914, was clearly inadequate to prevent the 
escape of any internees who made a determined effort to do so. Despite this fact, 
however, the number of escape attempts, successful or otherwise, was limited. No exact 
figures are available but the number of internees housed at Gaasterland remained 
constant for the rest of 1914 so it is reasonable to presume that there were few escapes. 
As the stream of retreating Belgian soldiers continued to cross the Dutch frontier it was 
apparent to the Dutch authorities that more locations were required that could be 
utilised as internment camps. The recently evacuated Dutch army barracks at 
Amersfoort was one such location that was available for immediate use. The barracks 
were normally the base for the 5th Infantry Regiment but they had recently left as part 
of the general mobilisation. The terrain was ideally suited for the task of internment. 
The facilities were newly built and the entire area of around 9 ha was enclosed, making 
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guarding the internees much easier. 2D On the night of 9/10 October 1914 some 4,000 
Belgian soldiers accompanied by 30 of their officers arrived at the camp to be greeted 
by the Commander of the Engineering Regiment that had been tasked with adapting the 
accommodation to meet the needs of the internees. He found himself with the 
additional problem of having to allocate accommodation and ensure that the internees 
were fed. The newly appointed camp commander and his staff did not arrive until the 
following day. A company of infantry from the Dutch army was transferred from 
Apeldoorn to act as guards. 
With a population of 4,000 internees and their guards the army camp made an ideal 
internment camp. When a further 6,000 Belgian soldiers and 90 officers arrived on 11 
October the available accommodation was stretched to its absolute limit even with the 
further addition of two more companies of Dutch troops to assist with guarding and two 
nursing officers to deal with the sick. The arrival of another 4,000 internees on the 12th 
October pushed the available space in the camp to such an extreme that on 13th 
October the Minister of War, Generaal-Major Bosboom, made a personal visit to the 
camp to assess the needs for himself. At the time of his visit the population of the camp 
stood at 223 officers and 16,500 soldiers. 
With the help of a detachment of 200 genietroepen (army engineers) that had arrived on 
11 October, 500 tents were erected on the parade square (7 ha) and when this proved 
inadequate a further 400 tents were placed on the ground behind the barracks. This area 
then had to be enclosed with barbed wire to prevent a mass escape. The tented camps 
20 The suitability or otherwise of these empty barracks is a matter of opinion. Laporte speaks less 
favourably of the facilities offered to the Belgian internees. Laporte, Belgische Geintemeerden in 
Nederland Gedurende De Eerste Wereldoorlog, p. 33. 
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were provided, as far as possible, with latrines and other necessities but it was not until 
14 October that some sort of realistic order could be brought to the camp. Laporte in 
Vluchten voor de Groote Oorlog talks about minor unrest in this camp because of the 
large numbers interned there and the cramped conditions. 21 It seems to have been 
limited, however, to the throwing of projectiles at the Dutch guards. The local people 
were aware of the problems and some brought gifts of food, which they passed through 
the wire fence. Not all were this charitable and some tried to sell food through the wire. 
The local paper, De Amersfoortsche Courant, criticised those Netherlanders that sought 
to make a profit out of the `helpless internees'. ' 
Amersfoort 19142; 
The officers all gave their word not to escape and were released from the camp to find 
" Ritter also alludes to minor unrest in these temporary camps when he talks about the need for more 
permanent accommodation Ritter, De Donkere Poort, deel I, p. 147. 
22 Laporte 'Vlucht en opvang van de Belgische Soldaten', p. 32 
11 http: //www. wereldoorlog1418. nl/refugees/vluctelingengen/militarien. html 24 August 2008 
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accommodation in the town. They were given freedom of movement but were not 
allowed to leave the local area. The accommodation situation seems to have aggravated 
the animosity between the Belgian soldiers and their officers. The release of the 
officers to live in what Laporte describes as `luxury' at the very time that the ordinary 
troops were facing the worst overcrowding and chaotic organisation was ill timed, even 
though it was aimed at relieving the situation. ' With the help of some of the Belgian 
officers the Dutch authorities now began to produce a form of nominal roll, which 
included the names of the interned and their military unit. 
Given the large numbers that had to be housed in tents it was clear that Amersfoort 
would need to be one of the first camps to be reduced in size. On 19 October 1,500 
internees were transferred to Gaasterland and Leeuwarden and once the newly built 
camp at Zeist, some 7 1/2 km away, was in a state to receive internees a further 6,000 
were transferred there. This reduction in the number of internees meant that a far 
greater proportion of those still left at Amersfoort could be housed in other than tented 
accommodation and that the number of guards needed was also reduced. u 
Almost immediately after the fall of Antwerp it had become apparent to the Dutch 
authorities that the current provision of internment accommodation was inadequate. A 
large number were housed in tents that were insufficient to deal with the oncoming 
winter and those that were in more suitable buildings were frequently occupying 
barracks that the Dutch army now required to accommodate new conscripts. The 
solution was a decision taken by the government in mid October 1914 to erect a 
24 Laporte, Belgische Geinterneerden in Nederland Gedurende De Eerste Wereldoorlog, p. 3. See also 
Bosboom, in Moeilijke Omstandigheden, p. 341. 
25 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering p. 99 to p. 103. 
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purpose built camp close to the town of Zeist. 6 
The Ministry of War placed the task of constructing the camp in the hands of the Wapen 
der Genie (Engineering Regiment) under the supervision of Kapitein G. C. Beltman. 27 
On 13 October he was instructed to build a camp for 6,000 internees plus their guards 
(calculated at 1 guard for 10 internees) within 14 days. ' The civilian firms Van Rossurn 
and Technisch Bureau Rutgers, both from The Hague, were also commissioned to assist 
with the task. 
By 14 October some 175 troops from the Engineering Regiment were already at work 
clearing the ground. Materials, primarily wood, were moved in to the site day and night 
through the railway station at Huis ter Heide. The army of civilian carpenters brought in 
to construct the barracks, however, only worked during the day although they did 
continue on Sundays. When the number of military labourers proved inadequate more 
workers were drafted in from Utrecht. Four days into the building of the camp at Zeist, 
Beltman was also instructed to build two further camps, one at Harderwijk for 7,500 
and one at Oldebroek for 3,500. During the building it was decided to extent the camps 
at Zeist and Harderwijk to 13,500 and 11,500 respectively. 
The camp at Zeist was developed from the experience of the first two camps at Alkmaar 
and Gaasterland. It was sub-divided into three smaller camps, two for internees and one 
26 Laporte, Belgische Geinterneerden in Nederland Gedurende De Eerste Wereldoorlog, p. 41. 
27 Beltman, G. C. Eenige Mededeelingen Bettreffende den Bouw en de Inrichting van de 
Interneeringskampen to Zeist, Harderwijk en Oldebroek, an undated pamphlet. The text had originally 
been printed in De Ingenieur; Orgaan van het Koninklijk Institute van Ingenieurs en van de Vereeniging 
van Delftsche Ingenieurs, No 35,28 August 1915. 
2'Bosboom, In Moeilijke Omstandigheden, p. 341. 
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for guards. The guard camp comprised four accommodation barracks, one for each 
company plus a fifth barrack that provided not only accommodation for a further 100 
men but also space for rest rooms, a tailor and barbers. In an effort to cut down on costs 
the kitchens, canteens and workshops that already existed on the site were pressed into 
use. For the internees everything was to be newly built. Camp 1 had 30 accommodation 
barracks that could hold 250 men (or 300 in an emergency), 4 washrooms and laundries, 
4 latrine blocks plus a Roman Catholic chapel, a post office, a refuse oven and 
workshops for tailor, barbers and cobblers. Camp 2 had only 24 accommodation 
barracks and as well as the normal facilities provided in camp 1 it had three school 
buildings, a cinema and both a Roman Catholic and a Protestant chapel. Each of the 
internment camps had a guardhouse with tents for new arrivals and two portable Red 
Cross barracks for the sick. The camps all covered an area of roughly 12 ha each. A 
more detailed description of the construction of the camp at Zeist, and all of the other 
Belgian camps, can be found in Laporte, Belgische Geinterneerden in Nederland 
Gedurende De Eerste Wereldoorlog. He provides an interesting contrast to the Dutch 
view that the construction of these camps in record time was a major feat of engineering 
and a humanitarian gesture. In Laporte's eyes the camps were far from perfect and were 
deliberately constructed in that way. 
Two companies from Army Battalion E plus their staff arrived on 31 October to take up 
responsibility for guarding the camp. The first 6,000 internees arrived on 3 November 
1914 and although the bulk of the building work was complete many of the 
supplementary building were not yet entirely finished. In addition, there were no cells 
available and no accommodation for the officers that made up part of the Dutch guard 
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detachment. These were quartered on a temporary basis in nearby Soesterberg and Huis 
ter Heide. ' 
The camp at Harderwijk was constructed along similar lines to the camp at Zeist. The 
Dutch army had rented the camp area for many years from the local authority at 
Harderwijk. It covered an area of around 32 ha and was subdivided into five separate 
camps; guards, internees, stores, visitors and sport. The accommodation for the 
internees was in 46 accommodation barracks supported by 2 canteens, 1 church which 
had facilities for both Roman Catholic and Protestant worship, 3 education barracks and 
1 barrack for the sick. It also had all of the necessary washing and toilet facilities as 
provided in Zeist. As this camp was not located near a railway line as Zeist had been, 
the first task for Beltman was to organise for a special line to be laid. Although a major 
task it was considered a cheaper option than bringing in all of the required materials by 
other means of transport. It also provided a means of transporting the internees to and 
from the camp. Once the camp was completed a road was also built, replacing the 
existing dirt track with a hard surface. The costs for the road were met jointly by the 
local authority and central government 30 
N LM Geschiedenis der Interneering p. 104. 
30 An good overview of this camp can be found in Elands, M. & Bossenbroek, M. P., Harderwijk, als 
militaire stall en de Geschiedenis van, (The Hague: Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis, 1994). p. 62-73. 
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Harderwijk before construction started: a tented camp. 
Harderwijk after the construction of permanent accommodation. 31 
Construction of the camp at Oldebroek was more problematic because, unlike the sites 
chosen for the Harderwijk and Zeist camps, at Oldebroek there already existed 
http: //www. wereldoorlog1418. nl/refugees/viuctelingengen/militarien. html 24 August 2008. 
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buildings that were to be utilised in the new camp. It was also already in use as a 
refugee camp. In early December 1914 the refugees left the camp and work 
commenced to convert it to an internment camp. A further problem with the camp at 
Oldebroek was that there were no existing towns or villages within close proximity of 
the camp. Relatives who wanted to visit the internees therefore had no means of 
securing accommodation in the area. The solution was the construction of a barracks 
next to the camp that could be used to house up to 100 visiting relatives 32 
The internees that were sent to Kampen were housed in the barracks of the Instructie- 
Bataljon (Education Battalion), specifically in the buildings of the chief instructor and 
the riding school. In order to make them habitable, the concrete floor of the exercise 
area and the sand ring of the riding school were covered with a wooden floor onto 
which surrounds for the straw mattresses were nailed. Canteens were established in all 
buildings and kitchens, wash areas and toilets were renovated and made more suitable 
for long-term use by the internees. 
On arrival the internees were divided into nine companies of approximately the same 
strength. In making this division the Dutch took account of the internees' units and 
language in an effort to avoid unnecessary tensions arising between groups. By placing 
French and Flemish speaking soldiers into separate groups it meant that orders only had 
to be given in one language. 
32 A short but comprehensive overview of the camp at Oldebroek can be found in Bremen, L, van den,. 
'De Kamp van Oldebroek' in Ample Epe No 89 (1989), p. 6-10. 
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The British Camps 
Compared to the large number of Belgians that were interned in the Netherlands the 
number of British internees was very small. The majority of British servicemen who 
were interned in the Netherlands during the First World War came from the Royal 
Naval Division that had been part of the British Expeditionary Force sent to support the 
Belgian army at Antwerp. The first British military personnel that crossed the border 
were sent on to Leeuwarden but the main British camp for the entire duration of the war 
was located in the northern town of Groningen -' 
As a result of the Dutch mobilisation there were two empty barracks available for use in 
Groningen and these were allocated to the British internees. The first arrivals on I1 
October were placed in the barrack on the Heerenweg; this was intended for the NCOs 
and other ranks. The camp commandant and his administration officer arrived on the 
same day. All of the British officers had given their promise not to escape and so were 
allowed, at their own expense, to live in the town. ` The accommodation in the barracks 
was well suited to the needs of the internees. A drill hall was used as a mess hall, a 
canteen was staffed by local civilians and the second floor was used as a sick bay. Later 
on the drill halls were provided with heating and lighting so that they could be used as 
recreational areas. On 17 October 1914 a further transfer of British internees from 
Leeuwarden brought the total of internees up to 1,513, far too many for the available 
accommodation. As the second available barrack at the garrison was less suited to the 
needs of the internees because it had been a military hospital, it was decided that instead 
' Oosterman, `De Interneering hier to lande'p. 807. 
34 The issue of officers parole will be dealt with in more detail in chapter 5. 
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of using it for accommodation, a different building would be leased. To this end a large 
bicycle factory, also on the Heerenweg, was rented from Fongers Rijwielfabriek as a 
temporary measure. This building allowed for the housing of 400 men but they slept on 
straw. The 1,100 housed in the barracks enjoyed the luxury of iron bedsteads. 
Permission was given for the building of two wooden barracks on the parade ground 
behind the barracks. These were completed on 28 October and allowed all of the British 
internees to be accommodated on one site. 35 
The camp at Groningen" 
The British had entered into the Netherlands as part of a military formation and the 
Dutch authorities encouraged them to maintain this form during their internment. The 
internees all came from three battalions of the Royal Naval Division, Hawke, 
Collingwood and Benbow. Each battalion was split into three companies, each company 
into four platoons and each platoon into four sections. In this way the officers were able 
LM Geschiedenis der Interneering p. 79. 
http*//wivw. greatwar. nl/ 24 August 2008 
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to keep control of their men. When the officers were not lodged at the barracks the 
battalions were controlled by a chief petty officer. The end result was that discipline 
was high amongst the British and, from the Dutch point of view the minimum number 
of men could guard them. This was in contrast to the situation in the Belgian camps. 
Unlike many of the Belgian internees the British entered the Netherlands only as part of 
a military formation. They had no families with them and so did not present the Dutch 
authorities with the additional headache of refugees that needed to be accommodated at 
the same location. The also enjoyed a great deal of support from firstly the authorities in 
Great Britain and secondly from the British civilian communities, both at home and in 
the Netherlands. Supplies of `extras' such as food, books, and sporting and musical 
equipment were swiftly forthcoming making life in this camp far more enjoyable. 
The German Camp 
Like the British internees, those Germans that found themselves interned in the 
Netherlands for the duration of the war were fully supported by their own government. 
The new site for their internment camp was at Bergen and initially they were 
accommodated in tents, but more permanent wooden huts, paid for by Germany, soon 
replaced these. There was already an established community of Germans living within 
the Netherlands and they offered a similar level of support to that provided by the 
British expatriate community to the British internees. The proximity of Germany, just 
over a land border also made it easier to receive supplies from the home nation, 
something that would be of more significance once the increased submarine war made 
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links to England more problematic and reduced the supplies to the British internees. 
The relatively small number of Germans that were interned by the Dutch compared to 
the larger groups of Belgians and British internees also made the Germans easier to 
administer and to provide for. In addition the German officers, like their British 
counterparts, also felt a responsibility for their men and actively participated in looking 
after their welfare and addressing any disciplinary problem that arose. 
Bergen was, even by comparison with the British camp at Groningen, a very small 
camp. Its population was rarely over 200 and this fluctuated because of the relatively 
high number of internees that were released. Once the German government had agreed 
to let its officers accept parole the officers moved out to live in Rotterdam, an area 
designated by the Dutch government as `German', (the British area was The Hague). 
The rest of the releases were German soldiers who, after investigation were found to be 
deserters. 
The Camp at Bergen for German internees. `' 
http"//www wereldoorlogl4l8. ni/refugees/vluchtelingen/militairen html 24 August 2008 
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Vlissingen 
A more unusual camp with a small but significant population was the one at 
Vlissingen. Under the control of H Piper, a police inspector, this camp was for 
internees that had committed a criminal offence. 38 More a prison than a camp, 
Vlissingen had a steadily increasing population during 1916. The number of Belgian 
internees increased from 73 in January to 93 in December whilst the British had 12 
men there in January and 16 in December although the number of British prisoners 
dropped as low as 4 in July. Most prisoners served only a few months in Vlissingen, 
some returned on more than one occasion and the escape attempts that were made over 
the years were all foiled. " Although intended only for those who had committed a 
criminal offence, Vlissingen was used in the later years of the war to house persistent 
escapees following the closure of Urk and only when the punishment cells in the 
normal internment camps were full. 
Conditions in the Camps 
Following the fall of Antwerp and the enormous influx of Belgian soldiers it became 
apparent that a more formal organisation was required to handle all aspects of 
internment. As a consequence the Afdeling Interneering (Department of Internment) 
was brought into being on 19 January 1915 and placed under the control of Generaal- 
majoor M. Onnen. A retired officer himself, brought back into general service by the 
38 Laporte, Belgische Geinterneerden in Nederland Gedurende De Eerste Wereldooriog, p. 57. 
3' LM Geschiedenis der Interneering p. 1135. See also Oosterman, `De Interneering hier to lande' p. 833. 
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war, Onnen was an engineer by background. He was to remain in post until the last 
month of the war when ill health forced his (second) retirement and his sudden death in 
December 1918 robbed him of the opportunity to enjoy it. Although Onnen is a key 
man in the history of Dutch internment very little is known about him and little has 
been written about him. Much of the documentation that might have shed more light 
onto his personal influence over internment had been destroyed. We are left with a 
vague view of him as a hardworking, loyal and honest public servant. 
His office was part of the General Headquarters of the Ministry of War and he was 
given a staff of nine officers and eighteen writers, of which four were Belgian 
internees 40 The creation of the Department of Internment and Onnen's appointment 
concentrated attention on internment and, now that the panic of October was over, 
more attention was given to formalising the administration of the camps. 1915 brought 
a flurry of paperwork, as guidelines were issued to all and sundry regarding every 
aspect of the treatment of internees. Decisions were now made more on a national basis 
rather than local commanders reacting to local conditions. " 
Food and Clothing 
Housing the internees was only one of the more practical problems faced by the Dutch 
authorities. Feeding and clothing them were also aspects of internment that had to be 
4° De Roodt, Oorlogsgasten, p. 38- 
CA good example of the type of instructions that were issued during 1915 are the `Instructions for the 
commandant of an internment camp' and the `Instructions for the commandant of a special internment 
camp, designated for internees, whose presence in the other internment camps is considered 
unwekome'. Issued on 20 February and 31 may respectively. Gegevens betreffende de Interneering P. 13 
-21. 
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dealt with. Initially this responsibility fell to the local authority into which the internee 
had originally entered the Netherlands. Once he was placed in a more permanent camp 
then this responsibility was taken over by the central government. 
At the beginning of the war the food allowance given to internees was identical to that 
provided for the Dutch military; even the menus used were taken from the Dutch 
military. ` Unfortunately, whilst at this stage in the war there were few complaints 
made about the quantity of food being served, there were many complaints about the 
quality. Dutch military menus, whatever their reception by Dutch soldiers, were not 
popular with the internees. Traditional Dutch meals such as brown beans and bacon 
were not well received. ' A logical and popular move was to hand the running of the 
kitchens in the internment camps over to the internees. The Dutch provided the rations 
and the internees could then produce meals that suited their own national taste' 
A less easily solved problem was that many of the kitchens were inadequate for the 
number of men that they had to feed. In Amersfoort for example the kitchens could 
only turn out 4,500 meals, completely inadequate for a camp population that rose 
rapidly to 16,500.51n this case, as in other similar instances, outside contracts were 
given for staples such as bread in order to relieve the pressure on the camp kitchens. 
Even here efforts were made to meet the tastes of the national groups. For example, 
contractors in Groningen were asked to produce whiter bread because this was more to 
the taste of the British internees than the normal brown loaf eaten by the Dutch. 
42 Laporte Belgische Geinterneerden in Nederland Gedurende De Eerste Wereldoorlog, p. 61. 
'3 Laporte Belgische Geinterneerden in Nederland Gedurende De Eerste Wereldoorlog. p. 66. 
44 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 150. 
45 Laporte, Belgische Geinterneerden in Nederland Gedurende De Eerste Wereldoorlog, p. 60. 
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According to Oosterman, once these adjustments had been made, then the internees 
received excellent food throughout the entire period of their internment. Whilst this 
cannot be seen as an impartial opinion it is clear that the number of complaints about 
the quality of the food did decrease in 1915. Later on in the war, however, complaints 
once more increased but this time over the quantity of food as the national shortages 
meant that all ration allowances were reduced. In 1918 the rations for the Belgian 
internees were so small that there was serious concern for their health, especially those 
working in heavy industry and mining. This has to be seen, however, against the food 
shortages throughout the Netherlands at this time. 46 
There were some local variations in the quantity and type of food provided to the 
internees as efforts were made to keep costs down by using local produce, but these 
were minor. A typical day's ration in 1914, intended to provide food for three meals 
was, 47 
600gr bread 
20gr butter 
50gr rice 
220gr beef with bone 
65gr meat fat (sometimes replaced with bacon) 
2 litre potatoes (sometimes replaced by brown beans) 
6gr coffee 
2cts treats 
'6 Laporte, Belgische Geinterneerden in Nederland Gedurende De Eerste Wereldoorlog, p. 62-65. 
47 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering p. 150. 
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For those who, for exceptional reasons, did not receive their rations directly in food 
then an allowance of 35ct per day was made with the possibility of up to a further 25ct 
per day at the discretion of the issuing authority. This was not a generous allowance. 
For example in 1915 an egg cost 7 cents and a roll 10 cents. As food became scarcer 
these prices increased. 's 
Initially given the same amount of food as the Dutch soldiers, it soon became apparent 
that the ration allowance for internees was unnecessarily generous given their inactive 
and sedentary lives. The basic ration was therefore cut, although not by much, and the 
extra money that this made available was used to buy luxury goods, for events such as 
Christmas, without having to raise the overall expenditure. 49 The daily rations were also 
supplemented by food donated by charitable organisations. The Red Cross parcels are 
one example but many other smaller groups also devoted themselves to the welfare of 
the internees. A group in Liege, for example, applied to the Dutch Consulate in that city 
for permission to send food boxes to internees in the Netherlands that would be `no 
more than 5kg in weight and contain such things as chocolate and pain d'epicei90. 
Permission for such acts of charity was rarely refused. s' 
The clothing worn by most internees at the time of their internment was in a very poor 
state. This was principally a problem for the Belgian internees. The British were looked 
48 Laporte Belgische Geintemeerden in Nederland Gedurende De Eerste Wereldoorlog, p. 67. 
49 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 154. 
50 A sort of spiced fruit bread. 
" ARA 2.05.04 inv 742 No 32446 Letter from Dutch Consulate in Liege to Foreign Affairs dated 20 
November 1914 and reply from Ministry of War to Foreign Affairs giving permission dated 23 
November 1914. 
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after directly from the UK. New supplies of uniforms for all British troops interned in 
the Netherlands were sent over almost immediately at the request of the Dutch 
authorities. The Germans were also provided with all necessary items either from 
stocks taken from casualties and passed on by the Dutch Red Cross or from German 
sources within the Netherlands. Occasionally extra supplies were also sent directly 
from Germany. As the numbers of British and German internees were always 
considerably less than the number of Belgians then clearly the problems of supply were 
also always going to be less. As far as the Belgians went, however, the problem was 
twofold. Not only were there more of them, but the German occupation of Belgian 
made it impossible to obtain more supplies from the home nation. The bulk supplies of 
Belgian army uniforms were held in an area of Belgium that was now occupied by the 
Germans. In a letter dated 9 November 1914 the Belgian government, now located in 
Le Havre, refused to allow the Dutch government to approach the Germans with a view 
to utilising these supplies. Instead they merely assured the Dutch that new uniforms 
would be provided ` at the earliest opportunity' . -3 
The stocks of the newly mobilized Dutch military were also very low, and so any 
supplies that could be obtained from Dutch sources were minimal. An issue of 
underclothes was made, but new outer clothes were slower to come. Even when they 
were available the Dutch authorities were forced to stop issuing the Belgians with 
' ARA 2.05.04 inv 742 No 30998 Letter dated 28 November 1914 to Minister of Foreign Affairs from 
his opposite number in London confirming that 2,000 spare uniforms would be sent over immediately. 
n ARA 2.05.04 Inv 742 No 30998 and 27727 Correspondence between the Belgian Government in Le 
Havre and the Ministry of War dated 9 November 1914. 
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surplus Dutch military clothing as this only made it easier for any internees making an 
escape attempt. ' 
In December 1914 the Belgian government went a long way towards solving the 
clothing problem by giving its permission for Belgian uniforms to be made in the 
Netherlands and issued to the internees. Shoes were another problem and shortages led 
to many of the Belgians being given clogs to wear. Unfortunately the wet winter of 
1914/15 left many with unbearable blisters. ' 
By July 1915 the Ministry of War was sufficiently well organised to issue a list of 
clothing and personnel effects which should be issued to each Belgian internee below 
commissioned tank. "' 
tunic 1 
trousers 1 
cap 1 
overcoat 1 
working trousers 1 
working smock 1 
shirt 2 
underpants 2 
5' LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 157 and Laporte Belgische Geinterneerden in Nederland 
Gedurende De Eerste Wereldoorlog, p. 69- 
-" LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 157 and Laporte, Belgische Geinterneerden in Nederland 
Gedurende De Eerste Wereldoorlog, p. 69. 
'6 Gegevens Bettreffende Interneering 1915 p. 93. The order was signed by the Secretary General of the 
Ministry of War, AJ Doorman. 
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socks 2pr 
vest 2 
shoes 2pr 
towel I 
mess tin 1 
(If deemed necessary by the camp commandant) 
(Of which one pair were clogs) 
comb 1 
spoon 1 
fork 1 
clothes brush and shoe brushes as available 
Even if every Belgian internee was in receipt of his full clothing allowance then 
maintaining personal hygiene was still difficult. With only one spare set of underwear 
and only one spare shirt, washing clothes (and more importantly getting them dry 
again) was a constant problem. In the unheated barracks internees often had to wear 
everything they owned in an effort to stay warm during the winter. This, combined with 
the straw mattresses, meant that lice were a constant problem. 
The uprising at Internment Camp Zeist 
Unlike POWs, the internees in the Netherlands had no further contact with the enemy 
they had been fighting. Where soldier captured by the enemy on a battlefield, and 
subsequently imprisoned, still sees his enemy on a daily basis and has a focal point for 
whatever anger or dissatisfaction that imprisonment generates, the internees had no 
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means to carry on the conflict, however ineffectively. ' Forbidden by their own 
governments from escaping, again the prerogative of a POW, the internees, and 
especially the Belgian internees that had effectively been abandoned by their 
government, led a frustrating existence. 
The atmosphere in each of the camps was dictated by many different factors. The living 
conditions, the location of the camp, the health and well-being of the internees. The 
character of the camp commandant was also an influencing factor. In Harderwijk the 
camp could reasonably be described as contented. The internees were prepared to work 
with the Dutch engineers to ensure the speedy completion of areas of the camp that 
were still under construction. In return the internees were given a limited amount of 
extra freedom. They were, for example, allowed to meet their families outside the camp 
and to go with them into the local town. In Zeist the opposite situation existed. The 
sterner character of the camp commandant led to conflict with the internees and a loss 
in cooperation. The internees at Zeist would not help with the construction work and as 
a result did not receive extra privileges. 
By the end of November 1914 most of the essential building work at Zeist had been 
completed, but this had been done without the assistance of the camp occupants. The 
Belgian soldiers refused to work, claiming that as they were not POWs they could not 
be forced to work. Whilst they were not prepared to help with the official construction 
work, they did steal large quantities of the building materials to make extra items for 
their own barracks; chairs, tables and the like. Besides being a breach of discipline, 
s' Audoin-Rouzeau, Stephane & Becker, Annette,. 1914-1918 Understanding the Great War, (London: 
Profile Books, 2002). p. 81.. 
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which brought the wrath of the Dutch authorities down upon them, this also created 
delay in the construction work as new supplies had to be obtained. The occupants of the 
camp were, in any event, not in a very satisfactory state of mind. Food was available but 
at this stage still based more on traditional Dutch recipes rather than Belgian fare. The 
Belgian government had decided, unlike its British and German counterparts, that 
heating in the sleeping barracks was a waste of money and would not be good for the 
health of the internees. The internees had been issued with some replacement uniforms 
but clothing was still scarce. Many only owned one set of clothes and, with no heating 
in the barracks, it was almost impossible to get washing to dry as winter set in. Shoes or 
boots were very scarce and those worn by the internees were either in a poor state of 
repair or had been replaced by wooden clogs, which caused very bad blisters. Events 
outside the camp did little to lift the mood. Their own government was calling them all 
deserters; their officers were reluctant to take responsibility for their men and preferred 
to live outside the camps in private accommodation. In Harderwijk the internees for the 
most part looked at the positive side of events, they were fed, housed, and away from 
the was with their families in the near vicinity if not actually housed with them. In Zeist, 
under a more oppressive camp commandant and with no officers to intervene on their 
behalf, the collective view of the internees was a lot more pessimistic. 
Matters came to a head on 3 December 1914 outside the camp canteen. The building 
that would eventually house the canteen had not yet been completed. It had been given a 
low priority and instead a large tent had been erected to serve as a temporary canteen. 
Large though it was, this tent was not large enough to accommodate all of the internees. 
As they were not allowed to go to the nearest town it was also the only place that the 
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internees were allowed to meet their families. The internees were given an allowance of 
10 cents a day but this did not go very far. On the evening of 2 December 1914 there 
was a great deal of discontent in and around the temporary canteen. The Belgians 
started to air all of the grievances. The situation escalated until the Dutch guards were 
forced to fire a number of shots into the air to disperse the crowd. This had the desired 
effect and the grumbling Belgians returned to their barracks. The following day, 
however, the situation remained tense and the Dutch authorities were concerned enough 
to put an extra fifty guards on duty. Even this did not stop a crowd of internees 
congregating outside of the canteen to continue the complaints of the previous evening. 
The size of the crowd depends on the report. Many sources put it at around 100 to 150, 
whilst Bosboom, in the official government report into the disturbance, claims that it 
involved half of the camp. Attempts were made to disperse the crowd by addressing 
them in both French and Dutch. This was unsuccessful and the situation soon escalated 
and the commander of the guard, Lieutenant G. A. Mallinckrodt, acted upon the 
permission given to him by the camp commandant Generaal-majoor J. H. Knel, to open 
fire if necessary. Three volleys were fired before the Belgians realised that this time the 
Dutch were not firing into the air and that some of their number had been hit. Five died 
immediately, one shortly afterwards, one in hospital later the same day and one the day 
after. A further eighteen were injured. ' 
The death of eight Belgians at the hands of their Dutch guards generated, predictably, a 
lot of attention. Questions were asked in the Dutch Parliament on 5 December 1914 
"3 Hendrickx- Van der Avert, M. L. C., De opstand in he: Interneringskamp Zeist op 3 december 1914, 
Araersfoort, (1985) unpublished dissertation p. 40 ARA library 168 D87. 
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requesting an official enquiry. Bosboom agreed and the investigation he initiated made 
its report on 2 January 1915 saying; 
Only this timely and powerful intervention, however sad the result, prevented 
worse events from happening. With different action, certainly the resistance 
would have developed into a stronger force and this would have led to more 
serious breaches of discipline. ' 
The results of this report were generally derided in the press and by the Belgian 
authorities, but it seemed that only the press wanted to pursue the matter further. The 
Dutch government wanted the matter to be swiftly forgotten and the Belgians, 
understandably, had more concerns about their troops fighting on the front line than 
those interned in the Netherlands. It was suggested that, given the problems with 
discipline, Belgian officers should be brought into the camps to control their own 
troops. This idea was rejected by the Dutch government who did not want Belgian 
officers in positions of authority taking orders directly from the Belgian government 
and implementing them in the camps without the knowledge or consent of the Dutch 
authorities. A more acceptable solution for the Dutch was a suggestion from General 
Dossin, the Military Attach6 at the Belgian Embassy, that the internees be given more to 
occupy them, especially more physical activities. 
Had the Belgian government been more concerned about the death of six of their 
soldiers in the Netherlands at the hands of the Dutch army then this incident would 
have generated more diplomatic activity than it did. As it was, the Belgian government 
-"' De Vries, `Nederland als Non-beligerente Natie en de Internering van Buitenlandse Militairen 
Gedurende de Eerste Wereldoorlog', p. 99. 
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considered all of those killed to be deserters anyway. It was less than two months after 
the fall of Antwerp, the government had been unseated from Brussels and had been 
forced to retreat to Le Havre, the whole of Belgium was in a time of crisis and these 
eight soldiers were a very long way down any Belgian officials' list of concerns. 
Likewise the Dutch were still into their first half-year of mobilisation and could be 
forgiven for believing that the Belgian internees, recipients of large amounts of Dutch 
aid in the preceding two months, had brought this retribution onto their own heads. 
Both governments were content to let the matter drop as quickly as they could. 60 
Whilst this episode was certainly regrettable, and perhaps predictable, there was one 
positive aspect to come out of all of the press coverage. The situation that the internees 
found themselves in became public knowledge, not only in the Netherlands but in other 
countries as well. This prompted an immediate increase in the amount of aid that was 
offered to benefit those in internment camps. Charitable groups and committees all 
over the world had found a new target for their good work. 
60 In 1920 the Belgian Government had to reopen the case because they were facing a request for 
compensation from the victims' dependants. They were forced to approach the Dutch Government for 
details of the incident as no official records were held in Belgium. ARA 2.05.04 box 763 inv nr 9383 
various documents, October 1920. 
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Chapter 5 
The middle years of the War; Consolidation 
With the completion of the infrastructure of the new camps at Zeist, Harderwijk and 
Oldebroek and a lot of ingenuity elsewhere, the Dutch government had gone a long 
way towards fulfilling its obligations with regards to the internees. All had some sort of 
roof over their head, all had a place to sleep and regular meals and, from the point of 
view of international law, all were either behind barbed wire and prevented by their 
Dutch guards from rejoining the war or had given their promise not to escape. Quite 
clearly, however, the Dutch authorities could not now turn their attention to other 
matters and leave the internees to sit it out until the end of the war. As the new year 
opened it was becoming more obvious that the conflict in Europe would not be quickly 
resolved and that the war, with all its accompanying problems, could last for some 
time. The complaints from Gaasterland that had prompted the visit of the Minister of 
War were a taste of the problems to come, once the internees had recovered from the 
trauma of their retreat into the Netherlands and started to take stock of their new 
surroundings. Criticism came not only directly from the internees. Foreign journalists 
in the Netherlands found the internees to be very newsworthy and their reports were not 
always favourable towards the Dutch government. 
'ARA 2.05.04 Inv 746 No 25970 Press clipping from South Africa commenting unfavourably on the 
Dutch treatment of internees. 1916. See page 81 for more details about the conditions in Camp 
Gaasterland. 
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Here again the different manner in which the different nationalities viewed their 
internments greatly affected the way that the camps were organised and the daily 
routine of the internees. The German and British internees had, for the most part, 
reached the Netherlands in the company of their officers or senior non-commissioned 
officers. The established discipline and command structure that governed the lives of 
these soldiers before they became internees was not altered once they were placed in an 
internment camp. The British and German officers, even when not living in the camps 
with their men still considered them to be their responsibility. Whenever appropriate 
they would intervene on their behalf. This relationship between the officers and their 
men, coupled with the support from the home nations, made the day to day running of 
the camps for British and German internees at lot less problematic for the Dutch 
authorities. 
The Belgians were another matter. The majority crossed into the Netherlands without 
their officers. They were convinced that their officers had abandoned them during the 
fall of Antwerp. The previous military command structure was in tatters and this made 
organising the Belgians in their camps far more difficult for the Dutch. It is hard to 
establish with any certainty why the Belgian officers were not housed with their men, 
at least initially. There was certainly a view amongst the Dutch military at the time that 
the animosity between the Belgian soldiers and their officers would only lead to further 
unrest if they were housed together. The messages from the Belgian government were 
also confused. They alleged that almost everyone involved in the fall of Antwerp and 
now in the Netherlands was a deserter and their lack of initial concern for the welfare 
of their soldiers did little to mend bridges between the ranks. ' The Belgian 
" Not all Belgian officers were despised by their soldiers. Luitenant-kolonel P. J. de Pauw was held in 
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governments primary concern appeared to be establishing which officers could be tried 
at Courts Martial rather than which officers could be used to command the Belgian 
internees. In Het Godsdienstig leven der Belgen in Nederland tijdens de oorlogsjaren 
1914-1918 Bruijnseels blamed the organisation within the Belgian camps for their 
monochrome lives. 
It is a shame that a similar arrangement was not made for our interned soldiers 
and that from the beginning they were not left under the command of their own 
officers with supervision by higher Dutch military authorities. The boring life in 
the internment camps behind the barbed wire, with the communal walks was 
unnerving enough for our unhappy boys. Was the fear of international 
involvement maybe the cause of this? 
Without doubt there were differences in the living standards enjoyed by the Belgian 
internees at the start of the war compared to the internees of other nationalities. The 
reason for this is open to debate. In searching the Dutch archives I have found the 
records to indicate that this deficit was largely due to the unwillingness of the Belgian 
government to provide for its soldiers. Laporte, who takes most of his information from 
Belgian sources puts more of the blame on the Dutch authorities. ' The truth probably 
lies somewhere in the middle and must also be viewed against the unfolding situation 
in Europe at the time. The internees were not a priority for either government. 
Zwolle along with other Belgian internees. When he died there was general sadness amongst his men and 
he was buried with full military honours by the Dutch army. Zegers, Een levendig Geschiedenis van 
Zwolle en de Grote Oorlog. p. 33. 
3 Bruijnseels, Het Godsdienstig ! even der Beigen in Nederland tijdens de oorlogsjaren 1914-1918, p. x. 
'Laporte, Belgische Geinterneerden in Nederland Gedurende De Eerste Wereldoorlog. 
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Numbers 
The number of internees in the Netherlands during the First World War was not 
constant, New internees were arriving all of the time. Not in such great numbers as in 
1914 but as a steady flow of individuals, often from downed aircraft and small groups 
that crossed the land borders. Such large groups as there were, and compared to the 
numbers in 1914 these were still very small, were interned as the result of naval action 
when a whole ship's company was landed at a Dutch port. A decrease in the number of 
internees was mainly due to the release of internees who were no longer liable for 
internment. Some internees were released or transferred because of ill health and a 
few died during their internment, of either natural causes or injuries sustained before 
they entered the Netherlands. A number escaped, although given the relaxed attitude to 
guarding these were surprisingly few. One area that perhaps deserves more attention 
than it has received is the number of soldiers that crossed the Dutch border with the 
help of underground organisations in Belgium. If these had been escaping POWs then 
they would not have been liable for internment, but Belgian or British soldiers who had 
been cut off by the German advance and wanted to make their way back to their units 
via the Netherlands and a boat to England should most certainly have been interned. 
The large numbers of Belgians make identifying any that entered Holland by this 
means hard to spot but the British should have been easy to pick up. The official 
figures, however, show no increase in internment numbers for Britons entering by this 
route. There clearly was a route, and a very active one, as the death of one of it's 
operatives, Edith Cavell, attests to. She was not alone; many Belgian nationals were 
also sentenced to death for helping allied troops to cross the border into the 
150 
Netherlands, although the soldiers they helped do not show up in the Dutch internment 
figures. ' 
By the start of 1916 the combined efforts of the Department of Internment and the Red 
Cross had resulted in a far more accurate record of the internees being available. The 
Dutch authorities now knew exactly how many men they had in their charge, who they 
were and where they were all located. Such discrepancies as there were resulted mainly 
from individuals who, for whatever reason, did not want their true identity known and 
lived in internment under an assumed name. It is impossible to estimate how many of 
these there were, but it is a safe assumption that there were a few. Official Dutch 
(incomplete) figures for the year are as follows: ' 
Date Belgian British German French Total 
Off Other Off Other Off Other Off Other Off Other 
01.01.16 373 30097 51 1454 7 134 2- 433 31685 
31.03.16 372 30098 50 1493 8 141 2- 432 31732 
31.06.16 379 56 1487 8 128 4- 447 
31.09.16 374 29997 58 1461 9 141 3- 444 31599 
31.12.16 385 29813 53 1484 10 128 0- 448 31525 
5 Marguerite Blanckaert was sentenced to death by the German authorities in February 1916 for 
smuggling people across the Dutch/Belgian border. General von Blissing commuted this to life with hard 
labour and Madame Blanckaert survived the war. MRA Doos 2, Nr 11. 
6 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering p. 667. 
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The greatest change during the middle years of the war was not the total number of 
men deemed to be interned in the Netherlands but their location. In 1914 all of the non- 
commissioned internees were kept in camps and the officers who were not in camps 
were allowed to live out but only under very tightly controlled circumstances. By the 
beginning of 1916 the camps were emptying as more and more internees took up local 
employment and lived in what the Dutch authorities called `work groups'. This could 
be any thing from a handful of internees with just one guard living in civilian 
accommodation to the larger groups of several thousand attached to the mines. As a 
result several of the camps were closed, Oldebroek in August 1916 and Gaasterland in 
December 1916. ' 
The few remaining internees from these camps were transferred to other camps, 
primarily Zeist and Harderwijk. These two places became the central locations for the 
Belgian internees although even their population was less than in 1915. 
The only camps to be closed for the other nationalities were those designated for 
officers. With more clarity in the guidelines relating to parole given by the home 
governments, many officers felt that they could now choose to live outside of the 
camps again. Even those British officers, who had been considered a high risk and 
interned in Urk, were allowed to give their promise not to escape and were released 
into the community. In this way Wierickerschans and Urk were almost emptied. The 
Belgian officers that had been interned in Urk were allowed to move to The Hague, as 
did most of the British officers. This left just six officers in the camp at Urk, three 
' LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 667. 
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British who refused to give their promise not to escape and three French officers who 
held the same position. The French Ambassador made many complaints about the 
standard of the accommodation on Urk and the Dutch authorities made some initial 
enquiries about converting a fort near Lent or at Muiderslot into a more suitable place 
for interned Allied officers. It was estimated that this would cost Dfl 14,200.00, a 
figure that the Dutch government judged to be far too high for a camp that would hold 
just six internees. It was then decided that Urk would be closed and that a special 
barracks would be built within the camp boundary at Zeist. This could then be given 
extra guards and the total cost of the operation could be kept under Dfl 5000.00.8 By 
October 1916 all three French officers had escaped and the order was given to close 
Urk and transfer the remaining internees to Zeist. Although the camp was officially 
closed it was left with a skeleton maintenance staff so that if required it could be 
brought back into operation very swiftly. 
Whilst the emptying of the camps improved the daily life of the internees and provided 
Dutch industry and agriculture with a much-needed work force, it created a major 
headache for the elements of the Dutch army charged with guarding the internees. The 
creation of a lot of smaller work groups meant an increase in the number of guards 
needed. At the same time the commander of the Dutch armed forces, General Snijders, 
was anxious to ensure that he had the best men mobilized and positioned on the Dutch 
borders in case of attack. In December 1915 he instigated a survey to identify those 
Dutch soldiers and officers involved with guarding the internees that were fit to serve 
on the borders, and those soldiers who, through age or infirmity, were not suitable for 
active service. In addition to a shortage of man power there was also a shortage of 
8 LM Geschiedenis der Inremeering, p. 668. 
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suitable accommodation for the guards responsible for internee work groups. It was 
decided that when a soldier was identified as being unfit for active duty he would, 
where possible, be allocated a guarding duty close to his home. In this way both the 
manpower and the accommodation problem would be solved. To a certain extent this 
was successful but problems developed, especially in the camps, where responsibility 
was given to guards who were either too young and inexperienced or too physically 
weak to deal with belligerent internees of all ranks who were older, fitter and wiser 
than their guards. ' 
Welfare and Education Committees 
There was no doubt at all that the Dutch authorities were obliged to feed, clothe and 
shelter their internees and this they did. What was more problematic was the 
responsibility for keeping the men occupied within the camps. From the Dutch point of 
view it was clearly beneficial to keep the internees entertained. It required little 
imagination to predict the sorts of problems that could occur when thousands of men 
were shut up for long periods of time with nothing to occupy them. Many of the 
Belgians were suffering from depression, and the feeling amongst the Dutch authorities 
was that depressed men were more likely to attempt to either escape or incite some sort 
of trouble. The dispute in Zeist on 3 December 1914 is a prime example of this1°. The 
internees were in an unusual situation. In common with many of the soldiers in the First 
World War they were often simply civilians in uniform with no experience of military 
9 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering p. 673. 
'o For further information on this incident see Hendrickx- Van der Avert, De opstand in her 
Interneringskamp Zeist op 3 december 1914. 
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life that extended back earlier than July 1914. Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker assert that 
many of these newly created soldiers, once placed into imprisonment, kept stronger ties 
with the home front, where their real lives were, than with the actual war. They claim 
that the evermore tattered uniforms worn by many of those that were imprisoned en 
masse during the first few months of the war symbolised their mental return to being 
civilians rather than soldiers, now that there was no longer any requirement for them to 
fight. " 
In early November 1914 the matter of keeping the internees occupied was addressed 
by the Dutch academic Dr F. Buitenrust Hettema who laid the basis for what was to 
become the `Algemeen Comite tot Ontwikkeling en Ontspanning van de 
Geinterneerden in Nederland' (General Committee for Development and Recreation for 
the Interned in the Netherlands). This was also known as the `Zwolsche Comite' 
(Zwolle Committee) and to avoid confusion with other committees with similar names 
it will henceforth be referred to as the Zwolle Committee. 12 The aim of this committee, 
which was an independent civilian organisation, was to provide education and 
relaxation for all of the internees. In reality, however, it was aimed primarily at the 
Belgians as the British internees received support directly from Great Britain and 
British sympathisers in the Netherlands, and the many Germans who were themselves 
resident in the Netherlands met the German needs. 13 
" Audoin-Rouzeau & Becker, 1914-1918 Understanding the Great War, p. 71. 
'Z Genreente Archief Zwolle CA037. I am grateful to Maartje Abbenhuis for passing on this short insight 
into the workings of the Zwolle Committee. See also Laporte, Belgische Geinterneerden in Nederland 
Gedurende De Eerste Wereldoorlog, p. 122. 
'3 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering p. 264 
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The Zwolle Committee faced two main hurdles in its attempts to achieve its somewhat 
ambitious plans. The first was money. In providing for the `basic human needs' of the 
internees, the Dutch government felt that it had complied with all that was required of it 
by law, and it was disinclined to provide more money for entertaining internees when it 
had its own mobilized troops to consider. It supported the work of the committees in 
principle, but as it was unclear whether the costs of providing entertainment and 
education, potentially a substantial amount, would be reimbursed by the parent 
governments in the same way as the costs of the basic food and shelter would be, or if 
the Dutch government would find itself hugely out of pocket at the end of the war. 14 
In the event, as a gesture of goodwill towards the Belgian internees, Bosman made Dfl 
4000 available on behalf of the Dutch government. In addition to this an appeal was 
made on behalf of the internees and a further Dfl 12,000 was raised, primarily from 
large corporations. Not all funds were raised from large institutions. In the archives of 
the Dutch Army Museum in Delft there are various examples of fund raising activities 
aimed at individuals. ` The second problem faced by the Zwolle Committee was one 
that would be a major headache not just for them but also for all of the wartime 
committees dedicated to helping the internees. This was obtaining agreement from the 
Dutch army for the implementation of occupational schemes. This was an intransigent 
problem. Whilst the Dutch military could see the advantages of a camp population that 
was usefully occupied (as opposed to discontented and therefore more likely to 
generate disorder), it was not about to relinquish control of any area of the camp to a 
'a LM Geschiedenis der Interneering p. 260 
's. LM Q 194-40. 
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civilian organisation. " 
Following the riots at Zeist on 4 December 1914 several prominent Belgians in 
Brussels expressed concern about the boring existence of the Belgian internees and on 
15 December 1914 decided to initiate some form of trade education in the camps. In 
January 1915 the Belgian socialist politician and writer Camille Huysmans and a 
colleague visited the camps with the permission of the Dutch authorities. At the same 
time the Belgian government also began to show some concern for the welfare of its 
troops in the Netherlands. A slightly surprising move as it considered most of them to 
be deserters. A committee was formed with the lead being given to Baron Fallon, the 
Belgian Ambassador in the Netherlands from 1910-1919 and General Dossin, the 
Military Attach6 at the Belgian Embassy. 
The aims of this committee were very similar to those of the newly formed Brussels 
group so that on 21 January 1915 the two joined forces under the title of `Centrale 
Administrative Commissie der Werkscholen', (Central Administrative of Trade 
Education). The chairman was Baron Fallon and the Belgian educationalist Omer 
Buyse was the organiser of the work schools. On the basis of Huysmans report in early 
February an ambitious plan was launched to bring both practical and theoretical 
education to the internees. On 1 March 1915, on the initiative of General Onnen, the 
Belgian and the Dutch committees met and, in the hope of a more efficient 
organisation, agreed to combine their efforts into one committee, the `Centrale 
'6 Laporte alleges that relations between the Belgian internees and their Dutch guards remained strained 
throughout the entire war p. 86. The Dutch Ministry of War did agree to some Belgian officers being 
allowed into the camps in order to teach or to supervise military training such as gymnastics. ARA 
2.05.04 box 742 nr 9348. Letter from Ministry of War to Foreign Affairs dated 03 March 1915. 
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Commissie voor Ontwikkeling, ontspanning en Werkverschaffing' (Central Committee 
for Development, Recreation and Employment) which was formed on 22 March 1915. " 
The chairman, General Onnen, and the secretary of this new committee were Dutch 
military men. The remainder of the members comprised five civilians from the Zwolle 
committee and nine Belgian representatives from the two Belgian committees. Sub- 
committees were installed in all of the internment camps with the camp commandant as 
chairman and the general members made up of prominent local civilians and Belgian 
officers. "' Unfortunately, whilst the merging of the three committees into one may have 
made sense from an administrative point of view, the various factions within the 
committee were unable to reconcile their interests in order to produce a combined plan 
of action. The chairman, General Onnen had complete right of veto on any proposal 
that he felt went against the interests of the Dutch military or Dutch security in general; 
a fact resented by the Belgians especially as the majority of the money at the disposal 
of the committee had been raised in Belgium. An appeal for the Dutch government to 
increase its original grant of Dfl 4,000 had been refused. The former members of the 
Zwolle Committee felt themselves to be thwarted at every turn. Essentially against the 
military dominance of the committee, they also felt themselves to be outnumbered by 
the Belgian members. Caught between these two opposing factions, arguments within 
the committee reached such a peak that in December 1915 the members of the Zwolle 
Committee left. Out on its own once again the Zwolle Committee could continue to 
adhere to its original principles that the help it provided should be for all nationalities 
and without influence from governments or the military. Whilst it continued its work 
"Laporte, Belgische Geinterneerden in Nederland Gedurende De Eerste Wereldoorlog, p. 124 and LM 
Geschiedenis der Interneering p. 266. 
18 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 264. 
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until the end of the war it found it very difficult to raise sufficient funds for any major 
projects and had to content itself with providing books and the occasional teacher. 19 
This departure left an uneasy balance between the Dutch military members and the now 
entirely Belgian members. Not that the Belgians presented a united front. There were 
constant disputes between the Belgian civilians, who felt that the education provided to 
the internees should be aimed at equipping them for a return to civilian life after the 
war; and the Belgian military, represented by General Dossin, who wanted the training 
offered to be of a more military nature such as physical fitness and marching. 20 The 
biggest conflict, however, was between Buyse, who wanted to be given overall control 
of the workshops, and the Dutch military that refused to surrender its authority. Citing 
the poor discipline record of the Belgian internees this was one issue on which the 
Dutch authorities held firm. Whilst cooperating with Buyse wherever possible they still 
maintained over all control. 
Despite all of the policy differences within the committee, by now calling its self the 
`Centrale Administrative Commissie (Central Administration Committee), considerable 
progress was made in finding occupations for the thousands of interned Belgians. It 
had, in addition to the funds raised in the Netherlands, a further BF 100,000 available 
to it. Half was a gift from the Belgian King and half from the city of Brussels. The 
actual cost of providing education in the three purpose built internment camps at Zeist, 
Harderwijk and Oldenzaal was relatively inexpensive. Accommodation was free as the 
need for classrooms and workshops had been taken into account the initial building 
`9 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 269. 
30 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 266. 
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plans and there were sufficient teachers to be found amongst the internees. These were 
paid an extra allowance for teaching of Dfl 1,2 or 3a week depending on whether they 
taught for 3,3-6 or more than 6 hours a week. Only the materials for the lessons had to 
be paid for and the estimated cost for education in these three camps was set at BF 
32,000 per quarter. 21 
In June 1915 following the successful establishment of the schools in Zeist, Harderwijk 
and Oldenzaal a further BF12,000 was set aside for the provision of education at 
Gaasterland. This, however, was a more expensive and problematic venture as there 
were no existing classrooms and all of the required accommodation had to be built. 
A feature of the classes provided for the Belgian internees was the high demand for 
basic literacy skills. Many who started the war unable to read or write returned to 
Belgium in 1918 fully literate. Although these classes were also made available to the 
other nationalities interned in the Netherlands, the take up amongst the Germans and 
the British was far less simply because the basic levels of literacy were already higher 
amongst these troops. 
Z` LM Geschiedenis der Interneering p. 266. 
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A lesson in Camp Zeist. n 
The German and British internees required entertainment more than enlightenment. To 
this end both nationalities had well developed sporting activities in the internment 
camps, which not only kept the troops occupied, but also maintained a degree of fitness 
should the internees be able to return to their military duties. The British also showed a 
keen interest in theatrical pursuits. A band was formed and was provided with musical 
instruments by the Comite voor de Engelsche Geinterneerden (Committee for the 
English Internees) that had been established in October 1914 in Amsterdam. (This 
committee had already provided much of the sporting equipment used by the British 
internees). 2' This same committee funded the building of camp theatre at Groningen 
and "The Timbertown Follies" began its performances there. This group became so 
Postcard offered for sale on Ebay 24 August 2008. 
ARA 2.05.04 box 762 inv 12772 A booklet produced in 1920 outlining the wartime activities of the 
soon to be disbanded Comite voor de Engelsche Geintemeerden. 
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well known that it was regularly invited to perform in The Hague and other cities. 24 A 
visiting American journalist wrote in the Philadelphia Press on 6 June 1915 of the 
British internment camp in Groningen; `The camp.... is the most healthy and well- 
situated internment depot in this country. The spirit and discipline of the men is very 
high, they are on excellent terms with the Dutch authorities'. -" 
Tug-of-war competition at the sporting grounds of Camp 
Groningen (1916). 26 
There is a great deal of pictorial information available concerning the internees. The 
most common illustrations can be found on picture postcards which depict all aspects 
of camp life, some are sketches and some are photographs. It could be argued that the 
authorities tasked with producing these photographs would choose only the better 
24 Several programmes from performances by the Timbertown Follies can be found in the Dutch Army 
Museum in Delft. LM Q194-40. 
's ARA 2.05.04 box 743 inv 28088 Copy of press clipping. 
2. ' http; //www. wereldoorlog1418. nl/englishcamp/samenvatting/index. htm 24 August. 2008. 
162 
aspects of camp life, but these are supported by photographs in picture magazines of 
the time and personal scrapbooks. In these pictures the work of the various charitable 
committees is very evident. The Army Museum in Brussels (MRA) has a particularly 
fine collection that includes photographs of well-stocked libraries, workshops, social 
facilities and theatres. Sporting events such as sailing races, athletic meetings, 
gymnastics and the inevitable inter-camp football matches feature heavily as well. 
Whatever complaints were raised about the conditions under which the internees were 
held these photographs attest to the fact that in many areas the facilities were 
excellent. 27 
ooa IISG 
Bicycle race on the bicycle track built by the Belgians in Camp Harderwijk' 
Only a month after the fall of Antwerp there were already calls for the establishment of 
an institute of learning to enable the more highly educated amongst the internees to 
continue with their education. Joseph Schrijnen, a senior lecturer at Utrecht University 
'' MRA B. I. 105-107 Assorted photographs and postcards. 
2" 11NG BG A25/18 13 OctoberI918. 
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proposed the creation of a Belgian university in Amersfoort, then considered the most 
Belgian town in the Netherlands. " Within a matter of weeks around thirty Dutch and 
Belgian academics had made themselves available to teach at the new institution. It was 
opened on 19 January 1915 in an old but roomy merchants house. This house was 
equipped with classrooms, an auditorium and a library that was furnished with books 
donated by other universities. Initially attracting 91 students, the University proved to 
be very popular, offering a variety of courses. As the rules governing the movement of 
internees within the Netherlands became more relaxed, however, it became largely 
redundant. By January 1916, it had lost 137 potential students who were by then 
studying at established Dutch Universities; the majority were following technical 
subjects at Delft and taking advantage of practical facilities that could not be offered in 
Amersfoort30 
Officers' Parole 
An aspect of the law pertaining to neutral internment that was entirely different from 
the law with regard to POWs was the regulation that allowed officers to be paroled. 
Unlike all POWs who, for obvious reasons, were kept in camps, commissioned officers 
that had been taken into internment were allowed to give their word not to escape and 
could therefore be permitted to live outside the camps. The first few internees who held 
a commissioned rank were placed into the camp at Alkmaar; but with the move to 
Gaasterland and Bergen the opportunity was given for parole to be taken. In the case of 
' F. Collard, L'Universit6 beige d'Amersfoort, Utrecht 1915 p. 6 from Laporte, Belgische Geinterneerden 
in Nederland Gedurende De Eerste Wereldoorlog p. 169. 
30 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering p. 306. 
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Gaasterland this was largely academic, as the camp covered such a large area that 
movement was unrestricted within its boundaries. The normal terms of parole were that 
the officers had to remain within the bounds of the local authority in which they chose 
to live, but had pretty much free movement within those bounds. Different local areas 
were allocated to different nationalities. Officers were given an allowance that was the 
same as that given to a Dutch officer of equivalent rank out which they had to provide 
for their own food and lodgings. With the enormous influx of internees in October 
1914 the fact that the number needing to be accommodated within the camps could be 
easily and swiftly reduced by allowing the officers to make their own arrangements 
was embraced by the Dutch authorities. They, after all, were only complying with the 
letter of the law and the responsibility for preventing escapes by officers was then 
placed with the home nations who had to rely on the honour of their officers to comply 
with the regulations. In December 1914 the Dutch government passed a law which, 
amongst other things, included a clause that made escape, after promising not too, 
punishable by up to 6 years in jail. Whilst some punishments were given to failed 
escapees it was never as long as 6 years31 
The rule allowing officers to accept parole was one which clearly had not been given 
very much thought by the home nations prior to the war and one which had little impact 
on the relations between the officers concerned and their commanders at home. This 
was to change, perhaps prompted by the first few escapes by officers who broke the 
terms of their parole in order to do so. Two German pilots, Leutnant Hesse and 
Aspirant Philippe, escaped from Alkmaar by breaking their parole and managed to 
reach Germany. On reporting to the authorities there, however, they were told that their 
31. Gegevens betreffende de Interneering p. 74 and Staatsblad No 666. 
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escape was viewed in a very poor light and that they would be returned to the 
Netherlands immediately. 32The Dutch had cause to complain about a British escape 
when on 2 November 1914 Flight Commander T. A. Rainy RN managed to return to 
England by handing in a fake parole form that was sufficiently close to the real thing 
not to be noticed by his Dutch guards. Although strictly speaking Rainy had not broken 
his parole, and the British were swift to point this out to the Dutch, they agreed with the 
Dutch opinion that the escape had been `dishonourable'. Their solution was to 
discharge Rainy from the Navy rather than to send him back to the Netherlands. In the 
event neither punishment was inflicted as shortly after his return to Great Britain, Rainy 
was admitted to a lunatic asylum. The matter did not end there, however, as it appeared 
that Rainy had fled the Netherlands leaving several unpaid bills. These were settled on 
his behalf by the British government that was anxious not to cause any ill feeling. 
Rainy's bills were to his tailor and a local hotel where he had run up a bar bill. Unpaid 
bills were to be a regular feature of officer's escapes regardless of nationality and all of 
the home nations put considerable effort into ensuring that the bills were settled one 
way or another. 
The British attitude to parole was the clearest. After the retreat from Antwerp the non- 
commissioned British forces found themselves placed in the camp at Groningen. The 
officers took parole and moved into private accommodation, some in the area around 
Groningen, others in The Hague. The exception to this was the senior British officer 
Commander Henderson who opted to remain in the camp at Groningen with his men. 
In November 1914, however, the Admiralty informed Henderson that they considered 
32 ARA 2.05.04 Inv 742 No 34944 Letter from the Dutch Ambassador in Berlin to Foreign Affairs in The 
Hague dated 8 December 1914 passing on an enquiry from the German authorities concerning the 
punishment that the two pilots would receive upon their return to the Netherlands. 
166 
the officers' actions in not sharing the men's confinement to be `contrary to the customs 
of the British Navy' and that he would be reprimanded on his return to the UK for 
allowing the situation to occur. 33Henderson for his part then informed the camp 
commander at Groningen that all parole was revoked and that the officers should be 
moved back to the camp immediately. This, however, was not possible. A hurried 
correspondence between the commandant at Groningen and the Ministry of War 
resulted in the British being told that although the Dutch accepted their decision to 
rescind parole for the British officers, they could not do so without sufficient notice in 
order to allowed appropriate accommodation to be prepared ' 
The Admiralty agreed to the construction of new barracks at Groningen at a cost of 
GBP 8,000, which were expected to be completed in mid December 1914. On 4 
December, unwilling to wait any longer Henderson unilaterally informed the Dutch 
government that all deals were off and the British officers no longer considered 
themselves bound by the terms of their parole. Some of the officers were housed in the 
camp at Groningen to assist with the non-commissioned internees. In January 1915, 
following an escape attempt by 15 of the British officers who had rescinded their 
parole, 38 of those that were considered to be most likely to attempt an escape were 
sent to the fort at Wierickerschans near Bodegraven. Only eight of the 15 escapees were 
recaptured. It appears that these officers were assisted in their escape by sympathetic 
Dutch civilians. 35 Urk, now a fishing village on the side of the IJsselmeer, but in 1914, 
before the land reclamation programme, a small island in the Zuider Zee, was used to 
' ARA 2.05.04 Inv 742 No 8509 Letter from Henderson to the commandant at Groningen dated 20 
November 1914. Oosterman, `De Interneering hier to lande' p. 810. 
34ARA 2.05.04 Inv 742 No 8509 Several letters between the British and Dutch governments concerning 
the accommodation to be provided for the British officers, all dated 1917. 
35 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 227. 
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house those few British, Belgian and later French officers who were considered to 
demonstrate a very high risk of escaping. 
In the meantime, and faced by the stream of complaints from those officers interned at 
Wierickerschans about the `unsanitary and cramped' standard of accommodation there, 
the Admiralty were clearly having second thoughts. Complaints reached such a peak 
that the Dutch government sent in an inspector. The report by Generaal-majoor Quanjer 
of the Dutch Army Medical Corps found no major cause for concern, although work 
was underway at the time of his inspection to improve conditions. " In a letter to 
Johnstone dated 28 December 1914 the Admiralty talks of `a proper proportion' of the 
officers being stationed at Groningen and the rest being allowed parole. "There should 
also be some rotation of duties to prevent monotony. On 20 January the situation was 
made clearer in a telegraph to the senior officer at Wierickerschans, Commander 
F. V. Fargus, from the military attach6 at The Hague confirming that any officers 
wishing to retake parole would be allowed too., 8 Immediately 14 officers, 13 from 
Wierickerschans and 1 Lieutenant, who was at that time hospitalised in Utrecht, 
submitted applications for parole. 
The German attitude to parole was very similar to the British. Initially the matter was 
not addressed at all. Then, like the British, there was a period when the acceptance of 
parole was considered to be dishonourable but, ultimately, the same compromise was 
'6 ARA 2.05.04 Inv 742 No 6398, a selection of correspondence relating to conditions at 
Wierickerschans. 1914-1915. 
37 ARA 2.05.04 Inv 742 No 8509. Letter to Johnstone from the British Admiralty dated 28 December 
1914. 
`s ARA 2.05.04 Inv 742 No 8509. Telegraph to Fargus from British Embassy in The Hague dated 20 
January 1915. 
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reached as for the British officers. ' Some officers would remain in internment in a 
command function and the rest would be allowed to take parole. In late 1914 two 
German officers escaped from the Netherlands breaking their parole and were returned 
by the German authorities but only after enquiries about the severity of the punishment 
that they would receive. 4° 
For those British officers who had rescinded their promise not to escape, there was now 
nothing to keep them in the Netherlands and many escape attempts were made, a 
substantial proportion of which were successful. " The Dutch authorities, swift to 
complain when escapes were made breaking parole, seemingly had little problem with 
these `honourable' escapes, even forwarding the mail of escaped officers to England 42 
The Belgian government was even less consistent than the British and German 
governments when it came to the internment of its officers. Many of the individual 
Belgian officers felt that they could not accept parole, as it was their duty to escape and 
rejoin the war. Some that were considered to be `high risk' potential escapers were sent 
to join their English colleagues at the camp on Urk. ' Some took parole and still made 
an escape attempt. An attempt was made by the Belgian government to exempt Belgian 
officers from the terms of parole by arguing that Belgium had not entered the war 
voluntarily but only because her own neutrality had been compromised. This appeal 
fell on deaf ears and so the Belgian government declared that any officer who escaped 
39 But not until April 1917. Oosterman, `De Interneering hier to lande' p. 818. 
40 ARA 2.05.04 Inv 742 No 34944. Letter from the German Ambassador to The Hague to the Dutch 
Minister of Foreign Affairs dated 8 December 1914. 
4t Het Vaderblad dated II January 1915 speaks of an escape by seven British officers of which two had 
already reached England. 
"2 ARA 2.05.04 Inv 742 No 8509 Letter from Johnstone to Loudon dated 15 February 1915 thanking him 
for forwarding on the letters of four officers who had escaped. 
`3 Laporte, Belgische Geinterneerden in Nederland Gedurende De Eerste Wereldoorlog, p. 54. 
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from Holland having broken the terms of his parole would be stripped of his rank and 
dismissed from the army. ' Unfortunately news quickly spread of two Belgian army 
officers who escaped in November 1914 breaking their parole. They had rejoined their 
unit on the front and had been welcomed back as heroes. 
In addition to the problem of parole for its officers the Belgian government was also 
trying to discipline officers that it felt had not fulfilled their duty. On 1 December 1914 
a Belgian Royal Edict removed the rank of five officers interned in the Netherlands 
alleging that they had retreated into Holland before the situation required them to 
retreat. It requested permission from the Dutch government to mount a full 
investigation into the actions during the fall of Antwerp of the three hundred or so 
Belgian officers, including five senior officers, who were now interned in the 
Netherlands. The Dutch government refused to give permission for such an enquiry 
claiming that it would infringe its neutrality "' The Dutch authorities also anticipated 
that should any of the interned Belgian officers be reduced in rank or dismissed from 
the army as a result of the investigation, it would then place the Netherlands in a very 
difficult position both diplomatically and administratively. As a result the Belgian 
government agreed that the officers already reduced in rank could still be paid the 
allowance due to their old rank. Their request that the Belgian officers be used to 
command the Belgian troops in internment was refused. Given the hostility between the 
commissioned and non-commissioned ranks in the Belgian military the Dutch felt such 
a move was inadvisable but did agree to use more Belgian officers in administrative 
"' Oosterman, 'De Interneering hier to lande' p. 810. 
43 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 270. 
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functions. ` 
Employment and Work Groups 
It would be wrong to assume that the internees were kept locked up behind barbed wire 
all of the time. This, in fact, had never been the case. Given the way in which the 
numbers of internees suddenly increased after the fall of Antwerp the Dutch authorities 
spent much of the first year of the war struggling to provide the basic necessities of life 
for the internees and although security and guarding were given some priority, they 
were not at the top of the list. Holland wanted to keep as many soldiers as it could on 
the borders against the chance of an invasion and was reluctant to release many for 
guarding duties. The articles of international law did not state that the internees had to 
be imprisoned, just that they had to be prevented from re-entering the war. 
The responsibility for ensuring that soldiers did not re-enter the war lay as much with 
the home nations as it did with the Netherlands. Officers were allowed to live out of the 
camps on parole and other ranks were extended the same courtesy but on a shorter time 
scale. On the basis that they promised to return, they were allowed out for an afternoon 
to visit a local town, or more importantly, family. This attitude, that imprisonment was 
a possible but not an essential element of internment was crucial to allowing internees 
to take up paid employment during their time in the Netherlands. Paying the internees 
for work was not a new thing. During the construction of the new internment camps at 
Harderwijk and Zeist, the internees had been offered the chance to earn a very modest 
46 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 273. 
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wage and speed up the provision of facilities by helping with the construction work. 
This offer, in the aftermath of the Zeist incident, was refused but later other options 
were found to be acceptable. Internees that accepted positions in the newly formed 
training schools, for example, were paid according to the number of classes they taught. 
By 1915 the Dutch authorities were also prepared to consider allowing internees to take 
up employment outside the camps for third parties. 
Initially the available jobs were locally based, helping nearby farmers or industry. In 
these cases the internees would still live at the camp but would go out to work every 
day. Guards were sent with these groups but it was a notional tactic, only one guard for 
every ten internees. Requests were made by Dutch industry for workers to replace men 
who had been mobilized into the Dutch army. This idea that internees could be allowed 
to work outside of the camps was of most relevance to the Belgian internees and that 
was simply because of language. Bossenbroek asserts that by the end of 1916 some 
10,500 Belgians were working outside the internment camps and that by the end of the 
war this figure had risen to 15,000. "' Very few, if any, of the British and German 
internees could speak Dutch and so they were restricted to manual labour or tasks that 
did not require any great contact with Dutch speakers. This was also a problem for the 
French-speaking Belgians, but their Flemish-speaking countrymen found it very easy to 
integrate into working life in the Netherlands. There is some evidence that a few of the 
internees were even able to work for the same company that they had worked for 
before the war in Belgium. When a Dutch branch of a Belgium company became aware 
that one of their former employees was amongst the internees then a letter to the 
appropriate authorities was usually sufficient to allow the individual to leave the camp 
" Bossenbroek, Wuchten voor de Groote Oorlog p. 58. 
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and take up employment with the Dutch arm of the business. Similarly, as the range of 
skills held by the internees was quite broad then Dutch companies were able to ask for 
specific workers. The new employers were made responsible for housing and feeding 
the internees as well as paying the internees. An appropriate amount was then deducted 
from the internee's wages to cover these costs. The remaining wage, however, was not 
paid directly to the internee because it was felt that men with money at their disposal 
were more likely to attempt to escape. Instead a small allowance, little more than 
pocket money but slightly more than the allowance received in the camps, was paid to 
the individual at the time and the remainder was placed into a savings account and was 
to be made over at the end of the war. With the removal of men and equipment from 
Belgium by the occupying Germans that occurred after 1916 it was now often more 
desirable to remain in Holland and work than to return to Belgium were work was 
scarce and unemployment high. 48 
By 18 August 1915 some 2,144 internees were in living outside the camps in work 
groups spread all over the Netherlands. These men were guarded by 245 Dutch soldiers 
and 6 officers. Not only were the internees allowed to live outside the camps if their 
work required it, a further 141 were based at the universities of Rotterdam, Utrecht and 
Delft as students'9 
Preference for outside employment was given to married internees who had a family 
that was also living in the Netherlands. This was a double advantage for the Dutch 
authorities who up until that point had not only been responsible for the upkeep of the 
48 Chambers, F. P., The war behind the war 1914-1918. A history of the political and civilian fronts, 
(London: 1939). p. 215. 
49 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering p. 296. 
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internees but had also had to provide financial support for their families, many of 
whom had entered the Netherlands as refugees. Those men that had a family to support 
were allowed to keep more of their wages than the single men. Next in order of priority 
were the married men whose families still lived in the home country and last were the 
single men. A disadvantage of being allowed to keep more of their wages was that 
some of the internees now became liable for Dutch taxation, both income tax and local 
council taxes. 30 
In the early stages of these work groups the workers were spread out over 27 locations. 
This changed once the internees were identified as a source of labour to replace mine 
workers who had been mobilized. The move to employ the internees in the mines is not 
so surprising when two facts are considered. By mid 1915 it was clear that whilst 
supplies of coal had not yet reached the critical levels that were to occur in 1917 and 
1918 all was not well. Trade with Germany, Holland's main supplier of coal, was being 
affected by the Allied embargo and yet the need for coal was increasing as the war 
progressed. Large numbers of miners, although by no means all, had been conscripted 
for the army and the mines were finding it difficult to achieve full production. Not only 
were the internees seen as a large untapped source of labour, they were also a pool of 
skilled labour. Many of the men now interned in the Netherlands as Belgian soldiers 
had been miners in Belgium before they too had been conscripted. Once at the mine the 
men were split into three shifts and signed in with work contracts that were the same as 
those for civilian workers. According to Oosterman many of the Belgians found work 
in the Dutch mines to be far harder than the work they were used to in Belgian mines 
5' De Vries, 'Nederland als Non-beligerente Natie en de Internering van Buitenlandse Militairen 
Gedurende de Eerste Wereldoorlog', p. 104. 
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and asked to be transferred back to the internment camps. " 
Those that had families living nearby the mines were allowed to go and live with their 
families but only after completing three months of satisfactory work in the mines. 
During this probationary period they were allowed two or three night passes a week to 
stay with their family but were still bound by the rules of the work group. Once 
permission was given for them to live out, they were released from the necessity to 
attend role calls and instead had to sign in once a day. Their wages were adjusted to 
meet the change in circumstances so that those living with their families received 7/8th 
of their salary less deductions, with only 1/8th being sent to the savings fund in The 
Hague. Those mine workers with families living in the Netherlands but not near to the 
mines were allowed to keep 3/4 of their wages in order to support their families. m 
This arrangement was ideal for both the internees and the Dutch authorities. The mines 
obtained workers to replace the Dutch workers that had been mobilized. The Dutch 
authorities reduced their financial commitment to the internees by requiring the costs of 
clothing, housing and feeding the internees to be met either by the employer or directly 
out of the internee's wages, and as an added bonus it reduced the financial drain of the 
refugees associated with the internees by providing the means for internees to support 
their own families. For the internees themselves, especially the married ones the life 
style provided was as close to normal as they could achieve without actually returning 
to Belgium. 
LM Geschiedenis der Interneering p. 575. 
LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 576. 
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Once the precedent was set for internees to be allowed to live with their families 
requests were then received for families from the unoccupied part of Belgium to be 
allowed to join their fathers and husbands in Holland. Generally these requests were 
well received and, dependent on the financial position of the internee and the housing 
situation in the local area, many families were allowed to settle in the Netherlands. In 
some instances the employers, keen to hold on to their newly acquired workers and 
generally sympathetic to the situation that the Belgians found themselves in, provided 
accommodation. 
In 1917 more and more British and German internees began to take up employment 
outside the camps. Concern was expressed that the employment of foreign workers 
should not be at the expense of the Dutch. A conference was held between the Director 
General of Agriculture, Head of the Department of Internment, the Chairman of the 
Organisation of Employment Offices and the Director of Unemployment Insurance. "3 
The aim of this conference was to set down guidelines for the employment of internees 
in agriculture. There was still a great deal of anxiety concerning the employment of 
internees in all areas. Dutch workers claimed that internees were given priority for jobs 
because they were prepared to work for a lower wage. In December 1917 the Dutch 
unions made a request to the Department of internment for the removal of internees 
from the metal industry. The prevailing shortages of coal, iron and steel meant that 
production had dropped and Dutch workers were being laid off. 
At the end of 1917 the army command decided to allow internees to work alongside or 
for the Dutch military, an area of work that they had so far been banned from. At the 
LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 1075. 
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Army barracks in Millingen internees were used for menial work that would otherwise 
have had to be undertaken by Dutch soldiers. The internees were paid the same bonus 
for this work as Dutch soldiers were. 
On 21 June 1917 the miners at the underground coalmine in Heerlen responded to a 
call from the Dutch Socialist Mineworkers Union (Socialistischen Nederlandschen 
Mijnwerkersbond) and went on strike over pay and conditions. Not all of the 
mineworkers struck, members of the Dutch Christian Mineworkers Union 
(Nederlandsche Christelijke Mijnwerkersbond) did not support the action. 
Nevertheless, over half of the morning shift, which included internees, took part in the 
strike. Laporte estimates that some 90% of the internees were involved. -' The area 
around the mine was immediately returned to the status of Staat Van Beleg and 984 
striking internees were ordered back to Camp Zeist. After their departure some 199 
internees remained, 67 above ground workers and 132 miners who had not struck, 39 of 
these had not taken part in the strike because they were officially sick. In addition to 
the internees left at Heerlen there were also 3 11 family members who were not 
transported back to Zeist with their husbands and fathers. The socialist leanings of the 
internees were not obvious to all and whilst the Dutch authorities appeared to have little 
problem with the growth of socialism amongst the internees, the Belgian government 
and the Catholic Church were dismayed that their worst fears were now being realised. 
The strike ended on 5 July and the question was posed as to whether the striking 
internees should be allowed to return. The Directors of the mine had concerns but 
m Laporte, Belgische Geinterneerden in Nederland Gedurende De Eerste Wereldoorlog p160. See also. 
Oosterman, `De tnterneering hier to lande' and Laporte, Belgische Geinterneerden in Nederland 
Gedurende De Eerste Wereldoorlog p. 831. 
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ultimately little choice. The shortage of civilian labour meant that the only way that the 
mine could operate fully was to use internees. The government, concerned at the crisis 
in coal supplies, took the decision out of the hands of the mine directors and ordered 
the internees back. Even with this drastic action only 660 of the original 984 returned. 
In September 1917 a number of internees took part in a strike at a factory in Zwolle. 
All of the internees, even those living out with their families, were immediately 
returned to camp. At the request of some of the internees' wives, who were suffering 
not only the loss of their husbands but also missing their income, a number were 
allowed back. This return was under the strict understanding that they returned to work. 
On arriving at the factory, however, the men again refused to work and were, 
inevitably, sent back to camp. ' 
A direct result of the strikes in the coalmines was a parliamentary discussion 
concerning the rights of an internee in relation to employment in the Netherlands. The 
socialist parliamentarian Albarda put forward a proposal that would give internees the 
right to join Dutch professional organisations. This was passed by 53 votes to 17 and 
immediately some of the Belgian internees joined Dutch professional organisations or 
trade unions. Support for the internees joining Dutch trade unions or participating in 
strikes was far from universal. In a letter to general Snijders dated 25 August 1916 the 
Minister of War, Bosboom, had anticipated a situation where internees would be caught 
up in a Dutch workers strike and he clearly states that internees who join a strike must 
u LM Geschiedenis der Interneering p. 1082. 
'6 Laporte, Belgische Geinterneerden in Nederland Gedurende De Ferste Wereldoorlog p. 162 and 
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be returned to their internment camp. -"He goes on to say that internees should be 
strongly discouraged from joining Dutch unions, although he does not forbid it 
completely. His concern is that the balance of the Dutch economy would be upset by 
the influence of the foreign workers. Discussions in the Dutch Parliament regarding the 
budget for 1917 contradicted this position. In the light of the growing shortages, the 
contribution made by these foreign workers was recognised and it was decided that in 
the event of future strikes the internees would not be automatically sent back to their 
camp but would be kept in the local area. Likewise it was also decided that the 
internees must be paid the same rate as a Dutch worker, although they would not be 
given their pay, the bulk of the money would be invested in a savings account until the 
end of the war. ' 
A branch of the Organisation of Belgian Workers was instigated with its base at Camp 
Harderwijk. This was achieved with the permission of the camp commandant at 
Harderwijk. Such permission was not forthcoming when attempts were made to set up 
a similar group at camp Zeist. An appeal was made to Snijders who agreed to the 
establishment of such a group only provided that a Dutch officer attended all meetings. 
The employment of Belgian internees in Dutch industry was, on the whole, considered 
a good thing by all of those involved. One aspect, however, attracted much 
correspondence from the Belgian government. They were concerned that Belgians were 
being employed in factories that were producing goods that would ultimately find their 
way to Germany. Belgian diplomats in the Netherlands were constantly bringing to the 
ARA 2.13.70. Letter from Bosboom to Snijders dated 25 August 1915. 
SARA 2.13.70 No 1829, Ministerial Decision dated 16 April 1917. 
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attention of their government firms that were, usually indirectly, supplying goods to 
Germany. ' In 1918 the Belgian Foreign Minister forbade any Belgians from working 
on either the Dutch railways or in shipbuilding as he claimed that the German 
government was a beneficiary of both of these industries 60 
Savings Fund 
In August 1914 when the initial decision was made to allow internees to take up paid 
employment outside the camps, a decision was also taken about the rate of pay they 
should receive and whether they should be allowed access to their pay while interned. 
Unlike the internees who were employed inside the internment camps as cooks, 
cleaners, teachers etc, who received little more than extra pocket money for their 
efforts but continued to be housed and fed at the cost of the authorities; internees in 
outside employment were paid a fair market rate for their labour. In return they were 
expected to contribute towards their upkeep. Once a percentage had been deducted for 
bed and board, however, this often left a reasonable sum of money over, far more than 
the minimal allowance paid to non-working internees. The Dutch government decided 
that this balance was not to be paid to the internees as the money could be used to 
facilitate an escape. Instead it proposed a savings fund, to be paid into during the war 
and to be paid out after the end of the war when the internees were released. The 
Belgian government was in agreement with this as it would give those internees 
returning to Belgium a financial start that would make them less of an immediate drain 
on government resources. Significantly, there was never any question that this money 
Bossenbroek, Vluchten voor de Groote Oorlog p. 58 
60 Laporte, Belgische Geinterneerden in Nederland Gedurende De Eerste Wereldoorlog p. 165. 
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should be used to offset the costs of internment or to improve the conditions under 
which the internees were held. The savings fund was always intended to benefit the 
internees as individuals at the end of the war. 
The Fund was established in August 1915 and by 28th of that month Dfl 1826 had been 
paid in. 61 By 15 September 1915 this was Dfl 16,000. It was decided to put the 
administration of the Fund into the hands of a bank and the Nederlandsche 
Handelmaatschappij was appointed. It agreed to pay an exaggerated rate of interest on 
the fund, 4% in place of the then normal 11/2%. 
By March 1916 the Fund held Dfl 364,633 and the Bank declared that it could no 
longer afford to pay 4% over such a large amount and the rate was reduced to 2%. As 
other investments at the time were making 3% other investment opportunities were 
sought. General Snijders was keen to invest the money in areas that, although more 
risky, would show a greater return. This idea was rejected, the view held was that this 
money represented the future of many of the internees and that must be safeguarded. In 
May 1916 Dfl 610,000 was placed in promissory notes. 
As the fund grew it became an attractive target for groups related to the internees that 
needed funds. For example, an attempt was made in 1916 to utilise Dfl 100,000 of the 
Fund to the benefit of Belgian refugees but this was rejected as not being in the best 
interests of the internees. ' Likewise a request from the Belgian Ambassador in Holland 
61 LM Geschiedenis der Intemeering, p. 819. 
62 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 820. 
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to use the Fund to the advantage of Belgian POWs in Germany was also rejected' By 
the end of 1916 the capital amount in the fund stood at Dfl 1,949,923.57. 
During 1917 there was very little change in the way that the Savings Fund was 
administered. By 1 January 1918 the balance stood at Dfl 4,503,097.91 with the interest 
for the whole year at Dfl 88,124.79 and average of 3%M In mid 1917 consideration 
was given to the method that would be used to distribute this money amongst the 
internees at the end of the war. No problems were anticipated in paying either the 
German or the British internees. They were relatively few in number. The greatest 
problem was likely to be the Belgians. It was clear that the Belgian internees, still 
smarting from earlier allegations of desertion, did not want the money from the Savings 
fund handed over to their government for distribution. Investigations were made in to 
the possibility that a Dutch bank in Belgium could handle the matter. The option 
seemed feasible but very expensive. It was decided that the Dutch Internment Office 
would handle the payments and General Snijders passed the following message to all 
Belgian internees. ' 
`Payment of money to internees will be after the return to Belgium. A 
Dutch committee will make payment in Brussels, Gent, Luik, Namen 
and Charleroi. Notices will be placed in Belgian newspapers giving 
the times and places. All internees must provide proof of identity'. 
In anticipation of this each employed internee was provided with an identity and 
6' LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 821 
64 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 1098. 
65 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 1199. 
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address card. It was estimated that a committee of two people would need two months 
to handle the distribution at a cost of Dfl 1,500. This cost could very easily be met out 
of accrued interest. 66 
Further discussions were held concerning whether a proportion of the money in the 
Savings fund should be reserved and set against the costs of feeding and housing the 
internees. The home governments were liable for the costs and would be formally 
billed at the end of the war but should the internees also pay a proportion? It was 
considered unfair that those internees who had taken up the option of paid employment 
during their time in the Netherlands should have their earnings abated as a means of 
supporting those who had chosen not to work. Similarly the point was made that the 
intention of the savings fund was to benefit the internees at the end of the war, not the 
home governments. In April 1917 it was decided that the total value of the fund would 
be distributed to the internees, nothing would be withheld to meet costs. 
Another financial question was raised in 1917 and this concerned the profits made by 
the canteens situated in the camps and in the larger work groups. During 1916 the 
profits made by the canteens had been substantial and it was expected that by the end of 
the war there would be a considerable sum to be disposed of. In April 1917 the 
Minister of War and the Military Commander, Bosboom and Snijders, proposed that at 
the end of the war the canteens should be liquidated, all creditors paid off and the 
remaining balance should be added to the savings fund and distributed equally amongst 
the internees. Before a final decision could be reached by the army questions were 
raised over the legitimacy of the Dutch government's right to decide on the distribution 
66 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 1100. 
183 
of the canteens profits. Camp commandants were asked to report on the manner in 
which the canteens had been started. The canteens had, on the whole, been intended to 
benefit the internees as a group, not as individuals. The Minister of War then made 
another suggestion, that the money be placed into a special fund under the control of 
the Belgian government and used to benefit soldiers that had been victims of the war. 
Discussions based on legal and moral arguments continued but no real conclusion was 
reached beyond the decision that as there was no armistice in sight the matter was not 
urgent. 6' 
Camp Groningen N 1916 
Whilst the camps housing the Belgian internees were emptying rapidly during 1916, 
this was not the case at Camp Groningen. Principally because of language difficulties 
very few of the British internees took up outside employment other than seasonal work 
on local farms. ' At the end of 1915 only 10 British internees were located out of the 
camp as part of a work group. By the end of 1916 this number had increased but only 
to 140, approximately 10%of the non-commissioned internees. The camp population 
increased in January when the crew of the submarine E17 were interned followed by a 
further 9 men from submarine H6. Three internees died of ill health during 1916. 
The majority of the officers lived away from the camp. Only a few, usually four or five, 
were based in the camp at any one time to assist with the discipline and welfare of the 
67 No final decision was reached until after the end of the war when all profits were given to charity. This 
is dealt with more fully in chapter 8. 
68 Oosterman, 'De Interneering hier to lande', p. 836. 
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men. This presence, and the quality of the British non-commissioned officers, meant 
that the Dutch considered this to be an easy camp to guard. The main problem that the 
Dutch guards had to deal with was alcohol, as the British internees regularly used their 
passes to the local town as an opportunity to get drunk. " This led to some inevitable 
clashes with the local population although generally relations with the local Dutch 
residents were good. 
After the British government made assurances that all escapees reaching England 
would be immediately returned, the area in which the British internees were allowed to 
roam without a Dutch escort was increased. Sport and physical fitness training had 
always been a major feature of life at Groningen and this continued to be the case in 
1916.7° The sporting facilities were improved and football matches were arranged every 
week against local teams. 
Camp Bergen N 1916 
In many ways Bergen, the camp for German internees, followed similar trends to the 
camp for the British. Inhibited by language very few of the internees left the camp to 
take up employment in the Dutch community and life within the camp followed 
patterns established during 1915. Like their counterparts in Groningen, support from 
the home nation was good and building work continued during 1916 to the tune of Dfl 
19,000 in an effort to make the camp more comfortable. The total number interned at 
Bergen remained more or less constant over the course of the year but there the 
"' Oosterman, 'De Interneering hier to lande', p. 834. 
70 Oosterman, 'De Intemeering hier to lande', p. 836 
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similarity with the British ends. 
In January 1916 the camp strength was 7 officers and 133 other ranks. " By December 
of that year it was no officers, 112 other ranks and a further 14 living out of the camp in 
a work group. There had been, however, a further 1 officer and 112 other ranks taken 
into internment during the course of the year. The reason that the total number of 
internees at Bergen did not increase significantly was because a total of 127 Germans 
left the camp. All eight officers were moved to Wierickerschans, one inmate died, 8 
escaped and 4 were released from internment on appeal. n The remainder, 100 other 
ranks, were released after an investigation, which confirmed their status as deserters. '3 
The number of German soldiers crossing into the Netherlands and claiming to be a 
deserter was increasing. Some, depending on the attitude of the border guard they first 
encountered never made it into internment, some crossed in civilian clothes and 
remained unchallenged but officially those that claimed to be deserters had to be 
interned until their correct status could be determine. The German government had 
made it quite clear that it would not reimburse the Dutch government for any costs 
incurred by these deserters so the interests of all parties were best served by their 
speedy discharge. Tensions between these deserters and the regular German internees 
ran high and in June 1916 the decision was taken to build a separate barrack to house 
" LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 619. 
n Oostermans has slightly different figures, Oosterman, ' De Interneering hier to lande', p. 836. 
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them. 74 Close enough to the existing camp at Bergen to share many of the facilities but 
far enough away to prevent any contact between the two groups of Germans. 's 
Following the first four escapes, by internees that had promised not to escape, the 
Dutch government imposed a more ridged regime on the Germans. This was eased for 
those with no history of escapes, but re-imposed after further escapes in October. The 
Dutch authorities demanded the return of all escapees and threatened to withdraw the 
privileges of the remaining internees if they were not returned. 
Escapes 
The official government account of internment is very confusing with regard to escape 
attempts. Some are described in great detail, usually those where the escapee was at 
fault by breaking a promise not to escape; or those where they were either assisted by 
the home government or the home government failed to return them as requested. Other 
escapes are merely given as numbers and in almost all instances the numbers do not 
add up. It is therefore impossible to say just how many internees did escape. Oosterman 
in Geschiedenis der Interneering does give some figures for Belgian escapes as does 
Laporte but what is unclear is how many of these escaped back to Belgium and how 
many simply wished to remain in the Netherlands but not as a formal intemee. 76 With 
the erection of the wire fence between Belgium and the Netherlands in 1916 it is 
reasonable to assume that more `escapees' were opting to stay in Holland as passage to 
74 LM Geschiedenis der lnterneering p. 993 and Roodt, Evelyn de., ' Duitse deserteurs in Nederland 
tijdens de Eerste Wereldoorlog', Andriessen, Hans., Ros, Martin., and Pierik, Perry., (Eds), De Grote 
Oorlog, Kroniek 1914-1918, Essays over de Eerste Wereldoorlog, (Soesterberg: Uitgeverij Aspekt, 
2002). p. 140. 
75 Oosterman, `De Interneering hier to lande' p. 836. 
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Belgium was very difficult, if not impossible. It is a fair assumption, however, that 
certainly as far as the British and the Germans were concerned the numbers were 
relatively small, less than thirty, each year. In the case of the Belgians the numbers 
were almost certainly greater but are impossible to discover. The proximity of a 
Belgian land border and an ability to speak Dutch were two main advantages that must 
have helped many Belgians to return home. Belgian soldiers that managed to enter the 
Netherlands without being interned and then made their way to either Great Britain or 
Belgium must also be considered as escapees. Some estimates put the number who 
managed this after the fall of Antwerp at 7,000 but again, this is impossible to confirm. 
Snijders was concerned that if the Netherlands was being seen to be failing in its 
attempts to try and stop these escapes then Germany might consider it to be in breach 
of its neutral responsibilities. In January 1915 he issued orders that obliged the 
authorities at all Dutch ports to stop any Belgian of military age from crossing to 
England until it could be ascertained that they were not liable for internment. ' 
An effort was made to understand why internees would want to escape. The 
Commandant at Camp Zeist produced a report in July 1915, which concluded that there 
were four main motivations for trying to escape's 
i) To return to the front. 
ii) To obtain well paid employment in the Netherlands. 
iii) To obtain well-paid employment in Great Britain, possibly joining family 
that had already fled there. 
"Gegevens betreffende de Interneering p. 13 and ARA 2.13.16. nr 279. Orders from General Snijders 
dated 15 January 1915. 
'm LM Geschiedenis der Interneering p. 337 and Laporte, Belgische Geinterneerden in Nederland 
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iv) The chance of promotion. It was well known amongst the Belgian internees 
that sergeants and above who were sent to the front received rapid 
promotion to Sous-Lieutenant. The number of NCO's attempting to escape 
was proportionally higher than other ranks" 
It is perhaps surprising that a wish to escape because of dissatisfaction with the 
conditions of internment does not figure on this list. It should be remembered that the 
list was compiled by the interning authority and may not represent the true feelings of 
the potential escapers. Laporte cites concern for family back in Belgium as the main 
reason for escape attempts amongst the Belgians. Surprisingly, even though he is very 
critical of the way in which the Belgians were interned even he does not give 
dissatisfaction with the conditions of internment as a major motivation for escape. 
Once it became generally known that Belgian soldiers from the most recent intake of 
conscripts were being used as workers in the ammunitions factories rather than being 
sent to the front as soldiers then the number seeking to escape to return to the front 
declined. The forced movement of labour to Germany from Belgium that started in 
1916 also deterred many escapers who knew that if they returned home they would 
have to rejoin the Belgium army or face unemployment and the German draft. BD 
The number of escape attempts increased with the introduction of `uitgangskaarten' 
(exit passes) in December 1914. These allowed the internees to leave the camps for a 
short period, usually an afternoon or evening, on the condition that they return. The 
LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 339. 
90 Chambers, F. P., The war behind the war 1914-1918. p. 215. 
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NCO's received more of these than the enlisted men, which may also account for the 
higher number of escape attempts by the higher ranks. "' 
The Dutch authorities took various steps to stop the escape attempts succeeding. They 
increased the use of censorship, both of letters and telegrams. " They were also on the 
look out for parcels that might contain civilian clothes. Up to June 1915 sixty-six 
parcels were withheld because of their contents and when these measures were 
extended to cover parcels sent by rail and tram a further 50 civilian suits were 
discovered. ' One of the most important factors in the number of escape attempts from 
internment was the amount of outside help that the escapees were given. Dutch 
civilians were very sympathetic to the internees. Many gave active help in the form of 
food and shelter and even those that did not get quite so involved were willing to turn a 
blind eye and not report an escapee to the authorities. The number of internees that 
escaped and then chose to remain in the Netherlands demonstrates this. A number of 
escapees were later found in the main industrial areas in the Netherlands. The Dutch 
public was not the only source of help when escaping. The Belgian and British 
Consulates were also willing to offer assistance to soldiers who wanted to travel to 
England. While publicly supporting internment law and promising to return any 
internees that escaped in breach of a promise not to escape, they were still happy to 
issue visas without enquiring to closely into the applicant's circumstances. 84 Van 
LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 340. 
ffi LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 566. Censorship of post started in May 1915 and continued 
through out the war. 
83 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 346 
s" LM Geschiedenis der Interneering p. 334 also ARA 2.05.04 Inv 744 No 57070. A letter from the Head 
Commissioner of the Rotterdam Police to General Snijders dated 22 November 1915 explaining how 
easy it is for internees to present themselves at the Belgian Consulates for help. In this case he cites the 
consulate in Breda. Laporte, Belgische Geinterneerden in Nederland Gedurende De Eerste 
Wereldoorlog, p. 90. 
190 
Stryendonck, the British Vice-Consul in Vlissingen was caught giving civilian clothes 
to internees from Amersfoorr. When challenged he claimed not to be assisting 
escapees, but merely distributing clothes from charitable organisations in Great Britain 
who wished to help the destitute Belgians in the Netherlands. The matter was brought 
to the attention of General Snijders who clearly believed the story (or did not want to 
make diplomatic waves) and no action was taken beyond instructing the Dutch area 
commander to tighten up security. "s 
In an effort to halt the spread of escape attempts in February 1916, the Dutch 
government began to fingerprint and photograph all internees. The speed with which 
border guards were informed about escapes was also increased. In 1916 there had been 
49 escapes by Belgian internees. In 1917 this increased to 105, of which only 18 were 
returned by the Belgian government. In the year up to 1 June 1917 only 1 escape out of 
99 had been returned as a result of the Belgian policy decision that declared that only 
those who escaped after breaking a promise not to escape and those who had escaped 
after 3 June 1916 (when the Belgian government officially ordered its soldiers to abide 
by promises not to escape), would be returned. Monthly lists were prepared by the 
Ministry of War and sent to the Belgian Attache alerting them as to which internees 
had escaped. ' 
'5 ARA 2.05.04 Inv 743 No 14462 A military `Process Verbal' was held to look in to the incident. Its 
report is dated 25 March 1915. 
'6 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 1063. These figures are difficult to substantiate from any other 
source. 
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AT THE BORDER BETWEEN NEUTRAL HOLLAND AND BELGIU' 
In the second half of 1917 the situation became more complex as an increasing number 
of Belgian internees began to escape to Germany. Attracted by promises of high wages 
in German industry and by what the Dutch records of the time call `other reasons' 
which may well have been the rising socialist movement. The Belgian government 
issued a strong warning to its internees not to do this, calling all those who escaped to 
Germany deserters and making it a treasonable offence. Whether this warning had any 
great effect is doubtful. What had perhaps more impact was the Dutch statement that it 
had been informed by Germany that a Belgian internee who had crossed the 
"'Cartoon by Albert Hahn published in 1917. http: /hvww. greatwar. nl/ 28.08.2008 
192 
Dutch/German border in error had been placed in jail 8' 
By 1916 all Belgian officers bar two had given their word not to escape. The remaining 
two were left on Urk until agreement was reached with Belgium that they would be 
sent back following an escape attempt regardless of whether they promised not to 
escape or continued to refuse to make such a promise. One area of uncertainty 
remained. What happened to Belgian internees who escaped and made their way to 
France or Great Britain? Had these countries any responsibility to return internees of 
other nationalities? 
In November 1917 one of the two Belgian officers who had refused to give a promise 
not to escape did escape. At the time he was housed in the special barracks at Camp 
Zeist along with a French pilot who escaped on the same day. Neither man was 
returned and the Dutch press reported that the Belgian pilot had rejoined the Belgian 
army and was fighting the Germans. Some months later it was reported in the Dutch 
press that this pilot had been killed in action. Dutch records note that he was mourned 
by all of those that had known him-'O 
On 13 April 1917 the German Attach6 informed the Dutch government that German 
officers would now be allowed to give a promise not to escape. As a result all 13 
German officers in Wierickerschans were released. Ten went to The Hague, two to 
Amsterdam and one to Rotterdam. The German men in Bergen were now also allowed 
more freedom. On 20 and 21 April two officers on leave in Germany did not return 
LM Geschiedenis der Interneering p. 1067. 
LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 1173. 
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claiming that they had amended their promise forms and as such were not obliged to 
return. The German government would have no truck with such methods and sent both 
men back, although it was on the understanding that they would not be severely 
punished. A report raised on 21 November 1917 informed the German authorities that 
seven NCOs and soldiers were missing. Five were located and returned by the German 
authorities. 
As a result of the more formalised agreements with the home nations regarding the 
return of escapees, the number of guards used at the various camps was reduced. 
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Chapter 6 
1917: Deserters, Politics and Religion. 
It is clear from the differing concerns of the Dutch government in 1917 compared to 
1914, that the attitude and requirements of the internees had now changed. The issues 
being dealt with were no longer the basics, food, shelter and clothing; but more 
complicated matters that had greater potential to compromise Dutch neutrality. 
Provided that all nationalities received the same amount of food, that their home 
governments were happy with the accommodation provided and the clothing worn 
there was little to generate a diplomatic incident. Now that the internees were more 
settled, however, and their immediate needs catered for they were turning their 
attention to areas that had far more scope for causing political upset, politics and 
religion being chief amongst them. 
In 1917 the general pattern of more camps closing as an increasing number of internees 
took up employment in the local community continued. All internees, whether part of 
work groups or still resident in a camp, were allowed a greater amount of freedom. The 
rules governing release on a promise not to escape had now been established and 
tested. With a very few exceptions they were found to work. The number of internees 
notionally interned in the Netherlands but actually resident in another country also 
increased as more applications for extended leave were received and approved. 
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The main camps were now Zeist, Harderwijk, Groningen and Bergen and although 
there were a few other smaller camps at Zwolle, Heerlen and Vlissingen the main 
centres were these four. The overall numbers of internees changed very little over 
1917, a few were released from internment on health or compassionate grounds and a 
few, mainly downed airmen or shipwrecked sailors, were interned. The only significant 
change was the increase in the number of German soldiers crossing the Dutch borders 
and the high proportion of these that claimed to be deserters. ' 
With the increased stability in the internment organisation more attention was then 
devoted to individual concerns. The Belgian government was still in dispute with the 
Dutch authorities over the fate of four Belgian officers and twelve men who had been 
interned in 1914 after the fall of Antwerp. These Belgian troops had taken a boat and 
headed out along the Schelde, aiming to reach Ostend. In the confusion they had in fact 
ended up landing in the Netherlands and had consequently been interned. The Belgian 
government objection was based on the treatment given to a group of German soldiers 
who, having lost their way in a fog, had inadvertently crossed the Dutch border. When 
stopped by the Dutch border guards the Germans explained their predicament and were 
allowed to turn around and re-enter Germany without being interned. The similarities 
between the two cases are obvious but the Dutch argument for not releasing the 
Belgians from internment was that the Belgian authorities had not protested at the time 
of their internment, as the Germans soldiers had done. This lack of protest when 
originally interned, argued the Dutch, showed an implicit agreement to the imposition 
of the status of internee. A neutral state can authorise passage over its land if requested, 
' LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 1041. 
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but in this case, unlike the German example, no request was made. 
This case makes clear the Belgian governments views on the internment of its troops. It 
would comply with international law as far as that went but it would use every means 
within that law to obtain the release of as many soldiers as it could. The war was still 
being fought on Belgian soil and with a substantial part of its army interned in the 
Netherlands, Belgium had a severe manpower shortage. What is not clear from the 
documents available is the viewpoint of the individuals concerned. We have only the 
Belgian government's opinion that their landing in the Netherlands was an error. Many 
of the soldiers who retreated from Antwerp were accused of being deserters and a 
return to Belgium would result in disciplinary action. Many were indeed deserters, or 
simply soldiers who considered that they had done their bit and preferred to spend the 
rest of the war, however long that might be, in the relative comfort and safety of a 
Dutch internment camp rather than in a muddy trench on a Belgian battlefield. Had 
these particular individuals taken it upon themselves to escape from the Netherlands 
and return to Belgium it is unlikely that the Belgian authority would have made very 
strenuous efforts to have them returned and yet, as far as can been see from existing 
records, none of these men did take advantage of the increasingly lax guarding regime 
to return home. ' 
A further case concerning a Belgian soldier also illustrates that not all, if any, had any 
strong desire to be repatriated. A Belgian soldier was released from internment because 
the promised investigation into his status had not taken place within the 2 1/2 month 
limit imposed in this instance. On his release he appealed against the decision and 
3 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 1042. 
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asked to be allowed to return to the internment camp. As there was no doubt about the 
basis for the appeal, that he was a serving Belgian soldier, the appeal was upheld and 
he was returned to internment. 3 
The German government also made appeals. In one instance seven German soldiers 
had crossed the border to buy food and although they had every intention of returning 
they were interned. They were eventually released because they had not been given the 
option of returning to Germany at the time that they were first stopped, as required by 
Dutch standing orders. Germany faced the same problem as Belgium. Not all of its 
interned soldiers actually wanted to be repatriated. An example of this is the case of 
two German internees who were arrested on a charge of smuggling and were being 
transported to Gennep from Bergen. A mix-up in the orders resulted in their guards 
believing that they were due for release. One was handed over to the German border 
guards but the other declined the chance to go home and opted to remain in the 
Netherlands. ' 
The Dutch authorities were also concerned regarding the threat to Dutch security from 
foreign soldiers, principally German soldiers, who entered the Netherlands claiming 
they were either going shopping or seeking rest and relaxation. In March 1915 Saijders 
issued orders to his border guards to the effect that although these Germans should be 
allowed into the Netherlands, and as they were in civilian clothing they were not liable 
for internment; they were not to be allowed to remain in the area close to the southern 
borders of the Netherlands. The inference is clear, genuine visitors were welcome but 
3 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 1043. 
` LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 10 4. 
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potential spies were not. ' 
Internment Costs 
By the end of 1917 the Dutch government department that dealt with general 
accounting, the Algemene Rekenkamer (General Accounting Office) was able to 
correspond with the Ministry of War with a view to producing an invoice for the costs 
of internment for the year 1914. Discussions were held to determine how best the costs 
could be accounted for and how and when these bills would be presented to the 
governments involved. 
The idea that all genuine costs were the responsibility of the home nations and not of 
the interning authority was fixed in law, but there was still room for argument over 
what exactly constituted an internment cost. The invoices for 1914 were calculated 
against the following numbers of internees; 
Belgians 15,380 
Germans 145 
British 1,181 
This resulted in invoices being raised in the following amounts; 
Belgium Dfl 3,483,398.30 
S ARA 2.13.70 Inv 178, Letter from the commander of the Field Army to General Snijders dated 29 
March 1915. 
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German Dfl 53,641.72 
Britain Dfl 153,032.491/2 
France Dfl 3.58 
These figures are quite absurd. It is impossible to find an accurate figure for the number 
of internees held in the Netherlands during 1914, much less account for their upkeep to 
a half-cent. It does, however, show just how important the Dutch government believed 
it was to not only act fairly and scrupulously but above all to be seen to be acting in 
that way. 
Having raised these invoices for 1914 it was made clear that no payment would be 
required until the end of the war, as prescribed in The Hague Convention. This was 
welcomed by Belgium and Germany but not by Great Britain. They had already 
requested that they be allowed to pay off some of the costs in May 1917 and had a 
history of disputing bills on the grounds of insufficient information. ' 
German Deserters 
The number of German deserters entering the Netherlands increased dramatically in 
1917. De Roodt estimates that the number tripled in 1917 but actual numbers are hard 
to estimate and even harder to substantiate. ' Carsten quotes the German Chief of Staff 
6 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 1051. 
De Roodt, 'Duitse deserteurs in Nederland tijdens de Eerste Wereldoorlog', p. 123 and 128 and 
LM Geschiedenis der Interneering. p. 1055. 
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who said in October 1917 that conscripts were now leaving Germany `in droves. 8 
Those that found themselves stopped by the Dutch border patrols were sent initially to 
the camp at Bergen and then, after appropriate but swift investigation, the genuine 
deserters were released. Many offered themselves to foreign embassies as spies. Some 
did try to find work but these were in competition with Dutch workers and internees so 
they were not very successful. The Dutch were also concerned that released German 
soldiers would also spy in the Netherlands on behalf of the German army. ' Some turned 
to crime. The growing number of former German soldiers now living in the 
Netherlands without any official means of support was clearly a problem that needed 
addressing. 1° The government decided as a matter of principle to place limits on their 
freedom of movement and to put them under police surveillance. In the absence of any 
specific orders from the government, Snijders issued firm orders to his troops that all 
deserters were to be kept under control and fully registered. He was also concerned 
about the cost of looking after these unwelcome visitors. In a letter to the commander 
of the Army in March 1917 he says, `the deserter comes over the border against our 
wishes: only common humanity prevents him being turned back at the border or 
otherwise ejected. One has the right to ensure that the deserter causes as little cast as 
possible'. " The councils along the borders, where these measures were most stringent, 
complained that these new rules were unworkable. They did not have the resources to 
take on feeding and housing the deserters and, as most were unemployed and tended to 
move around, any form of control or registration was difficult. It was clear that a 
g Carsten, F. L., War against War, (Los Angeles: University of California, 1982), p. 121. 
'Suit, Nederland in de Eerste Wereld Oorlog, Part 2 p. 33. 
10 De Roodt, `Duitse deserteurs in Nederland djdens de Eerste Wereldoorlog', p. 143. 
" ARA 2.13.16 Inv 229 No 51081 Letter from General Snijders to the Commander of the Army dated 12 
March 1917 and De Roodt, ' Duitse deserteurs in Nederland tijdens de Eerste Wereldoorlog', p. 144. 
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national solution for the problem was needed, a camp specifically for deserters. 12 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked the Department of Internment to undertake the 
task of erecting a tented camp to the rear of the existing camp at Bergen. Close enough 
to utilise the existing contacts at the camp but far enough away to be completely 
detached and remove any possibility of contact between the occupants of the two 
camps. The deserters were forbidden to enter the village of Bergen and the internees 
also had the area in which they were allowed to roam cut, to avoid any possibility of 
the two groups meeting. Even deserters that had been cleared by the border guards and 
released into the Netherlands were to be rounded up and removed to Bergen, unless 
they could show that they were capable of supporting themselves. In the areas close to 
the border that were in a heightened state of readiness this was even more important, 
and was given considerable attention by the army. The camp was established in the 
early summer of 1917, but in July of 1917 the military commander in Limburg still had 
not received any official notification that he could send deserters to Bergen to be 
interned. " Although worried about the risk to Dutch security posed by the growing 
number of Germans attempting to settle close to the Dutch border regions, the Dutch 
authorities realised that these deserters were potentially a rich source of information 
themselves. Instructions were given for all deserters to be interviewed by the local 
police with a view to gleaning not only information that might be relevant to the overall 
national security of the Netherlands, but also details of smuggling routes and border 
12 ARA 2.13.16 Inv 229 Nr 53044 letter from the army commander in Limburg to the commandant of the 
army dated 7 April 1917 and ARA 2.13.16 Inv 229 No 51843 Letter from General Snijders to the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs dated 22 March 1917. 
13 ARA 2.13.16 Inv 229 No 58464. Letter from Commandant in Limburg to the Commander of the Army 
dated 10 July 1917. 
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crossing points. 14 
Almost as soon as the system was established for prospective deserters to be sent 
directly to Bergen, the procedure had to be revised to take into account the outbreak of 
the pox in Germany. Those crossing the German /Dutch border were now placed in 
quarantine before being allowed to proceed to Bergen. The deserters were kept 
separately from other groups such as POWs and internees in order to reduce the risk of 
infection. '-5 This all added a delay to the clearing process and lengthened the time 
before a deserter could be released. Not only German deserters were kept in quarantine. 
Escaping British POWs were also held for a time before being released. " Now, 
however, only those deserters that could prove that they had the means to support 
themselves were allowed to leave Bergen. Even then they were still required to report 
to the local police on a regular basis. Those that had no means of support had to stay in 
Bergen. This was judged by the Dutch authorities as being the best and most cost 
effective way of maintaining some sort of control on a group of men with the potential 
to become a serious problem. 
This new system did not, however, solve the problem completely. In a letter to the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Army dated 23 May 1917, the Commandant of the 2nd 
Division, Military Police expressed his concern about the number of released deserters 
that were still finding their way back to Limburg. He stated that many were still in their 
"ARA 2.13.16 Inv 229 No 48381 letter from the Commander Ist Division Koninklijke-Marechaussee to 
the Commander of the Army dated 2 February 1917. 
15 ARA 2.13.16 Inv 229 No 61190, Letter from Commandant in Limburg to the Commander of the Army 
dated 27 August 1917.. 
16 Harrison, M. C. C., 'Through the Bathroom Floor', Durnford, Hugh, et al. Tunnelling to Freedom and 
Other Escape Narratives from World War 1, (New York: Dover publications Inc, 2004). p180. 
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German uniforms and although they had changed the buttons and made other minor 
alterations they were still clearly identifiable as German soldiers. He asked the 
Commander-in-Chief to request that the civilian authorities not allow any more 
deserters to travel to Limburg unless they had employment in the area and could 
support themselves. It appears that his concerns were two fold; firstly he was worried 
about potential conflict with anti-German groups in Limburg and secondly, but most 
importantly, his concerns appear to be economic. In an attachment to the letter he gave 
a list of the numbers involved, which he split into two groups, those who were solely 
deserters and those who were deserters/smugglers. " This concern about deserters 
turning to smuggling to support themselves was not new. In February 1917 he had 
already written a long letter to the Commander-in-Chief outlining the differences 
between the `ordinary' deserters and the `smuggler' deserters. "' A further economic 
concern was that many of the deserters were not alone. Some travelled with their 
families and some, those that had deserted directly from the front, were joined by their 
families at a later date. Many of the deserters were in no position to provide for 
themselves and certainly could not feed and house a family. Whist deploring this extra 
burden on Dutch resources there appears to have been little support for the idea of 
returning either the deserters or their families to Germany. The correspondence on the 
subject of the German deserters is sympathetic and centred on how to deal with the 
problem within the Netherlands. 19 
"ARA 2.13.16 Inv 229 No 55615. Letter to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army from the 
Commendant of the 2nd Division, Military Police dated 23 May 1917. 
18 ARA 2.13.16 Inv 229 No 49057. Letter to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army from the 
Commendant of the 2nd Division, Military Police, February 1917. 
19 A good example of this duel idea of concern for Dutch security coupled with a sympathy for the plight 
of the deserters families is shown in the letter dated 9 March 1917 to the Commandant of the 1" Division 
Koninklijke Marechaussee in `s-Hertogenbosch from the Commendant of the 1' Division Koninklijke 
Marechaussee in Eindhoven. ARA 2.13.16 Inv 229 No 50969. 
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By August 1917 the new camp for deserters in Bergen was full and the military 
commander was once more forced to write to the Commander-in-Chief asking him to 
ensure that all civilian authorities were made aware of this fact. As these 
deserters/smugglers could no longer be accommodated in Bergen they were sent to 
other areas outside of the controlled zone but these councils were simply turning the 
men around and sending them back to where they came from; the point where they 
originally entered the Netherlands. ZO 
The German authorities were also concerned about the growing number of deserters 
entering the Netherlands. They had already clearly stated that they would not accept 
any financial responsibility for deserters and in July 1917 they expressed their concern 
that not only were German soldiers entering the Netherlands of their own volition, they 
alleged that an organisation within the Netherlands was actively contacting German 
soldiers and inviting them to desert. Snijders immediately instigated an investigation. " 
This not only compromised Dutch neutrality it also potentially increased the numbers 
of deserters that the Dutch would have to deal with. It is difficult to ascertain whether 
German soldiers were being enticed into desertion and if so whether their enticers were 
German or Dutch. The motivation to desert was mixed and there seems to have been no 
one overarching reason. 2' On balance though it seems more were motivated by a desire 
to leave Germany (or at least the German Army) than a desire to live in the 
Netherlands. A significant number also chose to desert to Switzerland and Denmark. 3 
' ARA 2.13.16 Inv 229 No 61189, Letter from the Military Commander of Camp Bergen to the 
Commander-in-Chief. 9 August 1917. 
21 ARA 2.13.16 Inv 229 No 2572, Letter from the Commander-in-Chief to the Commander of the Field 
Army dated 10 July 1917. 
22 Carsten refers to an organisation in Brunswick that was providing deserters with false papers so that 
they could cross the Dutch/ German border into the Netherlands. Carsten, War against War, p. 121. 
23 De Roodt, ' Duitse deserteurs in Nederland tijdens de Ferste Wereldoorlog' p. 126. 
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There were, however, organisations and individuals within the Netherlands that offered 
all manner of support to deserting Germans once they had crossed the Dutch borders. 
These ranged from an office in The Hague, staffed by German deserters, to more 
informal help from sympathetic Netherlanders. 
Political Activity 
It is perhaps unsurprising that the internment camps, with their large and often 
unoccupied populations, became centres of political activity. By far the most active on 
the political front were the Belgian internees, and because they were also the most 
numerous their political activities were the most noticeable. Laporte asserts that the 
rapid increase in political awareness was due to the lack of freedom, the poor living 
conditions and the lack of interest shown in the Belgian internees by the Belgian 
government in Le Havre. 24 The increased levels of literacy amongst the Belgians must 
also have been a factor. Many more could now be reached by using political pamphlets 
than had been the case before 1914. For the German internees the issue as the war 
progressed was not the conditions under which they were being detained in the 
Netherlands that raised political concerns, but the conditions that were prevalent in 
Germany. The increasing number of German deserters in the Netherlands and their 
socialist leanings was at times a major area of concern for both the Dutch and German 
governments. The deserters produced and distributed their own left wing news-sheets, 
Der Kampf and Michel im Sumpf. The Dutch kept a wary eye on these, afraid that their 
24 Laporte, Belgische Geinterneerden in Nederland Gedurende De Eerste Wereldoorlog p. 59 See also 
Bossenbroek, Vluchten voor de Groote Oorlog p. 59. 
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own workforce would be corrupted. 25 The British had no problems with political 
activity in the camp at Groningen. The number of British internees was small and the 
level support from the home government was high. It would be too much of a sweeping 
generalisation to say that the British internees were too contented to involve themselves 
with politics, but there is little evidence of any activity other than promoting anti- 
German feeling. It is noted in the Dutch records, however, that many of the British 
internees were members of the Labour Party. ' 
The Belgian authorities were very keen to prevent the distribution of any literature in 
the camps that could be seen as prejudicial to the internees `discipline and love of their 
fatherland'. The Belgian aversion to any political activity in the camps can be seen in 
the following: on 28 November 1916 the Belgian Ambassador made a complaint to the 
Dutch authorities that an anti-Belgian and pro-German newspaper was being 
distributed in the camp at Zeist. He requested that the paper be immediately banned. In 
fact closer investigation showed that this was a paper published in Brussels, the 
Bruxellois, and contained an article by a journalist that had recently visited the camp' 
He had sent a few complimentary copies to Zeist, which had generated very little 
interest in the camp itself. It demonstrates, however, the sensitivity of the Belgians to 
anything that might possibly be seen as anti-Belgian or pro-socialist. 2 There were 
newspapers distributed in the camps of which the Belgian government did approve. 
The Stem uit Belgie, for example, and its French version L'Echo de Belgique were 
u De Roodt, ' Duitse deserteurs in Nederland tijdens de Ferste Wereldoorlog', p. 151. 
26 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 608. 
n There were a large number of newspapers produced for or by the Belgians during the four years they 
spent in the Netherlands. Not all were politically biased but many were. Bossenbroek, Vluchten voor de 
Groote Oorlog p. 57. 
28 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering p. 1087 and Bossenbroek, Vluchten voor de Groote Oorlog p. 60 
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published in London by E. H. Flor Prims especially for the internees and refugees. ' In 
an effort to curb political activity the Belgian government also requested that 
`unsuitable' public meetings be banned. The Dutch authorities rejected this last request. 
They had little interest in seeing that the internees retained their love for their 
fatherland and could not agree with the Belgian authorities as to what constituted a 
threat to public order and discipline. A Dutch officer attended all meetings and that, as 
far as the Dutch were concerned, was as far as they were prepared to go. ' Laporte 
asserts that polarisation within the Belgian internee community was far more clearly 
defined than in Belgium itself. He cites three main divisions, Waals v Vlaams, Catholic 
v Protestant and, somewhat surprisingly, pro-German v anti-German 31 
The Belgian government was so concerned about political dissent amongst the Belgian 
internees, (most of whom it had alienated earlier in the war with the government 
assertions that they had deserted their posts at Antwerp), that it established an office in 
the Netherlands to promote the good name of the Belgian government. The `Office de 
la Propagande Belge' or Belgian Office as it is usually referred to, was situated in The 
Hague and had many functions 32 A major role was to monitor activities in the 
Netherlands and to provide reliable reports for the Belgian government. Another major 
function of the Belgium Office was to constantly remind the Dutch people, the Dutch 
government and the Belgian internees that there was still a Belgian government, albeit 
not one currently located in Brussels, and that the government that was in Brussels was 
' Bruijnseels, A., Het Godsdienstig leven der Belgen in Nederland tijdens de oorlogsjaren 1914- 
1918, Dee1 III, p. 49. 
3" LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 1088. 
31 Laporte, Belgische Geintemeerden in Nederland Gedurende De Eerste Wereldoorlog, p. 195 and 
Bossenbroek, Vluchten voor de Groote Oorlog p. 59. 
32 Bossenb, k, Vluchten voor de Groote Oorlog p. 62. 
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an occupying army. This was achieved in several ways, one of which was patronage of 
artistic or sporting events. For example in April 1917 the Belgian government in 
L'Havre wrote to the Belgian Office in The Hague informing them that the Belgian 
Minister of Science and the Arts had allocated Dfl 1500.00 for an art exhibition in the 
Netherlands. The Belgian Office was asked to form a committee to organise such an 
exhibition and to ensure that Belgian artists from the occupied zone were represented. 
As the Belgian internees became more involved with economic matters and 
employment they began to attract more attention from Socialist politicians. ' The 
Belgian Office was run on behalf of the government by Modeste Terwagne, a socialist 
politician and doctor who was also politically active in Antwerp as a member, and later 
leader, of the Antwerp Council. 35 Despite Terwagne's socialist credentials he was 
despised by the other Belgian socialist politician who took an active interest in the 
Belgian internees, Camille Huysman. An original member of the group dedicated to 
improving the lot of the internees by the provision of education Huysman saw 
Terwagne as a government puppet whose main aim was to suppress the socialist 
movement in the internment camps. Laporte describes the Belgian Office as `a 
chauvinistic and heavily anti-socialist propaganda and information service that, on the 
initiative of the Belgian government, must combat every form of anti-patriotism 
overseas'. ' In contrast to Terwagne's anti-socialist stance Huysman actively promoted 
socialism in the Netherlands during the war. 37 He, along with several members of the 
Belgische Werkliedenpartij, (Belgian Workingmen's Party) helped form the Bond van 
33 MRA Personnalia II Van Puyvelde 73. 
34 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 1085. 
35 Laporte, Belgische Geinterneerden in Nederland Gedurende De Eerste Wereldoorlog, p. 197. 
36 Laporte, Belgische Geinterneerden in Nederland Gedurende De Eerste Wereldoorlog, p. 197. 
37 Bossenbroek, Vluchten voor de Groote Oorlog p. 59. 
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Belgische Arbeiders in Nederland (Bond of Belgian Workers in Holland) known as the 
BBAN. This group was an attempt to get the Belgian internees to take some 
responsibility for their own welfare and also to provide a vehicle for counteracting the 
propaganda produced by the Belgian Office. ' Fundamental to this group was the dual 
aim of international socialism and peace. Huysman's belief in international socialism 
and his stance that the German workers should bear no blame for their governments 
entry into the war brought him heavy criticism from some elements of the Belgian 
government. Terwagne in particular called him the `spy from Berlin' -" 
The meetings of the BBAN that were held inside of the Belgian internment camps were 
well attended, a talk by Camille Huysmans in March 1917 at Harderwijk attracted an 
audience of 1,500, and even ordinary weekly meeting could reckon on drawing a crowd 
of around 1,000.40 Aside from insisting that each of the meetings was also attended by a 
Dutch officer, the Dutch authorities do not appear to have interfered in any way with 
this show of political feeling. Any concern seems to have been that a large-scale 
gathering had implications for public order rather than any anxiety over any extreme 
political views being expressed. 
The lack of concern shown by the Dutch government with regard to the activities of the 
BBAN and the Belgian socialists in general can be attributed to the fact that most of the 
complaints raised by the BBAN were levelled at the Belgian government, not at the 
host nation. Any complaints from the Belgian government that demanded the Dutch 
government take action against the socialists, whilst unwelcome, did not need such 
m Bossenbroek, Vluchten voor de Groote Oorlog p. 59 and p. 60. 
39 Laporte, Belgische Geinterneerden in Nederland Gedurende De Eerste Wereldoorlog, p. 197. 
40 Laporte, Belgische Geinterneerden in Nederland Gedurende De Ferste Wereldoorlog, p. 202-203. 
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careful consideration as a similar demand from the German or British governments 
would have required. Belgium was no threat to Dutch security, the only doubtful issue 
was the question of repayment of internment costs after the war and, assuming Belgium 
was in a position to pay, such costs were clearly covered by international law. A further 
consideration was the Flemish question. The long-standing and thorny issue of the 
separation of the Flemish and French speaking areas of Belgium was not officially part 
of the Dutch government's agenda during the war but all interested parties, the Dutch 
included, must have speculated on what might happen under any post-war peace 
settlements. Smit asserts that the Germans were keen to win the sympathy of the 
Flemish speaking Belgians and tried to exploit the long-standing discord between them 
and their French speaking countrymen, but with little success 41 With an expectation of 
hosting the post war peace conference, as it had hosted the 1899 and 1907 conferences, 
the Dutch government had reason to be confident that it would be well placed to ensure 
a settlement that was favourable to all Dutch speakers. The issue of Flemish 
separatism did not disappear during the war. In Belgium, the occupying German 
government took active steps to separate the Flemish and Walloon areas with a view to 
creating a greater pro-German, Dutch speaking country. To this end an order was 
issued in 1917 by the Germans to create two completely separate administrative areas 
within Belgium, with the Flemish area being the more dominant one. 2 The Belgian 
population in Belgium as a whole resisted this idea and the Belgian government wanted 
to ensure that the internees responded similarly. Political activity in the camps, whether 
socialist or not, fanned the flames of the debate. I have found no evidence to suggest 
that the Dutch government actively promoted calls for a separation of the northern part 
41 Smit, Nederland in de Ferste Wereld Oorlog. Part 2 p. 179. 
Chambers, he war behind the war 1914-1918, p. 216. 
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of Belgium within the camps but neither is there any evidence that they tried to 
suppress such calls and by allowing the BBAN to operate freely, the Dutch were 
complicit in allowing debate over the separation to flourish. The Dutch government 
offered no objection to the publication and distribution of newspapers and pamphlets 
that were aimed specifically at promoting the Flemish cause. These reached a greater 
audience outside of the camps than the Walloon equivalent simply because of the 
language they were written in. Most newspapers that were officially sanctioned by the 
Belgian government were written in French. Bossenbrook also alleges that the Vlaams 
question lay at the root of much of the Netherlands dealing with Belgium. 3 
Movement of families 
The shortage of accommodation in the vicinity of the internment camps and the 
increased prices and shortages in food and coal placed extra emphasis on the movement 
of families from Belgium to the Netherlands. The Germans placed restrictions on 
families leaving the occupied part of Belgium, but those from the rest of the country 
were free to move to the Netherlands. Once in the Netherlands the majority of these 
families were completely dependent on their husbands' salaries and if these 
disappeared then they would be destitute and wholly reliant on the Dutch authorities for 
their welfare. For this reason the Dutch government was no longer willing to sanction 
any further movement of families. At the end of 1916 a declaration was made to the 
effect that no more families would be allowed to move to the Netherlands unless they 
had asked for, and obtained, permission from the Dutch military prior to their move. 
" Bossenbroek, Vluchten voor de Groote Oorlog, p. 21. 
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Permission would only be granted to those families who could demonstrate that they 
had somewhere to live and adequate means of support. Those that arrived without the 
necessary permission were sent straight to a refugee camp. 
Unfortunately this decision, taken on 21 November 1916 was not widely publicised and 
families continued to arrive. The International Office of the Red Cross was 
instrumental in helping many of these families, and even they were not informed of the 
new policy until May 1917. By the summer of 1917 the problem of providing for these 
families was so acute that the commission charged with overseeing the situation 
decided that the time had come to call in the Minister of Internal Affairs directly. 
Although some special villages had already been built adjacent to the camps, 
Albertsdorp and Elizabethsdorp near Amersfoort and Leopolddorp and Heidedorp near 
Harderwijk there were still three hundred families in Amersfoort and a further one 
hundred and twenty-five in Harderwijk that were homeless. 44 Despite the change in 
official policy the Minister of Foreign Affairs refused to sanction sending them back. 
He said that to do so would be against the Dutch tradition of hospitality and that a 
solution must be found. By subsidising rents in the private sector, the organisation of 
emergency aid by the Belgian Ambassador, and by sending some families to refugee 
camps, the immediate crisis was dealt with but the ongoing problems remained. ' 
The Belgian government addressed the problem in two ways. Firstly it provided money 
for the building of new housing and secondly it increased the allowances that it paid to 
the families of servicemen. This did not give them sufficient income to live on without 
°4 De Vries, ` Nederland als Non-bellgerente Natie en de Internering van Buitenlandse Militairen 
Gedurende de Eerste Wereldoorlog', p. 103. 
45 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 1094. 
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the internee's wage but it did help ease the situation. Those internees that refused to 
work to support their families were immediately sent back to the camps. Those that 
were returned to the camps because of their own actions had all financial support for 
their families withdrawn, even housing. 
The medical care of internees' families was covered by Ministerial Decree of 23 March 
1915 (No 72) and by a later ruling in April 1916, which placed responsibility for the 
medical care of all internees' families with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 46 In May 
1917 responsibility on the ground passed back to the military when the Inspecteur der 
Volkgezondheid (Inspector of Public Health) asked the military medical services to 
take over the care of the poorest families. In the camp at Harderwijk the military was 
paid an allowance of DFI 175.00 a month and given the assistance of a Belgian doctor. 
All costs for medicine were borne by the Belgian Red Cross. 
The families that moved to the Netherlands from Belgium came almost exclusively 
from the unoccupied areas. The German authorities were very reluctant to allow any 
movement of individuals from their occupied area because of the security implications. 
Only in very exceptional compassionate circumstances were families from the occupied 
area allowed to move to the Netherlands. 
Following the wider publication of the new Dutch policy on restricting family 
migration there was a spate of escapes from the camp at Heerlen. 47 
Almost all of these were internees with families who were still in Belgium and it 
46 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 1115. 
47 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 1097. 
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highlighted one positive element of the family welfare crisis. The movement of 
families to the Netherlands resulted in fewer escape attempts being made-°B 
Religion 
Religion was an important aspect of everyday life. For those displaced by the war it had 
an even greater significance. Access to religious services was considered to be one of 
the basic provisions required for internees both by the Dutch government and the 
Churches themselves. Arrangements were made from a very early stage for all 
internees to be able to worship as they wished. For example, some of the internees in 
the British camp came from Scotland and spoke only Gaelic. A minister was brought 
over from Scotland to take services for them. 49 Anglicans were ministered to by a vicar 
who was normally based in Rotterdam, supplemented by a visiting vicar from England. 
When neither were available then a Dutch minister gave services, but as these were in 
Dutch they were poorly attended. m The Germans had services from a Protestant 
German priest who travelled from Amsterdam. 5t 
The existing churches in the Netherlands also opened their doors to the internees or 
provided celebrants who would visit the camps and hold services there. Some priests 
had entered the Netherlands from Belgium as part of the general exodus and they too 
were able to conduct services and provide pastoral care. The Catholic Church quickly 
41' Further information on the camps for families can be found in Laporte, Belgische Geinterneerden in 
Nederland Gedurende De Ferste Wereldoorlog, p. 113-118. 
°B ARA 2.05.04 box 743 nr 28088 Press clipping from Philadelphia dated 06.06.1915. 
'' LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 611. 
s` LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 630. 
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arranged for more priests to be sent to the Netherlands and, quite apart from offering 
spiritual guidance they also tried to improve the living environment of both the 
internees and the internees' families either outside of the camps or in the specially 
constructed family camps. The priests acted as negotiators, intermediaries and helped 
with more basic problems. In Den Bosch, for example, they opened a school, which 
started with 17 pupils in October 1915 but had grown to over three times the number by 
1918.52 
In reading the accounts left by many of these priests it can be construed that whilst the 
Catholic Church was keen to assist those displaced by the war, it also saw the camps as 
an opportunity to convert new members or encourage those that had lapsed to 
rediscover their faith. In the large camps they had pretty much a captive audience. Far 
from home with little to do, church services were a distraction from the daily routine if 
nothing else. In some cases, however, the arrangements required to meet the needs of 
the internees required far more effort. The handful of French officers interned on the 
island of Urk requested the services of a French-speaking priest to perform a mass for 
them. The Very Reverend Soon had to leave Oldebroek the day before the service 
(Thursday), spend the night in Kampen, get up at 5am and take a two hour boat trip in 
all weathers. He then had to wait a further two hours on Urk before the French officers 
were awake and ready for Mass. All this was then repeated in reverse so that he could 
be back in time to perform the Sunday Mass in the camp at Oldebroek. -3 
-" Bruijnseels, Het Godsdienstig ! even der Belgen in Nederland, deel 1, p. 140. 
Bruijnseels, Het Godsdienstig kven der Belgen in Nederland, deel 2, p. 54. 
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The Dutch support and tolerance with regard to political and religious activity in the 
internment camps worked very well. By refusing to ban any activity unless it either 
compromised Dutch neutrality or threatened to disrupt the good order in the camps, the 
Dutch government avoided bringing itself into direct conflict with the internees. Any 
criticism of the attempts to suppress political activity that were made by the internees 
(and this was mainly the Belgian internees) were instead directed at the home 
governments. Activities within the camps was an area over which the Dutch 
government had complete control. It could exert its authority and emphasise its neutral 
position without aggravating to any great extent the two nations that could end its 
neutrality, Britain and Germany. 
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Chapter 7, - 
Internment in a neutral country: the arrival of the 
Prisoners of War 
The mass movement of foreign troops across the Dutch borders in 1914 forced the 
Netherlands' government into a position where it was obliged, under the terms of 
international law, to house and feed some 35,000 men, plus many of their families. In 
1914 this was mainly a logistical problem for the then affluent and thriving country, 
and the government and the population of the Netherlands worked hard, and for the 
most part enthusiastically, to meet their obligations. In 1917 the Dutch government 
voluntarily offered to host a further 16,000 foreign troops as the result of a treaty 
concluded between Germany and Great Britain. This treaty allowed for the transfer of 
long-term and seriously ill POWs from captivity and into internment in the 
Netherlands. The Dutch population greeted this new influx with far less enthusiasm 
than it had the original internees. Whilst public sympathy for the individual soldiers 
remained, growing anger at the governments of the belligerent nations made many in 
the Netherlands question why, at this juncture in the war, such an undertaking had been 
entered into. In order to gauge the significance of this development in the eyes of the 
Dutch population, it is important to understand how much more intensely the European 
war was impacting on the Netherlands in 1917 in comparison to 1914. More so, 
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because this was an essentially voluntary commitment compared to the legal obligation 
to house and feed the original internees. 
After three years of conflict the war was having an undeniable effect on the 
Netherlands. The economy was caught between the British blockade and the downturn 
in trade with Germany. In addition to these restrictions, the continued presence of both 
Allied and German submarines in the North Sea also affected trade with the rest of the 
world. The mood in the country was depressed. Fuel, especially coal, was in very short 
supply and food was also rationed. For Ritter, the crises in the shipping and fishing 
industries represented the crises that the whole country faced during what he calls 'the 
fourth mobilization year'. Ritter used the example of seven Dutch merchant ships that 
were sunk on 22 February 1917 by a German submarine with the loss of twenty 
thousand tonnes of flour `while in Holland the bread ration is reduced'. He blamed not 
only the Germans, who launched the torpedo, but also the British who refused to allow 
the Dutch boats to leave the English port in sufficient time to beat the increase in 
German submarine warfare. ' 
In an effort to stop the problems of supply spiralling out of control, the Dutch 
government placed Minister Posthuma in charge of ensuring that the situation was 
handled in the most efficient manner. In September 1917 he transferred all relevant 
departments including agriculture, shipping, rationing and industry from the Ministry 
of Trade to a new department called `Crisiszaken'. Literally translated this means 
`crisis affairs'; and the name is indicative of the seriousness with which the Dutch 
government viewed their situation at the time. In addition to the existing departments 
'Ritter De Donkere Poort, p. 121 deel 2. 
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that were moved to the new ministry, a special section was created called the Bureau 
voor Mededeelingen (the Information Office). Mindful of the unrest that the economic 
problems and supply shortages was causing, the government was keen to ensure that 
the public was fully aware of the reasons why their new, often very stringent policies, 
were being imposed. Unfortunately, although efforts were made to explain why 
rationing was being imposed, (and later cut even further), this did little to deflect public 
criticism and Posthuma bore much of the brunt of this. Moeyes asserts that whilst 
Posthuma's personal integrity cannot be doubted, much of the blame for the subsequent 
crisis in supply can be laid at his door. Whilst Posthuma cannot be held responsible for 
the British and German trade policies that caused the initial problem, Moeyes does 
blame him for setting up a centralized system which was too cumbersome and crushed 
any opportunity that may have existed for spontaneous and flexible solutions, 
especially in the areas of agriculture, trade and food. 2 A valid point but one which 
neglects to consider that this new `Crisis' department was a political as well as 
economic organ. By centralizing control it was easier for the Dutch government to be 
transparent in its dealing with both sides in the conflict. It may ultimately have resulted 
in less food and coal in the shops, but it did help underline the Dutch position of 
neutrality. 
Coal was one of the big issues in 1917. Although The Netherlands had some coalmines, 
it was in no position to produce all that it required and was forced to import the rest. In 
1913 it produced only two million tonnes of the twelve million it used. 3 Supplies from 
both Britain and Germany were reduced in the early years of the war, but it was in 1917 
2 Moeyes, Buiten Schot, p. 285. 
3 Moeyes, Buiten Schot, p. 286. 
220 
with the growing economic crisis in Germany and the submarine war limiting the 
amount of coal that could be transported by sea, that the problem of coal supplies 
became such a major issue. The Dutch miners, who had left their mines in 1914 when 
the army was mobilized, were, to a large extent, replaced by interned Belgians who had 
left their own mines and joined the Belgian army following the German invasion. A 
situation not without problems, as the subsequent industrial disputes demonstrated, but 
it did mean that the Dutch were at least making the most of their own resources. To aid 
production in domestic mining, summertime was introduced in 1916 and the Catholic 
Church sanctioned working on Sundays. 4 
Unfortunately, by 1917 coal was not only used to power industry and heat homes it had 
also become a political tool. The Dutch government would not buy British coal as long 
as the British and Americans held Dutch grain ships captive in British and American 
ports. Germany would only export to Holland if it was given substantial credit in the 
Netherlands that it could use to purchase food and other essential supplies. The 
intricacies of these trade negotiations are beyond the scope of this thesis, suffice to say 
that the end result was a marked decrease in the amount of coal available for the Dutch 
domestic market. ' The Dutch people were cold and large numbers had lost their jobs, 
and therefore their incomes, when industry folded because it could not power its 
machines. They laid the blame not only on their own government, (and Posthuma in 
particular), but also on the belligerent nations. The shortage of coal impacted on the 
4 Moeyes, Buiten Schot, p. 288. 
S There are numerous works that deal with the Dutch trading position during the First World War. The 
best known is perhaps Manan, De Nederlandsche Overzee Trustmaatschappij. This is a very 
comprehensive and lengthy book. A far shorter overview can be found in Frey, Marc., 'Trade, ships and 
the neutrality of the Netherlands in the First World War', International History Review, 19, (Aug 1997), 
p. 54! -562. For the impact of the trade sanctions on the Dutch people, Smit, Nederland in de Eerste 
Wereldoorlog and Ritter, De Donkere Poort, (1931) are the most informative. 
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population in many different ways. Some schools were closed: those that were open 
were also used as places of worship as churches were notoriously difficult to heat. 
Many local councils turned off their street lighting and places such as museums greatly 
reduced their opening times .6 
If coal shortages had been the only problem, then most households would perhaps have 
been able to cope. Unfortunately, by 1917 many other basic needs were also not being 
met. In February of that year food rationing had been introduced. On production of an 
identity card obtained from the local council, coupon books were issued. Most basic 
foodstuffs such as bread, rice, sugar, coffee, meat, fat and potatoes were rationed. In 
addition to food, clothes and shoes were also rationed. As 1917 progressed the rations 
were reduced several times to the very minimum necessary. ' Although mass starvation 
was not an issue, many people were struggling to find enough to eat. In his diary on the 
1917 Hague conference Lieutenant General Sir Herbert Belfield says "After lunch -a 
somewhat skimpy meal for there is not much to eat here. It's all very different to last 
year when it was abundant and excellent". Clearly the food shortages were beginning to 
affect even the diplomatic process although it is also possible that the Dutch authorities 
were making a point by providing a `skimpy lunch'. Belfield's diaries make it quite 
apparent that meals were an important part of his day. " By early 1918 various charitable 
organisations had identified a need to assist the very poorest and the increasing number 
of homeless. Thanks to support from local businesses centrale keukens (literally 
`central kitchens') were being opened all over the Netherlands where hot meals could 
'Ritter, De Donkere Poort, p. 144 deel 2. Even the Rijksmuseum was partially closed. 
7 Oosterman, `De Interneering hier to lande' p. 831. 
8 Imperial War Museum 1651 91/44/1 HEB 1/3. p. 4. 
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be obtained for a very small sum. 9 The Koninklijke Nationaal Steuncomitc (Royal 
National Support Committee) offered to pay three quarters of the cost of these kitchens, 
provided that the food was not available free of charge. The cost to the dinners was 
small, 10 or 15 cents, but it was not free. 1° 
A cause for great concern amongst the Dutch population, and one that became 
symbolic of the growing shortages, was the potato ration. Early in 1917 Posthuma 
declared that there were sufficient potatoes in store to last until the next harvest. By the 
end of February it was clear that this was not the case. Not only were supplies being 
used up too quickly, such potatoes that were in store were not of an ideal quality. " The 
potato came to represent all that was bad about rationing. Although the government 
tried to educate the Dutch housewives to serve other things besides potatoes, it was 
such a staple of the daily diet that most were either unable or unwilling to switch to 
something different. Every bit of available land was turned over to growing potatoes, 
but still the supplies could not meet demand. Public opinion turned against the 
government when it was disclosed that much of the Dutch potato harvest was being 
sent overseas. In exchange for fuel, mainly coal, the Dutch government was sending 
Britain and Germany a quarter of the harvest each. By 1917 the German concentration 
on munitions at the cost of supplying the nation with foodstuffs was hitting home and 
the German government was anxious to import food from wherever it could be 
9 LM Q194-40 
`o Bibliotheek Nederlandsch Legermuseum Q194-40 'Eet Gij uit de Centrale Keuken? ' A short pamphlet 
concerning the provision of kitchens in Amsterdam. It is not clear who issued the pamphlet but it bears 
the crest of the Amsterdam Gemeente (Council). An interesting point is that out of some thirty-six 
distribution points for hot meals in Amsterdam, eight were designated as providing food for members of 
the Jewish faith. 
"A member of Parliament even turned up to a session with a plate of potatoes to demonstrate that their 
quality was 'no better than pig food'. Ritter p. 171. 
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obtained. 'Z In the summer of 1917 a group of Rotterdam housewives gathered at the 
docks and confiscated a cargo of potatoes that was about to be loaded onto a boat for 
England. In Amsterdam another group of housewives, unable to buy potatoes in the 
shops because only half of the required supplies had been delivered, raided an 
unguarded warehouse full of potatoes and removed everything. This was just the start 
and in a few days at the beginning of July there was general unrest, led by the women, 
and many more warehouses were plundered. Posthume eventually brought peace by 
promising regular and adequate supplies of potatoes but it was an uneasy truce. 
As more and more workers lost their jobs because of the shortage of fuel to keep the 
factories going, many found that they were unable to pay their rent. Not only was fuel 
in short supply, building materials were also scarce and this, amongst other factors, had 
resulted in a shortage of rented accommodation. In turn this had pushed rents up far 
higher than their pre-war levels. Workers who still had jobs struggled to meet the new 
prices, the unemployed stood no chance, and many ended up on the street Viewed 
against the increasing level of domestic hardship it would have been very 
understandable if the Netherlands had declined to host so many exchanged POWs. 
Background to POW Exchanges 
The idea of a neutral country volunteering to take on responsibility for sick and 
wounded soldiers from belligerent neighbours was not entirely new in 1917. The Swiss 
had been active in this area since 1914, but it was a feature of international warfare that 
12 Moeyes, Buiten Schot, p. 298 and Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, p. 349. 
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had not been even contemplated before the First World War. The idea stemmed from a 
proposal by the Swiss journalist Louis de Tscharner, who wrote on the topic in the 
Berner Tageblatt in 1913. Anticipating war, he suggested that Switzerland should offer 
to take care of an equal number of soldiers from each warring nation. Once recovered, 
these soldiers would be sent home. In return, the nations involved in the war would 
undertake to respect Swiss neutrality. 13 In 1914 the International Committee of the Red 
Cross took up the idea and proposed to Germany and France that POWs who were too 
badly wounded to take any further part in the war should be repatriated, with the Red 
Cross acting as intermediary. It took until February 1915, and the intervention of Pope 
Benedict XV, before an agreement was finally signed. "' The first exchange of prisoners 
took place on 2 March 1915. By November 1916 a total of 2,343 Germans and 8,668 
French soldiers had been exchanged. 
Efforts were now made to help POWs who, though injured or sick, were not 
permanently incapacitated and could potentially return to the front once recovered. The 
Swiss solution to this was to suggest that after treatment these soldiers would not be 
returned to their homeland, but would instead be interned in Switzerland until the end 
of the war. With the example of the internees in the Netherlands to draw upon, it was 
clear that this was a viable option. 's With an agreement on the idea in principal 
13 Speed. Richard, B., Prisoners, Diplomats and the Great War. A study in the Diplomacy of Captivity, 
(New York: Greenwood Press, 1990) p. 33. 
'4 There are several asides in the literature regarding the POW Exchange Treaties that refer to either Pope 
Benedict XV personally or one of his representatives. Unfortunately I have found little proof as to the 
scale of their involvement, influence or motivation. Given the Catholic Church's concern for the Belgian 
internees and refugees in the Netherlands, where efforts were made to strengthen the faith of existing 
Catholics and convert as many new recruits as possible, it could be surmised that this was seen as 
another method of creating a 'captive audience'. It could, however, be argued that any Catholic 
involvement was purely charitable. It is to be hoped that documents come to light in the future that can 
clarify a currently cloudy issue. 
'5 Moorehead, Dunants Dream. War, Switzerland and the Red Cross, p. 203. 
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discussions turned to the details. Which medical conditions would entitle a soldier to be 
considered for internment? Where would they be held, and under what terms? By the 
start of 1917 there were around 27,000 soldiers interned in Switzerland. Mostly French 
or German they also included an increasing number of British and Belgian troops. 16 
Both of these countries had asked to join the scheme in early 1916. " 
Co-operation with the warring nations to assist with sick and injured POW's was 
something that the Netherlands had been involved with for some time. As early as 
1915, the repatriation of severely wounded soldiers from both sides had been taking 
place via the Netherlands. 'g The Dutch government sanctioned an agreement between 
Britain and Germany, enabling German ambulance trains to enter the Netherlands and 
meet British hospital ships that had crossed to Vlissingen. Later exchanges were made 
via Rotterdam but the principles remained the same. Responsibility for administering 
these exchanges was placed with the Dutch Red Cross who appointed Jhr. Ernest van 
Loon to oversee the entire operation, with Dr. F Hymans as Chief Medical Adviser. 19 
The hospital trains would be met at the Dutch/ German border by members of the 
Dutch Red Cross, who would then travel with the sick and injured, undertaking 
complete responsibility for their care up to the port. The occupants of the train then 
swapped places with the injured that had been brought over on the British hospital ship. 
"There is a large collection of documents from the Belgian Embassy in Bern relating to the Belgian 
POWs in Switzerland now held in the MRA in Brussels. This includes many individual records of POWs 
as well as diplomatic papers. MRA Inventaris de Archieffonds 1914-18 11 Personalia boxes 17,18,19 & 
20. 
"See Favre, Edouard (ed)., L'internement en Suisse des Prisonniers de Guerre Malades ou BlessI3 
Vols, (Geneva: Georg and Cie, Libraires-Editeurs, 1917,1918 & 1919), Annet, P., 'L'intemement de 
soldats frangais en Belgique pendant to guerre de 1870'. Revue beige d'histoire militaire, Vol 28, 
(Brussels, 1990). p. 337-349. and Picot, Henry Philip,. The British interned in Switzerland, (London: 
Edward Arnold, 1919). All give an excellent insight into the internment of exchanged POWs in 
Switzerland during the First World War. 
'' Oosterman, 'De Interneering hier to lande' p. 821. De Roodt, Oorlogsgasten, p. 274. 
19 Mandere, Geschiedenis van her Nederlandsche Roode Kruis (1867-1917), p. 163. 
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The Dutch medical staff then continued to travel with their patients on the boat to 
England. At the same time their colleagues, who had escorted the invalids from Britain 
would continue their journey by train, only relinquishing their charge at the German 
border. These exchanges were to a large extent carried out in secret. In order to be 
eligible to be exchanged, an individual had to have very serious injuries; triple 
amputations were not unusual, and neither Britain nor Germany were keen for the 
conditions of their soldiers to be made public. Some journalists were invited to witness 
the exchanges, but they were for the most part kept away from the injured. Articles in 
the press emphasised the good work being done by the Red Cross rather than the 
horrific state of their patients. 
By mid 1916, however, the Dutch shipping company operating these hospital ships, the 
Maatschappij Zeeland, announced that it was no longer prepared to bear the risks that 
crossing the North Sea entailed and withdrew its ships from participating in the 
exchanges. Its place was taken by the British Great Eastern Railway Company (that 
also owned ships) and the St Denis became the new hospital ship. This new 
arrangement only lasted until February 1917, when the German announcement of an 
increase in the use of submarines made the crossings far too dangerous and they were 
effectively suspended. Nevertheless by the end of 1916 some 1,269 British and 774 
German injured had already been repatriated via the Netherlands. 20 
As well as facilitating the formal exchange of POWs, the Netherlands had always been 
willing to assist with individual exchanges on compassionate grounds, either of POWs 
or its own internees. As early as September 1914 diplomatic moves were made to 
20 Mandere, Geschiedenis van het Nederdandsche Roode Kruis (1867-1917), p. 163. 
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arrange the exchange of Belgian and German officers on compassionate grounds. 
Details are sketchy but it seems likely that they were aircrew that had been badly 
injured in crashes. 21 For example, in November 1914 Petty Officer W. H. Webb of 
Collingworth Battalion was exchanged for Oberleutenant Zur See Klein. Klein was 
injured and had been hospitalised in The Hague, Webb had a dying wife and three 
children to care for. Initially the Germans were reluctant to agree to this exchange, the 
Dutch Ambassador in Berlin writing to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in The Hague 
about the exchange says, ` the unchivalrous way in which the British have conducted 
the war does not make the German military well disposed to such sentimental 
actions'. ' 
The Hague Treaty of July 1917 
In early July 1917, a treaty was put forward between Britain and Germany allowing a 
number of POWs to be released from their current camps and transferred to the 
Netherlands, along the same lines as the existing arrangement with Switzerland. " The 
conference to negotiate the treaty was held in the Netherlands and was hosted by the 
Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs. Great Britain was represented by Lieutenant 
General Sir Herbert Belfield KCB KCMG KBE DSO, the Director of Prisoners of War 
from 1914 to 1920, and a small group of associates from Great Britain. The main 
German negotiator was Major General Friedrich. The meeting was chaired by Van 
Vredenburch, the Dutch Ambassador to Scandinavia, on behalf of the Netherlands. 
21 ARA 2.05.04 Inv 742 No 33783 Letter from Legation de Belgique to Loudon dated 18 September 
1914 
22 ARA 2.05.04 Inv 742 No 33783 Letter from the Dutch Ambassador in Berlin to the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs dated 29 November 1914. 
23 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering. p. 1059. 
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Belfield was clearly a great diarist and has left an interesting record of his impressions 
of both the Netherlands and the German negotiators. Of the Netherlands he says, `It is 
outstandingly clean - roads, houses (especially the windows, which positively shine) 
and everything; but at first sight, anyway it seems uninteresting. '" He describes 
Loudon, their host on the first night as `a charming gentleman who speaks English with 
ease'. His views of the Germans are less complimentary. `The Germans seem to be 
agreeable and with us pleasant - but who can tell? Friedrich poses as one whose heart 
bleeds for the prisoners, but one must suppose that he is largely responsible for the 
brutal treatment to which they have been subjected. `5 The Dutch efforts not to cause 
offence in any way, to either set of delegates, were apparent even from the beginning of 
the conference. The participants were seated with Britain on the left of the Dutch 
chairman and Germany on the right. This was explained by the chairman as being 
because 'Allemande precedes Grande Bretagne in the alphabet'. Similarly no 
preference was given to any language. Belfield spoke in English, Friedrich in German 
and Van Vredenburch translated. When Van Vredenburch addressed the entire meeting 
he spoke in French. 
Despite all of the efforts of the Dutch government to demonstrate their neutrality, 
Belfield clearly doubted that this was the case. He was convinced that the Germans had 
been allowed to break into the British delegation's rooms and have looked at all of their 
paperwork. He also had his doubts about Van Vredenburch, `Van Vredenburch who is 
of more than doubtful neutrality and shows his German preference, notwithstanding his 
24 Imperial War Museum 1651 91/44/1 HEB 1/1 Lieutenant General Sir Herbert Belfield diary, p. 3. 
25 Imperial war Museum 1651 91/44/1 HEB 1/1 Lieutenant General Sir Herbert Belfield diary, p. 6. 
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attempts to conceal it, at every turn'. 26 Whatever the actual position of the chairman, 
and Belfield offered no proof of his bias, the treaty negotiations proceeded fairly 
smoothly. There was a considerable amount of horse-trading, compromises were 
reached on a number of issues, not only relating to potential exchanges, but also 
dealing with all aspects of the treatment of POWs. The treaties concluded before the 
war had been signed in the expectation of POWs, but in many areas were found to be 
too vague with too many loopholes. The 1917 Hague Treaty was, in many places, quite 
specific, and was a treaty born of experience rather than expectation. It was not, 
however, the first treaty to try and match actual events with diplomatic rules. A 
previous treaty signed between Germany and France had already addressed some issues 
although, according to Belfield, with only limited success. 
We have been a good deal hampered by a previous agreement with regard to 
internment in a neutral country and exchanges concluded between France and 
Germany at Berne. This, besides being full of sentimental rubbish, was most 
favourable to Germany. The Germans are constantly referring to this agreement 
and we cannot leave it entirely. We have steadfastly refused to consider some of 
its worst features but we should have been better if it had not been concluded. 27 
Eventually, an agreement was reached that provided for some 16,000 POWs to be 
moved to a neutral country (Holland) and for all costs incurred to be reimbursed by the 
home nations. Of the 16,000 authorised to be moved, 7,500 places were reserved for 
the sick and wounded, 6,500 for officers and NCO's who had spent more than 18 
months as a POW, and the final 2,000 places were for sick civilian prisoners. Although 
this conference, and the treaty that resulted from it, were notionally to facilitate the 
26 Imperial War museum 165191/44/1 HEB 1/1 Lieutenant General Sir Herbert Belfield diary, p. 8. 
2' Imperial war museum 1651 91/44/1 HEB 1/1 Lieutenant General Sir Herbert Beileid diary, p. 11. 
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internment of POWs in the Netherlands, the actual document that was produced at the 
end covered far more. In setting down guidelines for the treatment of POWs in the 
Netherlands, this treaty effectively updated the regulations for all POWs, whether 
interned in a neutral country or held in a standard POW camp. 28 This new treaty did not 
replace the existing agreement to repatriate the very seriously injured through the 
Netherlands. The movement through The Netherlands of soldiers who were clearly too 
ill or injured ever to take any further part in the war continued. The new treaty was 
aimed at the moderately ill and injured, those who were likely to recover, and those 
who had been a POW for more than eighteen months. 
Even after having completed his negotiations, Belfield still grumbled about German 
bias, as the German delegates were able to go home immediately. The British 
delegation, however, had to wait for an opportune time to make the crossing back to 
England. Belfield was forced to spend a few days amusing himself in The Hague, 
where he visited a gallery `very fine (pictures) but the subjects are dull and I don't want 
to see them again' and the casino at Schreveningen `the most hideous I have ever had 
the misfortune to see. The Hague is a place of outstanding cleanliness, stinking canals, 
plain women, beautiful flower shops, reckless cyclists and trams. The people look as 
flat as their country'. ' 
Although the formal treaty was signed in July 1917, it would be a further five months 
before any exchanged POWs actually set foot in the Netherlands. The German and 
ffi Parry. Clive. (Ed), The Consolidated Treaty Series Vol 2241918-1919, (New York: Oceana 
Publications Inc, no date). 
29 Imperial war museum 1651 91/44/1 HEB Lieutenant General Sir Herbert Belfield diary, 1/1 p. 19. 
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British negotiators, having reached agreement in principle, then had to hammer out the 
details. Britain initially wanted to nominate Hull as the embarkation and 
disembarkation port in England, but the German delegation could not guarantee the 
safety of ships making the crossing from so far north. Eventually, they reached 
agreement on Boston on the Wash as the port to be used. Likewise, there was much 
discussion concerning the route that the hospital trains would take from Germany to 
Rotterdam. They would travel through Belgium, but had to be diverted so as not to 
interfere with troop trains heading to and from the front. 
Internment of the POWs 
This delay between the treaty being signed and the arrival of the first POWs suited the 
Dutch. In October 1914, when over a million refugees and soldiers had crossed their 
border in a matter of days, the Dutch nation had risen to the challenge. Food, clothing, 
shelter and medical attention had all been provided both swiftly and willingly. In 1914, 
just after the start of the war, Holland was not yet experiencing any major shortages, 
and public sympathy for the refugees was high. In 1917 the situation was very 
different. Although the numbers were far smaller, the Netherlanders had far fewer 
resources to draw on and public cooperation could no longer be relied on. Many 
ordinary Dutch people had little enough for themselves and their families without being 
asked to share it with another group of foreigners, especially foreigners whose 
countries were largely responsible for the shortages in the first place. 
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The Dutch moved swiftly to set up an organisation to deal with the POWs. The Swiss 
had been accommodating POW exchanges for some time and so the initial action by 
the Minister of War was to send Generaal-majoor Onnen on a fact-finding mission to 
Bern. 30 He was accompanied by two medical doctors and his instructions were to glean 
all of the information he could. The three men spent two weeks in Switzerland as the 
guest of the Swiss Army Medical Services, who were in charge of all aspects of the 
POWs' lives. On their return Onnen presented a full report to the Minister of War. This 
three man commission had been tasked with investigating five specific areas; housing, 
freedom of movement whilst reducing escape attempts, costs, community life and lastly 
measures to restrict any possible attempts to use POW exchanges as a means of 
planting spies in the Netherlands 31 
In Switzerland, all aspects concerning the care and welfare of the POWs lay in the 
hands of the Swiss Army Medical Service. This was not the way that the Dutch 
government wanted to proceed. In July 1917, Snijders had written to the Minister of 
War outlining his plans for a new organisation to oversee the care of the POWs. 
Although he envisaged a completely separate department to deal with the new arrivals, 
he still wanted to utilise the experience of internment acquired in the past three years 
by appointing Onnen as its chief, 32 Snijders was given half of what he had asked for. 
Onnen was appointed head of the new Dienst der Geinterneerde Krijgsgevangenen 
(Department for Interned Prisoners of War) but instead of being under the control of 
30 ARA 2.05.42 Inv 2 Item 800, a copy of the brief given to Onnen before embarking on his information- 
gathering trip on the internment of POWs in Switzerland, 2 July 1917. 
" ARA 2.05.04 Inv 742 No 24660. The final report of this trip can be found at ARA 2.05.42 Inv I dated 
22 July 1917. 
32 ARA 2.42.05 Inv 1 letter dated 27 July 1917. 
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the Ministry of War, and therefore Snijders himself, the new department was to come 
under the control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ' 
On Onnen's return from Switzerland, although not yet formally appointed as head of 
the new organisation, he immediately began to address the more practical problems of 
housing and feeding 16,000 new internees. The new treaty allowed for ranks below the 
rank of officer to be accommodated in barracks, but both Britain and Germany had 
expressed a wish that no new barracks were built. Instead, all those who did not require 
hospitalisation would be accommodated, where possible, in a range of private hirings. 
Advertisements were placed in national newspapers asking for details of property for 
rent, and for retired Dutch military officers to come forward and volunteer to work for 
the new department as regional commanders' 
It was decided that the POWs would be accommodated in `areas'. Different 
nationalities would be allocated accommodation in different parts of the Netherlands in 
the hope of not only spreading the burden for accommodating the POWs, but also to try 
and prevent any outbreaks of hostility between men whose countries were still at war. 
To a large extent these areas coincided with areas where internees were already in 
camps or living in the local area as part of a work group. It was not the intention of the 
Dutch authorities to mix the two groups. The Hague was associated with the British 
and Rotterdam continued to be a base for the Germans. The medical services were 
instructed to ensure that there were adequate medical facilities in these areas to deal 
with the specific needs of the two nationalities. This was to be 
33 ARA 2.05.42 Inv 1 nr 329 Letter from Foreign Affairs to Ministry of War dated 15 September 1917. 
34 ARA 2.42.05 Inv I Clippings from the NRC dated 5 August 1917. 
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achieved in close cooperation with medical officers from both Germany and England. 
One of the important differences between the establishment of facilities for the 
internees and the preparations for the POWs was the involvement of the home nations 
at every stage, especially in all matters medical 35 
Despite the time lag between the signing of the treaty and the arrival of the first POWs, 
there were still delays in providing the facilities needed by the POWs. In late December 
1917 the head of the Army Medical Corps wrote to the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
claiming that none of the medical facilities were ready, that no arrangements had been 
put in place to cover the cost of these facilities, and that this failing could be laid at 
everybody's door but his own. 6 This is perhaps an exaggeration, the Army medical 
officers were not pleased that they had not been given overall charge of the POWs in 
the same way that the Swiss Army Medical Corps had been in Switzerland. This 
dissatisfaction comes through in much of the correspondence of the time and whilst it 
would be going too far to say that the Corps was uncooperative, it does appear that it 
was less flexible and forthcoming than it might otherwise have been. As the medical 
care for those POWs that required it was left largely in the hands of medical staff from 
the home nations this ultimately had little overall effect on the level of care made 
available. 
The Information Office of the Dutch Red Cross was also heavily involved in the 
internment of POWs in the Netherlands. Just as they had with the existing internees, the 
ARA 2.13.70 No 503/11, Letter from Onnen to the head of the army medical corps dated 20 December 
1917. 
36 ARA 2.13.70 No 271, Letter from head of the Army Medical Corp to the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
dated 21 December 1917. 
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Information Office was tasked with keeping a record of all POWs, including details on 
their locations and health as well as their names ranks and units. ' This information was 
freely exchanged with the British and German information offices, as both a way of 
informing families about the well being of soldiers and also providing contact 
addresses. In fact, because under Dutch law letters to and from the Information Office 
were free from postal charges, it also became an unofficial post office. It was utilised 
not only as a means of saving the internees and their families postage costs, but also 
because the Information Office had the most up to date information on a soldiers 
whereabouts. This was especially useful for the British. One result of the increased 
danger in crossing the channel during 1918 was the length of time it could take for a 
letter posted in the UK to reach its destination in the Netherlands. The recipient of a 
letter could well have moved on. The Red Cross ensured that all mail was forwarded. It 
also, where necessary, ensured that the personal belongings of a POW were sent on to 
next of kin in the event of the death of an interned POW. 
Despite the wishes of the British and German authorities that all POWs be housed in 
private hirings, this proved difficult to organise and all servicemen below NCO rank 
were put into camps that were in essence very similar to the original internment camps. 
The officers and NCOs were, for the most part, allowed to live out in the local 
community although with restrictions on exactly where they could roam. This was 
unpopular with the local Dutch population, as housing was difficult to find and the 
influx of POWs requiring accommodation served only to increase further the already 
high rents being charged by private landlords. Many of the British and German officers 
had private incomes that meant they did not have to rely solely on their military 
7 ARA 2.05.42 Inv 2 nr 503. Letter from Minister of Foreign Affairs to Onnen dated 11 December 1917. 
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allowance and so could afford not only to rent good quality accommodation. They 
could also pay the prices demanded by the black market and ensure that they enjoyed 
the meals of meat and vegetables that ordinary Dutch citizens could not afford. 
Although the majority of the POWs were accommodated in camps they were allowed a 
lot of freedom. Indeed it was expected that all servicemen, except officers, who were 
medically fit would take up some sort of employment. This was usually assisting with 
the building and maintenance of the camps. The same problem with language applied 
for the POWs as it did for the German and British internees, very few of them spoke 
any Dutch and this restricted the type of employment that they could undertake. 
The official correspondence regarding POWs and the majority of the literature 
regarding the POW exchanges speak only of British and German POWs, and does not 
mention any of the other nationalities involved. In fact the `British' contingent included 
a large number of Australian and Canadian servicemen who, although they came under 
the overall control of the British authorities, had their own senior officers and consular 
representation to look after their interests. A separate treaty had been concluded 
between Britain and Austria that allowed for 500 Austrian and Hungarian POWs to be 
interned in the Netherlands, but this was never utilised so it is reasonable to assume that 
any Austrians who were considered eligible for exchange or internment were moved to 
the Netherlands as part of the German allocation of places. 
Not all Germans that were sent to the Netherlands for internment wanted to return to 
Germany after the war, and as signs that the end of the war might be approaching this 
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was a matter that the Dutch were keen to address. Given the large number of German 
deserters that were now crossing the border and taking up residence in the Netherlands, 
it was potentially a problem. The commander of the POW camp at Hatten wrote to 
General Onnen in July 1918 asking what he was to do with Germans who refused to be 
repatriated. In his camp, he said, there were many. -'8 Unfortunately no reply is available 
in the archives, but it was an issue that occupied the thoughts of the Dutch authorities. ' 
Not only did they have to plan for events at the end of the war but they now also had an 
increased number of Germans who were not liable for internment to deal with. The 
increasing number of German deserters who crossed the Dutch borders were being 
added to by a number of Germans who were deserting during their repatriation from 
Great Britain, or who were completing their repatriation to Germany and then 
immediately returning to the Netherlands as a legal entry rather than as a deserter. An 
example of this is the civilian Goldberg, also known as Neumann, who escaped from a 
transport ship to avoid repatriation to Germany. A police report into his whereabouts 
also included the details of Rudolf Rocker, a German POW who had been repatriated 
but who had then legally returned to the Netherlands. ' 
Discipline had been an issue with the internees that had been in the Netherlands since 
1914, but not a big one. There were numerous small breaches of discipline and the 
ongoing problem of preventing escapes, but overall discipline was not a big problem. 
The ever-decreasing number of guards is one indication of this, as is the relatively 
38 ARA 2.05.42 Inv 21 Nr 5 Letter from the commander of the POW camp at Hatten to General Onnen 
dated 08 July 1918. 
39 ARA 2.05.42 Inv 4 Nr 17 Letter from Foreign Affairs to Onnen concerning German POWs who do not 
wish to be repatriated and where they should be allowed to live in the Netherlands dated 30 May 1918. 
40 ARA 2.05.42 Inv 4 Nrs 12 & 14 dated 7 May 1918 and 8 May 1918. Correspondence regarding further 
examples of escapes by German POWs can be found at ARA 2.05.42 Inv 7 Nr 10 & 11. 
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small population of the camp at Vlissingen. This was the `prison' camp for persistent 
and more serious offenders, but its population was rarely more than 75, which out of a 
total internee population of more than 35,000, was a very small percentage. With the 
POWs this was not the case. Discipline was very much an issue, especially amongst the 
British. Infringements of the rules varied from minor issues, such as the refusal by 
some British officers to salute officers of the Dutch military (as they were supposed to), 
to drunken brawls in the middle of Dutch towns. As a result of the constant breaches of 
discipline the camps at Urk and Wierickerschans were re-opened. Urk was for serial 
escapees and more serious offenders, Wierickerschans was clearly intended to be a 
drying out clinic for alcoholics, where the emphasis was on care and cure rather than 
punishment. ' To relieve the pressure on the Dutch authorities, a special detachment of 
the British military police was sent to The Hague specifically to deal with discipline 
problems. 42 Discipline was not only an issue amongst the British. The commander of 
the German camp at Hatten requested the building of a separate camp for `disruptive' 
POWs. He was concerned not only about the high number of escape attempts, but also 
an outbreak of thieving amongst the POWs ' Eventually Onnen issued an order to the 
German POWs making it quite clear that those POWs who attempted to escape would 
be sent back to England. ' 
Despite the hard line taken with escapees, the Dutch government claimed that it had no 
responsibility to prevent the interned POWs escaping. In response to a query from the 
4' ARA 2.05.42 Inv 2 nr 821 and ARA 2.05.42 Inv 9 nr 1. Instructions from Onnen regarding the day-to- 
day regime at Wierickerschans. 
42 ARA 2.05.42 Inv 20 nr 2. Letter from the Chief of Police in The Hague to the Minister of Justice dated 
16 March 1918. 
' ARA 2.05.42 Inv 6 nr 4 Letter from Commander of the internment camp at Hattem to Onnen dated 29 
April 1918. 
44 ARA 2.05.42 Inv 4 nr 14 dated 8 May 1918. 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the issue of whether the law relating to 
internees also applied to the POWs, Onnen replied that it did not and that no new laws 
were required because as part of the original treaty, both Britain and Germany had 
undertaken to return any escaped POWs and all other offences would be dealt with 
under existing civilian or military law. 45 
The POWs benefited in many ways from the Dutch experience with internment during 
the first years of the war: one of the more significant advantages they enjoyed was the 
immediate assumption that they should be given access to education. As with the 
internees, this ranged from basic literacy and numeracy lessons to university education. 
The emphasis for many was on learning skills that could be used once the war was 
over, and, as an end to the fighting was now a possibility, many were motivated to 
acquire new skills and qualifications. Both Germany and Britain sent over instructors 
when none could be found either locally or amongst the POWs. For those, usually 
officers, who had started a university course before the war, provision was made for 
them to complete their study at a Dutch university. " The only restriction was regarding 
location on security grounds. German students, for example, were diverted away from 
studying at Utrecht University because of its proximity to the Dutch waterline. ' British 
students were allowed to attend Utrecht University but their movements were restricted 
and they were required to wear uniform at all times. 48 
45 ARA 2.05.42 Inv 1 nr 287 Letter from Minister of Foreign Affairs to Onnen dated 13 September 1917 
and Onnen's reply dated 13 November 1917. 
46 Delft, the Dutch technical university was especially popular. ARA 2.05.42 Inv 4 nr 40 List of German 
students proposing to study at Delft in he academic year 1918/19 
47 ARA 2.05.42 Inv 4 nr 7 Briefing dated 06.04.1918. Also ARA 2.05.42 Inv 4 nr 26, April 1918. 
48 ARA 2.05.42 Inv 2 nr 810 Letter from the military commander in Utrecht to Onnen dated 6 March 
1918. 
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The Dutch authorities had already encountered problems in finding adequate 
accommodation for the families of internees who had been in the Netherlands since 
1914. As more and more of the (mostly Belgian) internees found work outside the 
camps, more of their families travelled to join them in the Netherlands. To a certain 
extent this problem solved its self. If an internee was working, and remained in 
employment, then he was in a position to provide for his family and they did not 
become a burden on the state. Even so, in 1917, as the shortages of both food and 
accommodation became more of an issue, the government was forced to place a ban on 
any more families entering the Netherlands. Poor communication and lack of any 
effective deterrent meant that the flow of families of internees into the country did not 
stop, but it did slow to a more manageable level. As far as the POWs were concerned, 
the Dutch government wanted to discourage any families moving to the Netherlands on 
a permanent basis. Even visits, which were allowed, were to be restricted because of 
the food and housing shortages. " The Germans had a big advantage because they could 
easily enter the Netherlands. The British had further to travel and, even if families 
could find a place on a ship, they ran the risk of being attacked by German submarines. 
German families were so keen to see their loved ones that many travelled to Rotterdam 
to meet the hospital ships as they docked. '' Although the Dutch did all they could to 
discourage the families of POWs from entering the Netherlands, once there, they were 
allowed to stay, without their husbands incurring any penalty. 5t The government would 
not, however, take any responsibility for finding accommodation for these families. In 
March 1918, the military commander in The Hague wrote to Onnen confirming that no 
49 ARA 2.05.42 Inv 22 nr 6, Letter from Foreign Affairs to Baron Gevers (a member of the Dutch 
Government) concerning plans by the German government to arrange for visits by POW families dated 
27 April 1918. 
'0 ARA 2.05.42 Inv 4 nr 30. Letter from Rotterdam area commander to Onnen dated 29 August 1918. 
5' ARA 2.05.42 Inv 4 nr 45 Letter from Minister of Foreign Affairs to Onnen dated 12 November 1918. 
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houses had been hired for use by the families of POWs? The Dutch government stated 
that even those families that were given official permission to move to the Netherlands 
would not be allowed to live with their husbands. This clearly affected the lower ranks 
more than the officers. Officers who had given their promise not to escape, especially 
those with private incomes, could make their own arrangements and would be allowed 
to live with their family. -3 
Another solution to the problem of families visiting the Netherlands was to allow the 
POWs to return home on visits. This was initially only when there was a clear 
compassionate need, if either the wife or children of a POW were at risk of death, but 
as such a large number took advantage of this regulation it must be assumed that the 
provision of compassionate leave was abused and that the Dutch were complicit in this 
abuse. -s' It was not uncommon for internees to be given extend leave to return home 
permanently when exceptional circumstances required it. For example, a number of 
British officers that came originally from the colonies spent most of their internment in 
locations as diverse as New Zealand, Canada and Kenya. A frequent reason was the 
need to return home to run the family business or farm following the death of a father 
or elder brother. As they were not going to be participating in the war, and had made a 
promise to that effect, then approval was given. Eventually, all internees and interned 
POWs were given the right to return home for visits, regardless of whether there was a 
compassionate reason or not. This was not an option for Belgian internees whose 
52 ARA 2.05.42 Inv 2 nr 750 Letter from Commander of the Hague area to Onnen 23 March 1918. 
-l' ARA 2,05.42 Inv 2 nr 751Letter from Onnen to Hauptmann von Scheven, representing the German 
Minister of War, dated 12 February 1918. 
-14 ARA 2.05.42 Inv 2 nr 652 Letter from Foreign Affairs to Onnen dated 28 January 1918. 
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homes were in the occupied part of Belgium, even for those in the unoccupied part, 
getting past the German wire fence made home visits difficult if not impossible. 
Throughout the period during which POWs were interned in the Netherlands, there was 
an undeclared aim to enable as many men to be repatriated as possible. Just as the 
medical criteria for eligibility for internment were gradually relaxed, so were the 
guidelines for establishing who should be interned and who could be sent directly 
home. For example, in June 1918 the British agreed to a German proposal that all 
former civilian POWs, of whatever nationality, who were interned in the Netherlands 
and who were over 45 years of age, should be immediately repatriated., " All POWs that 
were under medical care in the Netherlands were constantly monitored, and many were 
allowed to go home. The Dutch were especially keen to repatriate those with mental 
illnesses, as there were only limited resources available to treat these conditions in the 
Netherlands. 
Just as the living conditions for the Dutch population deteriorated during 1918, then the 
same happened to the POWs. The Dutch government refused offers of extra coal and 
food from Britain and Germany that was intended for use by the POWs as this, it was 
felt, would cause friction between the POWs and the Dutch people. Instead the POWs 
were placed on the same rations as the Dutch population. The British government was 
not pleased and requested that the POWs be given the same rations as the Dutch 
military (which were more generous) but this request was refused. 
, `ARA 2.05.42 Inv 4 nr 24 dated 25 June 1918. 
-" ARA 2.05.42 Inv 2 nr 630. Letter from Major General Williams of the British POW department to 
Onnen dated 16 Jan 1918 and Onnen's reply dated 17 January 1918. 
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Although the Dutch government had agreed to take upwards of 16,000 POWs, they did 
not ever reach the maximum. Constant revision and downgrading of the regulations for 
full repatriation meant that many who would have been interned in the Netherlands 
now met the less stringent repatriation criteria and went straight home. 
With the experience of three years of internment to call on, the organisation and 
execution of the plans to house and feed the POWs went very smoothly. The British 
and German governments had always been very co-operative and supportive of Dutch 
efforts regarding the internment of their countrymen, and this attitude was carried 
forward into the situation with regard to the POWs. If anything, the home nations were 
overly generous in their support. The Dutch government was put into the position of 
having to refuse extra supplies of food and fuel that were meant for the POWs because 
they did not want the POWs to be seen to be enjoying a better standard of living than 
ordinary Dutch citizens. 
The destruction of much of the Dutch archives during World War Two means that it is 
difficult to establish what the Dutch motivation was for entering into an agreement to 
accept exchanged POWs at this stage in the war. The problem of a lack of official 
documentation is compounded by the tendency of Dutch politicians and diplomats not 
to leave a record of their years in office by publishing memoirs or even leaving their 
personal papers for posterity. It must be seen as significant then, that those few who did 
leave a memoir of some sort, (and prominent amongst these is Bosboom, the Minister 
of War), gave little or no attention to the POW exchanges. Even Ritter, who 
commented on all aspects of Dutch life during the war allocates less than half a page to 
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the Treaty Conference. ' It is possible to assume that the 1917 treaty was seen as 
merely a natural extension of the already existing agreements regarding the exchange 
of wounded prisoners through Dutch territory. Who made the initial approach to the 
Dutch government to extend their aid to POWs is unclear. Indeed, it may have been a 
Dutch initiative. The treaty between Germany, Belgium and France, signed in 1915, 
which allowed for exchanged POWs to be accommodated in Switzerland was brokered 
for the most part by the Pope's representative in Switzerland. Given Papal interest in 
POWs and the strength of the Catholic Church in the Netherlands it is possible to 
surmise, (but not to prove), that there was Vatican involvement in this treaty. Other 
theories have been put forward. One theory that occurs frequently in literature 
concerning the POWs is that the Netherlands entered into the agreement in exchange 
for increased supplies of coal. I can find no substantiation for this theory at all, and 
given that the Dutch government actually refused additional coal meant for the POWs, 
I find it hard to accept. A more plausible alterative is that put forward by Klinkert, that 
the initial impetus came from the Norwegian businessman F. E. Steen'' This theory is 
supported (albeit somewhat tenuously) by the fact that the Dutch chose one of their 
ambassadors to Scandinavia, Van Vredenburch, as the chairman for the treaty 
conference, 
There are obvious reasons why the chance to undertake the role of a humanitarian 
neutral might appeal to the Dutch government, but it was perhaps the identity of the 
two countries involved that contributed to the Dutch willingness to become involved. 
In dealing with Great Britain and Germany, the Netherlands knew that it would be 
5' Ritter, De Donkere Poort, Deel II p. 206. 
Klinken, `Internering van vreemde mititairen', P. 2448. 
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dealing with governments who could, and would, deliver on any of the requirements 
that the Dutch might make both in terms of money and materials. Had Belgium been a 
prospective signatory to the treaty, then the Netherlands may well have been less 
willing to participate. The Belgian support for their existing internees was patchy at 
best and non-existent in many instances. Belgium was not in a position to provide 
material help in 1917 and might not, after the war, be in a position to repay any 
expenses incurred by the Dutch. The Dutch had already extended a large amount of 
credit to Belgium and may well have wanted to limit its exposure. Switzerland, which 
had been accommodating Belgian POWs since 1915 clearly held similar views and sent 
Belgium a monthly bill. It was not prepared risk losing money by keeping an open tab 
pending the end of the war. ' 
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Chapter 8 
Going Home 
Only one day after the armistice, the British ambassador in The Hague wrote to the 
Dutch government declaring that, as the war was now over, all treaties concerning the 
POWs interned in the Netherlands and Switzerland were no longer valid. He therefore 
requested that all British POWs should immediately be released and allowed to return 
home. To this end the British proposed to send five ships to collect the approximately 
5,000 British and Commonwealth men currently interned in the Netherlands. ' The 
Dutch were in complete agreement. They had no wish to detain internees for any longer 
than was strictly necessary in order to make appropriate arrangements for their 
transport home. On 15 November 1918 the first British internees and POWs embarked 
for the short trip home. ' The Dutch authorities took the British declaration of the 
invalidity of the internment treaties to mean that they now also had no obligation to 
intern any German servicemen, and they too were released in the week following the 
armistice. ' Their journey home was considerably easier as they had no sea to cross. 
Some, and it is hard to estimate how many, when released from internment opted not to 
go back to Germany but remained in the Netherlands. 
' LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 1528. 
2 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 1531. 
3 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 1533. 
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Even with the recent addition of the POWs, the number of German and British 
internees was, compared to the Belgians, relatively small. The return of the Belgian 
internees was complicated by the fact that a significant area of Belgium was still 
occupied by the Germans, albeit Germans that were heading homeward themselves. 
Consequently, although no longer under an obligation to intern the Belgians, the Dutch 
Minister of Foreign Affairs wanted to wait for agreement from the Belgian government 
before activating the plans for sending the Belgians home. These plans had been drawn 
up in 1917 in anticipation of the end of the war and allowed for a systematic, but 
gradual, clearance of all of the camps. The internees were to be transported to the 
Belgian border by a fleet of trains. The general principle was that those who were not 
employed in the Netherlands would be sent home first, so as not to leave Dutch 
industry suddenly short-handed. " The work groups would then be gradually 
withdrawn back to the camps, and they would then depart for Belgium from there. The 
internees would travel home alone; families were to be sent along later. 
The first trains for Belgium left the Netherlands on 2 December 1918. The Dutch 
government picked the date of 15 December 1918 as the point from which it would 
cease to have any financial responsibility for the internees. Any that remained in the 
Netherlands after that date would have to look to the Belgium government to provide 
s them with money to live on. The planning for the return of the Belgians was very 
detailed. Specific orders had been prepared dealing with everything from exactly how 
much luggage each man was allowed to take with him, to what would happen to the 
dirty sheets after the camps had been vacated (they were taken into store in Woerden). 
4 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 1529. 
S De Vries, `Nederland als Non-beligerente Natie en de Internering van Buitenlandse Militairen 
Gedurende de Eerste Wereldoorlog' p. 105. 
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The families of the internees were also sent back by train starting on 21 December 
1918 and continuing through the Christmas period. All of the families were initially 
transported to a resettlement centre in Antwerp. ' 
Not all internees were able to travel home immediately. Special arrangements had to be 
made for the seventy or so prisoners who were currently being held in the military 
prison at Vlissingen. They were escorted home under armed guard and handed over to 
the appropriate authorities in their own country. A larger group that also needed special 
attention was the internees who were too ill to travel. They remained in the Netherlands 
until appropriate arrangements could be made. For some this meant a long delay. In 
February 1919 there were still twenty Belgians under the care of the Dutch Army 
Medical Services and a further forty Belgians had to wait until June 1919 before they 
were transferred to the military mental hospital in Selzaete, to the north of Gent. ' 
Not only men had to be returned. During the course of the war the Dutch had also 
interned a large amount of equipment. Some had been taken over by the Dutch military 
and the cost of this equipment was offset against internment costs. Some was 
prohibited by the terms of the peace settlement from being returned, such as the 
German aircraft and warships, but the majority had to be sent back. The Allies were 
keen to get their property and the Dutch wanted to clear out the hangers and sheds they 
had been using for storage to make room for their own equipment now that the 
mobilisation was over. 8 Germany, Britain, France and America had their equipment 
returned during 1919. The Belgian material was returned in 1920. Horses had also been 
6 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 1550. 
7 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 1574. 
$ LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 1576. 
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interned and had themselves generated further internment costs. These horses were all 
German and 14 were still alive at the end of the war and were returned. As the Dutch 
military had made good use of them during the war at the cavalry training centre it was 
agreed that the bill of Dft 36,214.01 for their upkeep would be waived. 9 Any equipment 
that could not be returned or was not wanted was put up for sale. 
The Savings and Canteen Funds 
Over the four years of the war, the internees that had been in full-time employment had 
been required to pay a proportion of their wages into a savings fund. Following the 
armistice the returning internees expected that their proportion of the fund would be 
paid out very swiftly. For many this was their only source of income and was needed to 
re-establish themselves in Belgium. Unfortunately the planned distribution did not take 
place as quickly as both the Dutch and Belgium authorities would have liked. 
The initial difficulties were caused by the abandonment of the fund administration by 
the group of Belgian internees who were responsible for the daily bookkeeping. Their 
understandable haste to get home left the Dutch with no one to actually administer the 
fund. '° When the Belgian government's complaints about delays in the distribution 
prompted a Dutch government enquiry, it became apparent that the abrupt departure of 
the Belgian bookkeepers was only one aspect of the problem; there were also serious 
irregularities in the way that the fund had been managed. The Dutch officer in charge 
of the fund was disciplined, but there was little doubt that the irregularities were down 
9 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 1579. 
1° LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 1602 
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to his incompetence rather than any attempt at fraud. " This investigation, and efforts to 
correct matters, took time and by May 1919 only 6,500 Belgians had received any sort 
of payment, an amount totalling Dfl 2,430,164. The problem was exacerbated by the 
number of Belgians who had not waited for the official transport back to Belgium and 
had simply left. These internees had not been issued with the correct identity papers 
with which to claim their share of the fund. The official government account of 
internment, Geschiedenis der Interneering, devotes a lot of space to this issue. It was 
clearly an embarrassment to the Dutch government and they wanted to make it clear 
that, although somewhat belatedly, the fund had been distributed correctly. Very 
precise details are given about what was paid out and to whom. Despite all of this, a 
sum of Dfl 12,688 was left after everyone had been paid. This money was quietly 
absorbed into the Dutch army fund. Over a thousand Belgians claimed that they had not 
been paid all that they were due, but as a condition of receiving any money was that 
recipients had to sign a form saying that they agreed with the amount paid and would 
make no further claim on the Dutch government, there was little that they could do. 12 
The issue of what to do with the profits from the various camp canteens had been 
addressed during the war, but never really resolved. Great Britain took the initiative by 
asking that the British share of the money be sent directly to an orphanage in 
Portsmouth. Germany followed suit and also directed its share of the money to a 
worthy cause. The Belgian government, beyond agreeing that their share would also go 
to a charitable organization, could not make up its mind which one. The money was put 
on deposit in The Hague as a temporary measure but when the matter dragged on 
" LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 1603. 
12 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 1615. 
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beyond the limit of the Dutch governments patience the money was simply transferred 
to the Belgian government to deal with as they saw fit. 13 
Conclusion 
In his book The Theory and Practice of Neutrality in the Twentieth Century, Ogley 
poses the question that, if one accepts that it is better to abolish war than to legislate 
around it, does that therefore mean that neutrality, or nonalignment, is necessarily a 
betrayal of world order? This is a question that was certainly being asked about the 
European neutrals, both during and after the First World War. Ogley argues that the 
validity of neutrality as a stance depended on the nature of the war. In a conflict where 
there is a main aggressor, seen as a threat to world peace, he asserts that neutral or non- 
aligned countries can be regarded as traitors to the common good. Conversely, in 
conflicts between two equal aggressors, then being neutral or non-aligned can be 
construed as aiding the common good. 14 During World War One the Netherlands found 
itself being criticized for remaining neutral during a time of international conflict, 
especially in the latter half of the war. Unfortunately, the Dutch status as a trading 
nation did not help this view. The Dutch were seen by some as not only evading their 
international responsibilities but also as making a profit out of it. 15 The entry of the 
USA into the war and Woodrow Wilson's emotive speech to the US Congress decrying 
neutrality in order to justify Ameri ca's entry into the war, did little to help the Dutch 
reputation. For the Dutch themselves, however, although this was a world war, their 
concern was with the two aggressors flanking its borders. Sandwiched between Great 
13 LM Geschiedenis der Interneering, p. 1594. 
t4 Ogley, The Theory and Practice of Neutrality in the Twentieth Century. p. 6 
in the first three years of the war there was an element of truth in this. The profits from Dutch industry 
increased significantly. Kossman, De Lage Landen, p. 34 & 35 and Van Dijk, The Netherlands Indies and 
the Great War, 1914-1918, p. 619 
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Britain and Germany theirs was a more local war and the stance taken fits rather neatly 
with the second of Ogley's justifications for neutrality, that of a nation caught between 
two equal aggressors. 
The Netherlands was never going to be able to achieve the detached aloofness of the 
other European neutral countries simply because of its geography. Its proximity to the 
battlefields and the importance of its rivers and seaports meant that it was always far 
too valuable to both sides in the conflict to be simply left in peace. Switzerland and the 
Scandinavian neutrals were much better located to limit the impact of the war on their 
populations and as such they could afford to take a more rigid line when faced with 
demands from the belligerent nations, but even they faced measures that greatly 
reduced their sovereignty and self determination. As f rvik has said; 
The small neutral countries were not given much choice as to the maintenance 
of their neutrality. Squeezed, battered and beaten from both sides, they were 
compelled to do what was expedient, rather than what was desirable from their 
own point of view. But all neutrals did not submit to the same extent. Their 
actual bargaining power became the decisive factor in their gradual submission 
to the belligerent pressure. The weaker they were, the greater was their 
humiliation. 16 
Indeed f rvik claims that the Scandinavian countries were in fact un-neutral. Despite 
their wish to remain unaffected by the war, their inability to resist the pressures applied 
by the belligerents (through lack of force rather than lack of will) meant that they were 
in fact participants in the conflict, albeit non-fighting ones. " The Dutch position of 
neutrality from 1914 to 1918 was also not perfect. Despite all of the efforts made by the 
16 Q rvik , The Decline of Neutrality 
1914-1941, in Ogley, The Theory and Practice of Neutrality in the 
Twentieth Century, p. 87 
"0rvik, The Decline of Neutrality 1914-1941, in Ogley, The Theory and Practice of Neutrality in the 
Twentieth Century, p. 95 & 96. 
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government to adhere completely to international law, many compromises had to be 
made over the four years of the war and the population certainly ended up more than a 
little colder and hungrier than it wanted to be. Kossman, considering these 
compromises, rather aptly describes Dutch foreign policy during the war years as 
`supple and sober'. 18 
In August 1914 very few of those qualified to make an informed judgement would have 
given the Netherlands a realistic chance of surviving four years of European war whilst 
still maintaining a position as a neutral. The Dutch Commander-in-Chief, General 
Snijders, looking at the Dutch position at the start of the war from a purely military 
viewpoint certainly had no confidence in the official policy of neutrality. 19 Many of the 
1914 Dutch cabinet, although publicly supporting the government's neutral stance, 
were in private debating the relative merits of an alliance with either Britain or 
Germany. 20 In November 1918, therefore, the Dutch government could be forgiven a 
certain smugness for having maintained Dutch neutrality and thus avoided both of the 
main fears from 1914; the need to send its troops into battle to defend its borders 
against an invading army or being forced into an alliance with one or other of the 
warring factions. Either one of these options would have destroyed the longstanding 
Dutch policy of neutrality. Unfortunately for the Dutch, however, there was very little 
" Kossman, De Lage Landen, p. 32. 
19 Snijders repeated his request that the Netherlands formally align itself with one or other of the 
belligerents (preferably Germany) throughout the war. His requests were always refused. Kossman, De 
Lage Landen, p. 31 
20 An attempt was made to reflect the decision of the Dutch cabinet in 1914 as a mathematical model and 
to use this as a basis for predicting the policy of neutrality. The conclusion was that the outcome could 
not be predicted, not because the sympathies of the individuals could not be determined but because ` the 
probability of the outcome determines the choice of strategy'. Gallhofer, I. N. and Saris, W. E., 'Strategy 
choices of foreign policy: Decision makers: The Netherlands 1914', The journal of Conflict and 
Resolution, Vol 23 issue 3, (1979), p. 425-435. 
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chance that at the end of 1918 they could revert to their pre-war status as if the war had 
never happened. 
Whilst the Dutch government could celebrate retaining its neutral position, it could not 
claim that the Netherlands had been unaffected by the war. As Abbenhuis has said; 
The Great War challenged and impeded upon many of the concerns which 
neutrality was suppose to safeguard for the Dutch, including their economic 
stability, sovereignty, defence and security. " 
Certainly the Netherlands in 1918 was not the vibrant, economically flourishing 
country that it had been in 1914. International trade was conducted largely according to 
the whim of the British and German governments and as a result the Dutch population 
was hungry. Food rationing was a daily necessity and the scarcity of fuel meant many 
had lost their jobs because factories could no longer afford to operate. A lack of 
building materials and the subsequent housing shortages resulted in increasing numbers 
that were either homeless or paying exorbitant rents. The need to mobilize the army 
had meant that, even with the generous rules on home leave, many families had spent 
the entire war apart as husbands, sons and brothers were conscripted in an attempt to 
maintain the charade that the Netherlands was capable of defending its own borders. 
And yet, for all of the misery endured by the Dutch population during the later years of 
the war, and despite the many compromises that the Dutch government was forced to 
make to both sides in the conflict in order to maintain the often very precarious status 
of neutrality, there is one undeniable fact that underscores the Dutch decision to remain 
at Abbenhuis, The Art of Staying Neutral, p. 261 
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neutral at any cost. When the war ended and the Dutch troops were demobilized they 
all went home. Unlike the belligerents in the war, the Netherlands did not have to 
endure the grief of a missing generation. Dutch women did not have to face the 
prospect of a life without marriage because so many potential husbands had been left 
on some foreign battlefield and the country could look forward to an economic 
recovery built on the back of a full workforce. 
The question that now needs to be asked is how did the Netherlands manage to remain 
neutral? Was it down to the political savvy of the Dutch government and the deterrent 
posed by the Dutch military or was it simply that the belligerents allowed the 
Netherlands to remain neutral? It is arguable that a neutral Netherlands was of more 
use to both Britain and Germany than a Netherlands that was occupied by either one of 
them. At any time during the four years of the war either of the two main belligerents 
could have decided to end Dutch neutrality. That said, there were good reasons why the 
Netherlands could realistically hope that this would not happen. In general terms, 
Britain, who had entered the war as a result of the violation of Belgian neutrality, 
would have found it hard to justify ignoring the Dutch declarations of neutrality merely 
to further its own war aims. In order for Britain to send its troops over the Dutch 
borders the Germans would have had to have made the first move, or at the very least 
there would have had to have been undeniable evidence that they were about to attack. 
Germany, on the other hand, had altered its original plan, the Schlieffen Plan, in order 
to avoid entering the Netherlands on its way to Belgium and France. The reasons for 
this major alteration in German battle plans were still sound. A further front would 
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have stretched German resources too far and they would have lost an important trading 
partner that would have been at worst neutral and at best pro-German. 
Abbenhuis has argued that whilst the Dutch military deterrent was sufficient to prevent 
an attack by Germany in 1914, this decreased as the war progressed. " Likewise, the 
economic reasons for the belligerents to promote Dutch neutrality in 1915 and 1916 
had also waned by 1917. Abbenhuis asserts that the Netherlands geo-strategic position 
remained the belligerent's only consistent reason for respecting Dutch neutrality for the 
entire war. 23Moyes, who agrees that the Netherlands owed its neutrality to the decision 
of the belligerents not to invade, rather than to the Dutch ability to determine its own 
fate, places more emphasis on the economic importance of a neutral Netherlands, 
especially for Germany. He calls the Netherlands the `air pipe' for German trade, the 
link that prevented a complete blockade on German trade by the Allies. " 
The Dutch government was well aware that the precarious situation it found itself in 
could change very swiftly. It knew that in times of war both Britain and Germany paid 
only lip service to prevailing international law and would, if the need arose, have had 
no hesitation in ignoring it. As a result, the Netherlands adopted a policy of active 
diplomacy in order to protect itself. From the very beginning of the conflict the 
Netherlands government was willing to compromise and adapt in order to protect its 
neutral status. This was most evident in its trading relations with the belligerents. The 
imposition of trade controls by the British government was a clear infringement of the 
22 For a view on the Dutch army's ability to provide an adequate deterrent along the border with 
Germany see Klinkert, W., `Verdeding van de zuidgrens, 191419', Militaire Spectator, 156,0987) p. 213- 
219 & 250-257. 
23Abbenhuis, The Art of Staying Neutral, p261. 
Moeyes, Buiten Schot, p. 272-273 
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Netherlands' autonomy, but by insisting on transparency, so that the trading restrictions 
could be seen to be affecting trade with both sides equally, the Dutch used the British 
interference to their advantage. In the later years of the war the Dutch population 
endured the hardship of both food and fuel shortages because their government would 
not compromise its neutrality by accepting supplies from either Britain or Germany if it 
felt that those supplies could be in any way construed as being the basis for a 
diplomatic as well as financial agreement. 
It can be argued, however, that the Dutch willingness to compromise over trade was not 
a brilliant diplomatic move but simply a necessary reaction to a situation that was well 
beyond their control. The British navy was quite capable of inhibiting Dutch trade; 
indeed it was entirely capable of stopping all traffic to and from Dutch ports. Likewise 
the impact of the increase in German submarine activity from 1917 onwards did restrict 
the Dutch ability to ply their trade at will, even though the Germans were not 
specifically targeting Dutch shipping. Had they wished to, the Germans could also have 
closed down all Dutch ports. Similarly, should they have wanted to, the Germans had 
the added advantage of also controlling land and river access to the Netherlands. Whilst 
economic considerations were certainly key to the preservation of Dutch neutrality, 
especially in the earlier part of the war, as Abbenhuis points out, much of the 
Netherlands ability to trade had disappeared by 1917 and this weakened the case for the 
belligerents respecting the Dutch position simply to ensure a steady supply of goods. 25 
Dutch diplomacy was, arguably, its only consistent and realistic defence against a 
potential attack from one of the belligerents and internment provided an excellent 
25 Abbenhuis, The Art of Staying Neutral p. 261. 
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opportunity for increased diplomatic activity. Unfortunately it also distracted a 
proportion of the already inadequate Dutch military away from their primary function. 
The need to guard camps and police sensitive areas placed under the emergency 
measures of Staat van Beleg or Staat van Oorlog did uphold the credibility of the 
Netherlands as a neutral state, but at the same time, such activities reduced the army's 
effectiveness as potential deterrent along the Dutch borders. 
In complying with the new regulations concerning the internment of foreign soldiers 
the Netherlands achieved two things. Firstly, it underscored its position as a neutral. 
By scrupulously upholding the terms of the 1907 treaty with regard to internment it 
made a very public reaffirmation of the status of that treaty and the international laws 
that, it hoped, would ensure that the Netherlands neutrality was respected. As the host 
for the 1907 Peace Conference, the importance of the Netherlands as a neutral nation of 
standing was also tied up in the status of the treaty. If it failed, then the standing of the 
Netherlands would also be reduced and it would be considered as just another small 
European neutral. Secondly, the internment of soldiers from both sides of the conflict 
gave the Netherlands a reason to maintain strong diplomatic contact with both sides of 
the conflict, on terms that it could control. Unlike the diplomatic talks over trade, this 
was an area in which the Dutch held all of the cards and could, to a large extent, dictate 
the policy. As Ogley has said, `Survival, for neutrals is not merely a question of 
dissuading any belligerent from invading: it is also a question of resisting demands that 
are not compatible with neutrality. 26 
Ogley, The Theory and Practice of Neutrality in the Twentieth Century, p. 16 
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When war broke out in the summer of 1914 the Dutch were not expecting to be forced 
to intern so many foreign soldiers. During the initial mobilisation of the Dutch army, no 
thought was given to allocating any troops for guarding duties. It was only when the 
first trickle of Belgian and German troops crossed the border that any attention was 
given to the issue of internment. The first few internees, apart from testing the existing 
laws concerning internment, were of little diplomatic significance. The numbers were 
small; it was no great hardship to the Dutch to provide internment and no great loss in 
terms of manpower to either of the nations whose troops were interned. The sinking of 
the British ships the Hogue, Cressy and Aboukir in September 1914 provided the first 
indication that the diplomatic ramifications of internment could be significant for the 
Netherlands. The initial internment and then later release of the surviving British crew 
was a legal, political and humanitarian success for the Dutch government. The 
government was able to capitalise on the bravery and quick thinking of its merchant 
marine in saving so many of the sailors from the three sinking ships. The Dutch 
presented themselves as a neutral power willing to rush to the assistance of anyone in 
need, regardless of nationality. At the same time, by interning the survivors, they 
showed themselves to be a nation standing firm to the dictates of international law, 
unwilling to be swayed by mere sentiment or compassion. The swift release of the 
sailors once the government had had the chance to fully consider the legal situation 
only reaffirmed this position, especially as the sailors were released against the wishes 
of Germany. This incident, so early in the war, provided the Dutch with the means of 
underscoring their position as a country that would not favour either of the belligerent 
parties but would only act according to the law. In considering this, however, it should 
260 
also be noted that neither Britain nor Germany were likely to go to war over such a (for 
them) minor issue. 
Had there not been the influx of so many internees following the fall of Antwerp in 
October 1914, then the impact of internment as a tool for promoting Dutch neutrality 
would have been very limited. Both sides had more to worry about than the fate of a 
few soldiers whose incompetence at map reading resulted in their internment. The 
internment of around 35,000 troops, however, upped the stakes quite considerably. The 
Dutch were fortunate that the proportion of nationalities involved facilitated the 
diplomatic approach that was best suited to supporting a position of neutrality. The 
bulk of the internees were Belgian, and not only had the Belgian government very little 
interest in their welfare, it was also in no position to take any action against the 
Netherlands even if it was unhappy with the treatment its troops received. The numbers 
of British and German troops were far smaller, and therefore far easier to manage, but 
the diplomatic potential was far greater. The presence in the Netherlands of both British 
and German internees had two advantages. Firstly it allowed for new diplomatic 
channels to be opened and to be kept open. No matter what else was happening 
between either the Netherlands and Germany or the Netherlands and Great Britain, 
neither of the two home nations could be seen to be abandoning troops that they had 
very publicly declared to have the same status as POWs. For the Dutch, the second 
advantage was that it could use these new diplomatic channels to promote its neutrality 
confident that, in this area at least, it would not be challenged. This public display of 
humanitarianism and neutrality was enhanced further in 1915 by the agreement to 
allow the exchange of wounded through Dutch ports, and the logical extension of this 
261 
in 1917 to allow POWs to be interned in the Netherlands. In providing a diplomatic 
conduit for Britain and Germany to meet and discuss the welfare of their POWs, both 
in the Netherlands and elsewhere, the Dutch were also adding to the reasons why it was 
indispensable as a neutral and should be allowed to remain neutral. Having made a case 
for neutrality (in certain types of conflict) Ogley goes on to talk about the advantages 
of having neutrals. Commenting on Swiss neutrality in World War Two he says, ' if 
there is to be successful mediation in a conflict, it must come from neutrals'. ' A 
different country and a different war but the principle is easily applied to the 
Netherlands in World War One. It is arguable that Switzerland or Denmark could have 
fulfilled this role just as well. By 1917 both had some experience of internment, but in 
this instance Dutch geography worked to its advantage, situated as it was between 
Britain and Germany. Abbenhuis says `without the credible means of ensuring that the 
Dutch government kept its promises, the country's neutrality would be deemed 
worthless'. ' Internment provided a vehicle for the Dutch to prove their reliability and 
reaffirm their adherence to international law and unbiased neutrality. 
Laporte argues that it was only the need to promote Dutch neutrality that made the 
Dutch government look after the internees to the extent that they did. He argues that 
had there not been a diplomatic advantage to internment, then the quality of life for the 
internees would have been far worse than it actually was. To a certain extent this 
argument is supportable, but it is weakened by the fact that Laporte has only concerned 
himself with Belgian internees and, certainly in 1914 and 1915 when the internment 
camps were being built and organised, the Dutch government had no need to appease 
' Ogley, The Theory and Practice of Neutrality in the Twentieth Century, p. 9 ? 
28 Abbenhuis, The Art of Staying Neutral, p. 263 
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the Belgian government. What is more convincing is Laporte's assertion that the 
Belgian government used the internees as a political tool in its public relations 
campaign against the Dutch government. Using the internees as a political rather than a 
diplomatic tool is one of the few accusations that Laporte does not level at the Dutch 
authorities, which makes his criticism of the Belgian government more interesting. 
Unfortunately, perhaps because of his own position as a military officer, Laporte does 
not distinguish between the policies of the Belgian government and those of the 
Belgian military. In times of war these may be indistinguishable, and certainly 
between 1914 and 1918 the Belgian army had other things to keep it occupied, but after 
1918, as the Belgian government reverted to its 1914 attitude of derision and 
abandonment of the internees, there is no indication of the views of the military. 
In seeking to increase their diplomatic influence with the belligerents by agreeing to 
accept a further 16,000 POWs, the Dutch government also ran the risk of alienating its 
own population. Initially very supportive of the decision to mobilize the army, and 
sympathetic to the plight of the refugees and internees that entered the Netherlands 
after the fall of Antwerp, the people of the Netherlands were now suffering the effects 
of a war that they were not officially involved in. A further 16,000 mouths to feed and 
16,000 more beds to find was a difficult idea for the hungry Dutch to accept, especially 
when those 16,000 came from the two countries which the majority of the Dutch held 
responsible for their hardship in the first place. Lacking the national unity engendered 
in a country at war, the Dutch government had to consider not only their international 
position but also their standing at home. If the war, and its unlooked for impact on the 
Dutch, had continued for longer, then this would have become more of an issue. 
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As the war drew to a close and it became obvious that the Netherlands would not be 
forced to join the fighting; the diplomats that had navigated the Netherlands through 
four difficult years turned their attention to another issue. As the host nation for the last 
two peace conferences there was an expectation, in the Netherlands at least, that The 
Hague would be the venue for the post-war settlement. This was not to be the case. By 
losing out to the French, who wanted the conference to be held at Versailles, the Dutch 
failed to achieve the influential and important role in post-war peace talks that they had 
envisaged. ' Worried by Woodrow Wilson's fourteen points and the priority he was 
placing on self-determination, the Dutch wanted to participate in the Peace conference 
not only because they saw the role of chief European peacemaker as their due, but also 
to ensure that if any self-determination was to be allowed then it should not be amongst 
the Belgians at the cost of any Dutch territory. Fortunately for the Dutch, Belgium was 
also sidelined at the Conference as being too small and insignificant and its wishes 
were also largely ignored. The American president's desire to lower trade barriers was 
another major worry for the Dutch who, after four years of hardship and trade 
embargos did not want to see control of their profitable colonies slip from their grasp at 
the last minute on a tide of new liberal legislation. 30 Had the post-war settlement been, 
essentially, the third Hague peace conference then the diplomatic activity that preceded 
it, the Netherlands' success in keeping both sides talking to each other only a short 
distance from the front lines would have been put into perspective. The 1917 German 
2" The British were also keen for the Peace Conference to be held in a neutral country. Macmillan, 
Peacemakers, p. 35. 
30 Van Dijk, The Netherlands Indies and the Great War, 1914-1918, p. 617-620. For a more detailed 
account of the Woodrow Wilson's impute into the peace conference see Macmillan, p. 12. It is 
interesting, that in this comprehensive book on the months immediately after the end of the war, how 
infrequently the Netherlands is mentioned. 
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British agreement on POWs would, arguably, have been seen as a stepping-stone to the 
final peace treaty. With the eyes of the world in 1919 and since focused firmly on 
Versailles, Dutch diplomacy during the war has been relegated to a domestic issue 
rather than an international one. The Dutch quickly discovered that, post-1918, not 
being a belligerent was a disadvantage. Marginalised and largely ignored, their input 
into the raft of post-war legislation was to reflect on their main contribution to the war 
as a whole. A small, vulnerable neutral that knew a lot about internment. 
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Appendix i 
Dutch Cabinet 1913-1919 
Prime Minister 
Minister of Home Affairs 
Minister of War 
C. van der Linden (29.08.13-09.09.18) 
Jhr. Mr. Ch. R. de Beerenbrouck (09.09.18- 
18.09.22) 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Jhr. Mr J. Loudon 
(27.09.13-09.09.18) 
Jhr. Mr. Dr. H. A. Van Karnebeek 
(09.09.18-00.00.22) 
C. van der Linden (29.08.13-09.09.18) 
Jhr. Mr. Ch. R. de Beerenbrouck 
(09.09.18-18.09.22) 
N. Bosboom (29.08.13-15.05.17) 
Jhr. Mr. B. C. de Jonge (15.06.17- 00.00.18) 
Minister of Finance A. E. J. Bertling(29.08.13-24.10.14) 
Mr. S de Vries Czn (09.09.18-28.07.21) 
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Mr. M. W. F. Treub (24.10.14-08.02.16) 
(22.02.17- 01.09.18) 
Minister of Law 
Minister of Agriculture, 
Mr. B. Ort (29,08,13-00.00.18) 
Industry and Trade Mr. M. W. F. Treub (29.08.13-19.11.14) 
F. E. Posthuma (19.11.14-00.00.18) 
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Appendix ü ow 
Foreign Representatives in the Netherlands 1914-1918 
Germany 
Ambassador 
Military Attache 
Naval Attach6 
Ambassador 
Military Attache 
F. von Muller (01.1908-03.1915) 
R. von Kuhlmann (04.1915-10.1916) 
Dr. F. Rosen (11.1916-05.1921) 
Lieutenant-kolonel Renner 
Korvettenkapiain Von Muller 
Great Britain 
Sir A Johnstone (12.1910-02.1917) 
Sir W. Townley (02.1917-1919) 
Colonel Oppenheim 
Belgium 
Ambassador Baron A. Fallon (07.1910-05.1919) 
Military Attache General Dossin 
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France 
Ambassador H. AIIize (08.1914-10.1919) 
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, Appendix ni Pw 
List of Internment Camps 
Belgian 
Alkmaar Aug 1914 only 
Amersfoort Oct 1914 - Dec 1914 
Assen Oct 1914 - Feb 1915 
Gaasterland Aug 1914 - Dec 1916 
Harderwijk Oct 1914 - Dec 1918 
Heerlen Aug 1915 - Dec 1918 
Kampen Oct 1914 - Jan 1915 
Leeuwarden Oct 1914 - Feb 1915 
Loosduin Oct 1914 - Aug 1916 
Nunspeet Feb 1915 - Apr 1915 
Oldebroek Feb 1915 - Aug 1916 
Zeist Nov 1914 - Dec 1918 
Zwolle Oct 1914 - Jan 1915 
British 
Gaasterland (Used for the crews of Cressy, Hogue and Aboukir only) Sep 1914 
Groningen Oct 1914 - Nov 1918 
Leeuwarden Aug 1914 only 
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German 
Alkmaar Aug 1914 only 
Bergen Aug 1914-Nov 1918 
Special Camps 
Urk Detention camp for persistent Allied escapers used until mid 
1917 but kept open but unoccupied until the end of the war. 
Vlissingen Multi-national prison camp within a normal prison. 
Wierickerschans Officers camp, initially British then German, later used to house 
POWs. 
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Appendix iv 
The Netherlands and Belgium (1910)' 
httD: //etc. usf. edu/maps/1aees/1800/181 1/1811. htm 3. October 2008 
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